1.         The present Revision Petition (RP) has been filed by the Petitioner against Respondent as detailed above, under section 58(1)(B)  of Consumer Protection Act 2019, against the orders dated 08.04.2024 of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Telangana (hereinafter referred to as the ‘State Commission’), in F.A.I.A. No. 2130 of 2023 in FA No. 831/2023 and in FA/831/2023  in which order dated 23.02.2023 of District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as District Commission) in Consumer Complaint (CC) No. 323/2020 was challenged, inter alia praying for setting aside the order passed by the State Commission.

2.         While the Revision Petitioner (hereinafter also referred to as OP/Insurance Company was Appellant before the State Commission and OP before the District Commission and the Respondent (hereinafter also referred to as Complainant) was Respondent before the State Commission and Complainant before the District Commission.

3.         Notice was not yet issued, learned Counsel for the Respondent/Caveator appeared on the first date of hearing i.e. on 18.06.2024.  Learned Counsel for the Respondent stated that they having filed the caveat, takes notice of the case and are ready to finally argue the case.  Petitioner’s Counsel also stated that they are ready to finally argue the case. Hence, Revision Petition was admitted and heard finally on 18.06.2024 itself.

4.         The District Commission partly allowed the complaint filed by the Complainant/Respondent herein vide its order dated 23.02.2023.  Against the said order passed by the District Forum, the Petitioner filed writ Petition No. 14938/2023 on the ground that there was no pecuniary jurisdiction for the District Commission to entertain the complaint.  Hon’ble High Court vide its order dated 20.09.2023 dismissed the Writ Petition with a direction to avail the alternate remedy.

5.         Hence, the Petitioner filed an Appeal before the State Commission. The Appeal was filed with a delay of 193 days.  The State Commission vide order dated 08.04.2024 dismissed the appeal with the following observations:

“ 7. Point:- After a careful perusal of the petition affidavit and counter, we are forced to observe that in the presence of statutory appeal to the State Commission under Section-41 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, the Petitioner/Opposite Party ought not to have expended considerable time in challenging the order of the District Commission by filing the Writ Petition before the Hon’ble High Court on the same grounds of pecuniary jurisdiction which was already answered by the Commission below.

8.  We find that when the statutory remedy is available, the Writ Petition is filed only to circumvent the procedures prescribed and deposits to be made to admit an appeal.  The Petitioner/Opposite Party being an Insurance Company having been involved in numerous consumer cases cannot claim ignorance of knowing the rule procedure and especially when IA No.99/2021 was filed before the District Commission regarding pecuniary jurisdiction.

9.  Therefore, we find the reasons submitted are devoid of merits and there is no substantial material to condone the delay. 

10. In the result, the petition is dismissed.  Consequently, the appeal is rejected.”

6.         Petitioner(s) have challenged the said Order dated 08.04.2024 of the State Commission mainly on following grounds:

1. The State Commission dismissed the appeal on the ground of limitation.The State Commission, while rejecting the application seeking condonation of delay of 193 days, has wrongly held that the petitioner ought not to have expended considerable time in challenging the order of the District Commission by filing the Writ Petition before the Hon’ble High Court on the same grounds of pecuniary jurisdiction which was already answered by the Commission below.

    

2. The allegations in respect to avoiding the statutory deposit is completely baseless and unwarranted.The State Commission has not appreciated that the Hon’ble High Court has granted liberty to the petitioner to avail alternate remedy, therefore, the delay could be condoned in the light of section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

3. The State commission has not appreciated the merits of the case while dismissing the appeal, wherein the total quantum of more than Rs.8 Crores is involved.The meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold without appreciating the merits of the case, has caused great financial loss to the petitioner and undue benefit to the respondent and caused defeat of justice.

4. Even after filing the writ petition, the total delay in filing the first appeal before the State Commission was 193 days, which could be condoned considering the merits of the case.

5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jeevani Devi Vs. Commercial Motors & Anr. [CA No.10120-10121 of 2014, decided on 10.11.2014] has held that the delay in filing the petition should have been condoned and the controversy should have been addressed on merits.The matter was remanded back to this Commission for deciding the matter on merits.

6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manager, Indusind Bank Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Sanjay Ghosh [CA No. 4104 of 2022, decided 17.05.2022] has held that the delay in filing the Appeal was not huge, that should have been condoned under the Consumer Protection Act, 1985.The question of limitation is not to be examined with a view to decline the condonation, but to do substantial justice.

7. In Hemlata Verma Vs. M/s ICICI Prudent Life Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr. [C.A. No. 5131 of 2019, decided on 01.07.2019] held that in the matter of condonation of delay, the Court should take liberal view.The Petitioner also relied upon the judgment passed in Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. [1987 AIR 1353].The Hon’ble Supreme Court has condoned the delay of 67, 135 and 207 days in various consumer cases in order to meet the principle of natural justice and to give the parties to defend their case on merits so that the other party cannot take undue benefit on account of delay in filing the appeal, which shows that the State Commission has passed the order without application of mind and quoting the judgments routinely like in every other case.

8. There is a justifiable reason for condoning the delay of 193 days as the writ petition was pending before the Hon’ble High Court against the final order passed by the District Commission on a pure legal issue.

9. The State Commission has not appreciated that the petitioner has raised a specific defence of non-compliance of 64VB in the appeal, which implies that at the time of loss there was no effective and valid contract of insurance between the parties. Considering the merits of the case, the impugned order is required to be set aside.

7.         Heard counsel of both sides.  Contentions/pleas of the parties, on various issues raised in the RP, Written Arguments, and Oral Arguments advanced during the hearing, are summed up below.

7.1       As the petitioner has repeated most of the averments as stated under the grounds (para 6), hence, are not repeated here. It is contented that the State Commission ought to have considered the application for condonation of delay on the ground that the writ petition was pending before the Hon’ble High Court and the State Commission ought to have decided the matter on merits.  Petitioner has relied upon following judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court:

i)            Jeevanti Devi Versus Commercial Motors & Anr. -Civil Appeal No. 10120-10121 of 2014 decided on 10.11.2014, in which Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside the order of the NCDRC in not allowing delay of 135 days in filing the Revision Petition.

ii) Manager, Indusind Bank Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Sanjay Ghosh- Civil Appeal No. 4104 of 2022 decided on 17.05.2022 in which Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside the order of the NCDRC in not allowing delay of 67 days in filing the Revision Petition, observing that “the question of limitation is not to be examined with a view to decline the condonation, but to do substantial justice.”

iii) Hemlata Verma Vs. M/s ICICI Prudential Life Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr. -Civil Appeal No. 5131 of 2019 decided on 01.07.2019 in which Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside the orders of NCDRC in not allowing delay of 207 days in filing the Revision Petition.

iv) New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Phoenix Overseas Ltd.- decision dated 08.02.2016 of NCDRC in Revision Petition No. 1384/2014 in which NCDRC declined to interfere with the orders of State Commission along condonation of delay of 6 years and 2 months and 23 days in filing the Consumer Complaint.

7.2       On the other hand Respondent contended that Respondent availed Contractor’s All Risk Policy from Petitioner towards execution of Project awarded to the Respondent by THDC Ltd. for certain works to be carried at Indira Nagar Dam, M.P.  The policy was valid upto 25.03.2017, subsequently renewed/extended from time to time.  First incident--Due to heavy rains between 05.08.2016 to 14.08.2016, some damage occurred at the Project site.  After inspecting the damage, loss was ascertained to be Rs.52,69,586/- by NHDC, which was claimed by Respondent falling under excess clause of the Policy.  There was break in the Policy between 24.03.2016 to 16.08.2016 due to delayed payment of 5^th and 6^th instalment premiums due on 24.03.2016 and 24.06.2016 respectively, which were paid by the Respondent on 17.08.2016 at enhanced amount.  As against original stipulated premium of Rs.6,70,391/-, a sum of Rs.6,86,143/- was collected by Petitioner, regularizing the break in the Policy.  With payment of 5^th and 6^th installment on 17.08.2016 and payment of final installment one month ahead of due date, Petitioner received entire premium amount, regularizing the break in Policy and putting the Policy back in force from 17.08.2016.  Second incident—on 22.08.2016, due to unseasonal heavy continuous rain fall the water level in reservoir exceeded the permissible limit forcing NHPC to open the main gates of the dam.  On opening of the flood gates there was substantial damage caused to the project. After intimation about the loss the Respondent raised claim for loss arising from 2^nd incident on 30.03.2017.  Loss assessed was Rs.16.85 Cr.  The surveyor assed the net loss at Rs.8,53,08,762/- against the claim of Rs.16.85 crores.  The Petitioner repudiated the claim on 04.09.2019.  It is further contended that the respondent filed complaint, which was allowed by the District Commission.  The Petitioner filed Review Application, which was also rejected by the District Commission.  It is further contended that the Petitioner instead of availing the statutory remedy of appeal under Section 41 of the Act, filed a Writ Petition on 13.06.2023, before the Hon’ble High Court, which was dismissed on 20.09.2023 in view of the statutory remedy available under the Act.  Petitioner filed Review Petition before the High Court, which was dismissed on 24.11.2023.   The Petitioner filed belated appeal before the State Commission.  The State Commission observed that ‘in the presence of statutory appeal to the State Commission under Section-41 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, the OP ought not to have expended considerable time in challenging the order of the District Commission by filing the Writ Petition before the Hon’ble High Court on the same grounds of pecuniary jurisdiction which was already answered by the Commission below’.  The State Commission rightly  observed while dismissing the Appeal filed by the Petitioner that the Writ Petition is filed only to circumvent the procedures prescribed and deposits to be made to admit an appeal.  The OP being an Insurance Company having been involved in numerous consumer cases cannot claim ignorance of knowing the rule procedure and especially when IA/99/2021 was filed before the District Commission regarding pecuniary jurisdiction.  Hence, the State Commission did not condone the delay and dismissed the Appeal. The Respondent contended that also contended that the petitioner filed IA seeking condonation of delay of 193 days without setting out any sufficient cause or day-to-day explanation for delay. The Respondent has relied upon the following judgments, in support of his contentions regarding limitation and condonation of delay and also the case laws on limited revisional jurisdiction of the National Commission:

1. Cicily Kallarackal vs Vehicle Factory- (2012) 8 SCC 524.

2. Anshul Aggarwal vs NOIDA (2011) 14 SCC 578.

3. M/s Advance Scientific Equip. Ltd. Vs West Bengal Pharma & Photochemical Dev SLP(C) No. 017068-017069 of 2010.

4. Baswaraj and Ors. vs The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81.

5. DDA vs Krishan Lal Nandrayog (2004) 13 SCC 614.

6. Orchid Travel & Tours vs Kamini Chauchan 2023 SCC OnLine NCDRC 937.

7. Nelly Rodrigues Vs IFFCO Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. 2023 SCC OnLine NCDRC 1623.

8. Popat Bahiru Goverdhane vs Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 10 SCC 765.

9. Post Master General & Ors vs Living Media India Ltd. & Anr. (2012) 3 SCC 563.

10. Geeta Kapoor vs Competition Commission of India & Ors. Competition Appeal No. 41 of 2016 [MANU/TA/0045/2016].

11. Pankaj Rai vs Secretary, Competition Commission of India 2020 SCC OnLine NCLAT 1067.

12. Rubi (Chandra) Dutta vs M/s United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2011) 11 SCC 269.

13. Sunil Kumar Maity vs SBI 2022 SCC OnLine SC 77.

14. Rajiv Shukla vs Gold Rush Sales and Services Ltd. (2022) 9 SCC 31.

15. Sharda Associates vs United India Insurance Co. Ltd. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 942.

16.Primary Coop. Agriculture & Rural Development Bank Ltd. vs Anantharamegowda, 2024 SCC OnLine NCDRC 79.

17. India Assurance Co. vs M/s M.R. Filling Station, Revision Petition No. 2538 of 2018 [MANU/CF/0961/2023]

18. M/s. Maruti Suzuki India Limited Vs Rajiv Sharma & Anr., Revision Petition No. 2132 Of 2016 [MANU/CF/0044/2024].

19.   Mehra Bal Chikitsalaya Evam Navjat Shishu ICU Vs. Manoj Upadhyay & Ors. SLP (C ) No. 4127 of 2021 [MANU/SCOR/10842/2021]

20. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. Vs. Aarogyasri Health Care Trust 2018 SCC OnLine NCDRC 1797.

8.         We have carefully gone through the orders of the State Commission dated 08.04.2024. While declining to condone the delay of 193 days in filing the appeal, State Commission has observed as follows:-

“2. It is submitted that the final orders in CC.No.323/2020 was passed on 18.04.2023 and since there was no pecuniary jurisdiction for the District Commission to entertain the complaint, the Petitioner/Opposite Party filed Writ Petition No.14938/2023 which was dismissed vide order dated 20.09.2023 with a direction to avail the alternate remedy. It is their submission that since the Writ Petition was filed and the order was not received, there is no delay in filing the present appeal while availing the provision of Section-14 of Limitation Act. Hence, they pray the delay be condoned.

3. The Respondent/Complainant filed the following objections submitting that there was an interim application filed vide IA.No.99/2021 to decide the grounds on maintainability due to lack of pecuniary jurisdiction and this was decided on merits by the Commission below. They have further urged that the Petitioner instead of challenging the impugned order before this Commission filed the Writ Petition and the Hon'ble High Court rightly dismissed the same with the following observation:

"Filing the Writ Petition on the very same ground of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction is not maintainable in the light of availability of remedy of statutory appeal under Section-41 of Consumer Protection Act, 2019."

4. The Petitioner has not provided any other reasons for condoning the delay and has made the Respondent/Complainant run from pillar to post since 2016 for the claim. Therefore, the application ought not to be allowed.

5. Now the point for determination is whether the delay of 193 days can be condoned?

6. Nobody is examined and no document is marked before this Commission. Heard both sides.

7. Point:- After a careful perusal of the petition affidavit and counter, we are forced to observe that in the presence of statutory appeal to the State Commission under Section-41 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, the Petitioner/Opposite Party ought not to have expended considerable time in challenging the order of the District Commission by filing the Writ Petition before the Hon'ble High Court on the same grounds of pecuniary jurisdiction which was already answered by the Commission below.

8. We find that when the statutory remedy is available, the Writ Petition is filed only to circumvent the procedures prescribed and deposits to be made to admit an appeal. The Petitioner/Opposite Party being an Insurance Company having been involved in numerous consumer cases cannot claim ignorance of knowing the rule procedure and especially when IA.No.99/2021 was filed before the District Commission regarding pecuniary jurisdiction.

9. Therefore, we find the reasons submitted are devoid of merits and there is no substantial material to condone the delay.

10. In the result, the petition is dismissed. Consequently, the appeal is rejected.”

9.         Hon’ble High Court of Telangana in its order dated 20.09.2023 in Writ Petition No. 14938 of 2023 filed by the Petitioner Insurance Company herein observed as follows:

“14. Without referring to merits of the case and rival factual contentions, it is appropriate to take-up the preliminary ground of  maintainability of writ petition in light of Section 41 of Consumer Protection Act, 2019 wherein, against an order of the District Commissioner a statutory remedy of appeal has been provided.

15. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner reiterated the factual aspects contended in the writ petition and further contended that writ petition is maintainable against an order which has been passed without jurisdiction. In support her contention, she placed reliance on the following judgments:

i. Chief Engineer Hydel Project vs. Ravinder Nath reported in 2008 AIR (SC) 1315.

ii. Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. vs. Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Asessing Authority reported in 2023 Live Law(SC) 70.

iii. Radha Krishan Industries vs. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in 2021(6) SCC 771.

iv. Harbanslal Sahnia vs. Indian Oil Corporation reported in 2003(2) SCC107.

v. Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai reported in 1999 AIR(SC) 22.

vi. Dr.Jagmittar Sain Bhagat v.Director of Health Services, Haryana repoted in 2013(10)SCC 136.

vii. Alpha G184 Owners Assoication vs. Magnum Internation Trading Company Pvt.Ltd. reported in 2023 AIR(SC) 2527.

16. A writ petition is still maintainable even though alternative remedy is available, when the wit petition is filed for enforcement of any fundamental rights or whether there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Whirpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai.

17. On the other hand, respondent No.3 relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Cicily Kallarackal (supra) and also order of Division Bench of this Court passed in W.P.No.20141 of 2019. It is relevant to note that the judgments relied upon by respondent No.3 relates to and arising out of Consumer Protection Act, whereas, the judgment relied upon by the petitioner does not relate to matters of the Consumer Protection Act and are general in nature with regard to maintainability of writ petition.

18. It is noteworthy to mention that in the order dated 03.08.2021 in W.P.No.20141 of 2019, the Division Bench of this Court in similar matter arising out of order of State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission relying upon judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Special Appeal to Leave (C).No.4127 of 2021 in Mehra Bal Chikitsava Evan Navjat Shishu I.C.U (supra), order  dated 12.03.2021 and in Cicily Kallarakal (supra) held that writ petition is not maintainable and the Petitioner ought to have invoked the remedies available under the statute against the impugned order.

19. Further, lack of inherent jurisdiction to entertain the case and lack of pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the case are two different aspects. In the present case, there is no dispute with regard to inherent jurisdiction of District Commission to entertain the consumer complaint filed by the respondent No.3. However, principal contention of writ petitioner is with regard to lack of pecuniary jurisdiction and not that of inherent jurisdiction of District Commission to entertain the consumer case. Therefore, the judgments relied upon by the writ petitioner are not applicable to the facts of the present case, since the same are on the point of lack of inherent jurisdiction to adjudicate the matters.

20. Admittedly, the writ petitioner herein filed an application I.A.No.99 of 2021 in CC.No.323 of 2020 for rejection of consumer case on the ground of pecuniary jurisdiction and the said application was dismissed by the District Commission vide order dated 30.11.2021. The Petitioner did not take further steps to challenge the said order and thus, the issue has become final and binding on petitioner. Therefore, filing of writ petition on the very same ground of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction is not maintainable in the light of availability of remedy of statutory appeal under Section 41 of Consumer Protection Act, 2019.

Conclusion:

21. Given the aforesaid admitted factual matrix narrated in the preceding paragraphs, especially, availability of remedy of statutory appeal under Section 41 of Consumer Protection Act, 2019, we are of the considered view that the petitioner ought to have invoked remedies available under the statute against the impugned order passed by the District Commission. Therefore, writ petition is not maintainable and accordingly, writ petition is dismissed, leaving it open to the petitioner to avail the remedies available under statute. There shall be no order as to costs.”

10.       Rew IA No:2 of 2023 in Writ Petition No. 14938 of 2023 was also dismissed vide order dated 24.11.2023 with following observation:

2. By the order dated 20.09.2023, this Bench held that the petitioner ought to have invoked remedies available under the statute against the impugned order passed by the District Commissioner. Therefore, writ petition being not maintainable and accordingly, writ petition was dismissed, leaving it open to petitioner to avail the remedies available under statute.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner insurance company submits that writ petition is still maintainable even though alternative remedy is available, where there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Whirpool Corporation v. Register of Trade Marks, Mumbai. The further contention was that the Hon'ble Bench failed to distinguish the order passed by another co-ordinate Division Bench of Hon'ble Court and dismissed the petition filed by the petitioner herein.

3.1. She would further submit that learned Judges failed to appreciate the principle laid down in Whirlpool Corporation (supra). In addition to the above, at the time of admission of above writ petition, a copy of judgment rendered in V.L. Sujatha v. State of Telangana was passed on to the Hon'ble Division Bench, which was not looked into by the Hon'ble Divison Bench. The learned Judges ought to have observed that V.L. Sujatha matter, which was ruled by the same Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court for the State of Telangana, which is a writ against the State Consumer Commission order, where they relied upon Whirlpool Corporation judgment and Maharashtra Chess Association v. Union of India. The Hon'ble Division Bench in their judgment allowed the writ petition after relying upon the Whirlpool Corporation matter.

3.2. She further submitted that learned Judges ought to have observed that surprisingly this cited Division Bench judgment submitted by the petitioner company was not looked into; not considered and not even mentioned by the Hon'ble Division Bench, but on the other hand, considered another judgment rendered by the same Division Bench that was cited by the complainant company and hence, this impugned order is liable to be set aside. That learned Judges ought to have observed that the difference between inherent jurisdiction and pecuniary jurisdiction that was presented in the impugned order is not laid down in any of the prior judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court, which laid down the principle in this matter.

3.3. She further submitted that when an error which is evident per sefrom the record of the case and the error is self-evident, it is an error apparent. A 5-Judges of Federal Court in Harishankar v. Ananth Nath Mitter, held that ‘however the court disposes of a case without adverting to or applying its mind to a provision of law which gives it jurisdiction to act in a particular way, that may amount to an error analogous to one apparent on the face of the record, sufficient to bring the case within the purview of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC’.

3.4. He further submits that the grounds raised above squarely covers this proposition and it comes an error apparent on the face of the record, which warrants interference by this Hon'ble Division Bench in this review petition.

4. Heard learned counsel for review petitioner.

5. Having heard the contention put-forth by the learned counsel for review petitioner what cannot be lost sight is the scope of interference by this court in a review jurisdiction. The scope of review jurisdiction is by now well settled by a series of judgments by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as by the Hon'ble High Courts. Review can only be entertained in case there is an error apparent on the face of the record. The order passed by this Division Bench against which the review has been sought for, the petitioner has not been able to show any error on the face of the record.

6. The Principle of law to entertain review petition is well settled in catena of decisions, one of the decision in Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation Limited v. Mawasi. Similar view has also been taken by the Hon'ble Supreme court in cases of Smt. Meera Bhanja v. Smt. Nirmala Kumari Choudhary, Lily Thomas v. Union of India, Ajit Kumar Rath v. State of Orissa, Government of T.N. v. M. Ananchu Asari, and Kerala State Electricity Board v. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd..

7. Recently, in Sanjay Kumar Agarwal v. State Tax Officer. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:

“10. It is also well settled that a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so.

11. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi4, this Court made very pivotal observations:—

“9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise.”

12. Again, in Shanti Conductors Private Limited v. Assam State Electricity Board5, a three Judge Bench of this Court following Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi (supra) dismissed the review petitions holding that the scope of review is limited and under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided.

13. Recently, in Shri Ram Sahu (Dead) Through Legal Representatives v. Vinod Kumar Rawat, this Court restated the law with regard to the scope of review under Section 114 read with Order XLVII of CPC.

14. In R.P. (C) Nos. 1273-1274 of 2021 in Civil Appeal Nos. 8345-8346 of 2018 (Arun Dev Upadhyaya v. Integrated Sales Service Limited), this Court reiterated the law and held that:—

“15. From the above, it is evident that a power to review cannot be exercised as an appellate power and has to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions.”

15. It is very pertinent to note that recently the Constitution Bench in Beghar Foundation v. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retired), held that even the change in law or subsequent decision/judgment of co-ordinate Bench or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review.

16. The gist of the afore-stated decisions is that:—

(i) A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record.

(ii) A judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so.

(iii) An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record justifying the court to exercise its power of review.

(iv) In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected.”

(v) A Review Petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise.”

(vi) Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided.

(vii) An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions.

(viii) Even the change in law or subsequent decision/judgment of a co-ordinate or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review.

Xxxx

27. In view of the above stated position, we are of the opinion that the well-considered judgment sought to be reviewed does not fall within the scope and ambit of Review. The learned Counsels for the Review Petitioners have failed to make out any mistake or error apparent on the face of record in the impugned judgment, and have failed to bring the case within the parameters laid down by this Court in various decision for reviewing the impugned judgment. Since we are not inclined to entertain these Review Petitions, we do not propose to deal with the other submissions made by the learned Counsels for the parties on merits.”

8. Re-appreciation of the facts of the case and passing of fresh order by exercising the review petition is not permissible under law. It is well settled principles of law that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of the CPC. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review. The jurisdiction under review does not permit an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected. The mistake apparent on record means that the mistake which is self-evident, needs no research and stares at its face.

9. The review application for recalling the petition can only be entertained if any error of facts or law is apparent on the face of the record, but in the instant case, there is no such error to have been committed by the Bench in the disposal of the writ petition dated 20.09.2023. The judgment i.e., V.L. Sujatha (supra) being referred to by the learned counsel for petitioner was not placed before this Bench during the hearing nor in compilation filed by the petitioner. It is contended that the above judgment was passed on during the hearing at the time of admission before another Bench, of which neither of us are party, moreover, the same is also not on record. Regarding non-reference of judgment purported to have been passed on during the hearing at the time of admission before another Bench will not be ground to review the order passed by this Bench on 20.09.2023.

10. Thus, applying the settled principles of law on review to the facts of the present case, in considered opinion of this Bench, the review application is devoid of any merits and no ground is made out warranting this Bench to review the order dated 20.09.2013. Thus, the Review Application fails and accordingly, dismissed.”

11.       The main question for consideration is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the State Commission was justified in declining condonation of delay in filing the Appeal and dismissing it as barred by limitation. We have carefully gone through the orders of the State Commission, other relevant records and rival contentions of the parties. We have also considered the reasons for delay as contained in the condonation of delay application filed by the petitioner herein before the State Commission in the light of observations of Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Commission in various cases, especially the following:

1. Collector (LA) v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107  

2. G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, (1988) 2 SCC 142 

3. State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 SCC 132 

4. N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123

5. Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao, (2002) 3 SCC 195  

6. Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi Amma, (2008) 8 SCC 321   

12.       In the case of Collector (LA) (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 empowers courts to condone delays to ensure substantial justice by resolving cases on their merits. The term "sufficient cause" is adequately elastic, allowing courts to interpret it in a way that promotes justice, aligning with the judiciary's fundamental purpose. Hon’ble Supreme Court has adopted a liberal approach in condoning delays, noting that litigants usually do not benefit from filing appeals late. Denying condonation can prematurely dismiss potentially meritorious cases, whereas allowing it enables cases to be decided on their merits. The requirement to explain "every day's delay" should be applied rationally. Substantial justice should take precedence over technicalities, as the opposing party does not have a vested right in benefiting from non-deliberate delays. There should be no presumption that delays are deliberate, negligent, or malicious, as litigants risk more harm by delaying. The judiciary earns respect not by upholding technicalities that cause injustice but by its capacity of removing injustice. In the case of G. Ramegowda (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court highlighted an additional consideration in litigations involving the Government. When government appeals are dismissed due to procedural defaults, the public interest suffers, rather than any individual. Government decisions are collective and institutional, differing from those made by private individuals. Consequently, when determining "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is somewhat unrealistic to disregard the unique factors characteristic of governmental operations. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow and hindered by procedural red tape, which should be taken into account in judicial evaluations. In State of Haryana (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the expression "sufficient cause" should be considered pragmatically with a justice-oriented approach rather than through a technical analysis of every day's delay. The court recognized the unique and characteristic factors of governmental functioning and emphasized adopting a pragmatic approach in the justice-oriented process. It asserted that matters should be decided on their merits unless they are hopelessly without merit, and there should not be separate standards for determining sufficient cause for the State compared to private litigants. In the case of N. Balakrishnan (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the condonation of delay is at the discretion of the court, as Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not impose any specific time limit for this discretion. The length of the delay is no matter; rather, the acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. A short delay may be uncondonable without a acceptable explanation, while a long delay can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory. Once a court finds the explanation sufficient, this exercise of discretion should not be disturbed by a superior court unless it was based on untenable, arbitrary, or perverse grounds. However, if the initial court refuses to condone the delay, the superior court is free to reconsider the cause for delay and reach its own conclusion independently of the lower court's decision. The court understands that refusing to condone delay would prevent a party from presenting their case and there should be no presumption that delays are always deliberate. The term "sufficient cause" under Section 5 should be interpreted liberally to promote substantial justice. Recognizing that some lapses are inevitable in every case of delay, the court should show consideration to the litigant unless the delay is found to be deliberate and part of a strategy to gain time. In Ram Nath Sao (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the term "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act or similar provisions should be liberally construed to promote substantial justice, provided there is no negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides attributable to the party. Determining whether the explanation constitutes "sufficient cause" depends on the facts of each case, without a rigid formula. Courts should generally accept explanations for delays and refuse them only exceptionally, especially when no fault can be ascribed to the defaulting party. However, the courts must also consider that a delay might confer a valuable right to the other party, which should not be dismissed lightly. Courts should avoid a pedantic and hyper-technical approach, particularly when significant stakes or arguable points of fact and law are involved, ensuring decisions are made on merit to prevent irreparable injury and loss. Balancing the consequences of their orders on the parties involved is crucial.  In the case of Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court outlined the principles for considering applications to set aside abatement. The Court emphasized that "sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation" should be interpreted reasonably, pragmatically, practically, and liberally, depending on the case's specifics. The term "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should be liberally construed to promote substantial justice, particularly when delays are not due to dilatory tactics, bad faith, deliberate inaction, or negligence by the appellant. The Court noted that it is generally more liberal in considering reasons for condoning delay in applications to set aside abatement compared to other cases. While recognizing that a valuable right ensues to the legal representatives of a deceased respondent when an appeal abates, the Court tends to set aside abatement to decide matters on their merits rather than terminate appeals due to unintended lapses. The critical factor in condoning delay is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of a satisfactory explanation. The degree of leniency shown by the court varies based on the nature of the application and the case's circumstances. For instance, courts are more lenient towards delays in pending appeals than in the initial filing of appeals, and more lenient towards lawyer's lapses than litigant's lapses. Additionally, the Court clarified that lack of "diligence" or "inaction" can only be attributed to an appellant when something required to be done is not done. If nothing is required to be done, the appellant is not expected to be diligent. For example, if an appeal is admitted by the High Court and not expected to be listed for a final hearing for several years, the appellant is not expected to frequently check the case status or the respondent's condition but should await updates from their counsel.

13.       We have carefully perused the order of the State Commission and other relevant facts and are of the considered view that in the given facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court cited, the delay of 193 days in filing the Appeal before the State Commission can be condoned.  Accordingly, we hereby condone the delay of 193 days, set aside the order of the State Commission, remand the matter back to the State Commission for fresh disposal on merits after hearing both sides. Parties may appear before the State Commission on 10.12.2024. Thereafter, State Commission may fix date for hearing on merits.

14.       RP No. 1486 of 2024 is disposed off accordingly. Pending IAs, if any, also stand disposed off.