JUSTICE SUDIP AHLUWALIA, MEMBER

2. The factual circumstances leading up to the present Petition are that the Complainant/Respondent was initially allotted Plot No. 77-D, measuring 156.66 sq. yds., in July 1976. Due to identified construction irregularities, the Ludhiana Improvement Trust (LIT)/Opposite Party/Petitioner required payment of compounding charges amounting to Rs. 910/-, which the Complainant paid on 28.07.1983. After completing other formalities, a Sale Deed was executed in his favour on 13.11.1984. Following a decision by the Land Acquisition Tribunal in 1987, the Punjab Government resolved to charge an enhanced rate of Rs. 34/- per sq. yd. with  15% interest, resulting in an effective rate of Rs. 100/- per sq. yd., as per letter no. 1856 dated 10.02.1999. The Complainant subsequently paid this enhancement, totalling Rs. 15,666/-, on 15.03.1999. However, when he applied for a “No Due Certificate” on 19.08.2014, the LIT demanded an additional Rs. 42,959/- under Memo No. 10790 dated 25.11.2014. This demand was based on a second enhancement following the decision in CWP No. 1599 by the Punjab & Haryana High Court, which raised rates by Rs. 8/- per sq. yd. for Block-B (three-fourths of Kitchlu Nagar's land). Three years after the Court’s decision, the LIT passed Resolution No. 4 on 21.05.2009, setting a new rate of Rs. 199/- per sq. yd., which was publicised in December 2012, after a delay of over three years.

3. The Complainant filed his Complaint with the Ld. District Forum, Ludhiana, on 05.12.2014, disputing the calculation and asserting the correct rate to be Rs. 64.20/- per sq. yd. On 27.09.2016, the District Forum ruled in the Complainant's favour, quashing the demand notice and directing LIT to recalculate the enhancement rate in consultation with the Allottees. The Forum also awarded compensation of Rs. 10,000/- for mental harassment and Rs. 5,000/- in litigation costs.  LIT challenged this decision in Appeal No. 137 before the Ld. State Commission, Punjab, which dismissed the appeal on 04.08.2017, as the LIT’s Counsel could not substantiate the Rs. 199/- rate calculation.

4. Following the State Commission’s decision, the Complainant filed an Execution Application on 04.10.2017. In response, the LIT complied with the Forum’s order by paying the awarded compensation and presenting a revised enhancement rate of Rs. 64.21/- per Sq. Yd. through Resolution No. 13, dated 09.01.2018. However, the LIT also imposed an additional charge of Rs. 20.51/- per sq. yd. as interest for 11 years and 7 months, which the Complainant contends is unjustified, as this delay was due to the LIT’s own lapses. 

5. Despite these resolutions, on 13.08.2018, the LIT issued a new demand notice for Rs. 67,220/-, citing an enhancement rate of Rs. 199/- per sq. yd. plus interest and penalties, referencing the already-dismissed Appeal No. 137. The Complainant replied to the notice on 04.09.2018, requesting withdrawal of the inflated demand within a month, with the LIT bearing responsibility for any resulting damages.  The LIT, however, has not responded or withdrawn the demand. Aggrieved with the deficiency of service on the part of the Ludhiana Improvement Trust, he filed his Complaint before the Ld. District Forum, Ludhiana.

6. The Ld. District Forum vide its Order dated 15.01.2021 allowed the Complaint and directed the Petitioner to accept the enhancement amount of Rs. 10,059/- @ Rs. 64.21/- x 156.66 Sq. Yds., and to pay compensation of Rs. 5,000/- to the Complainant along with Rs. 5,000/- towards litigation costs. The Petitioner then filed its Appeal before the Ld. State Commission, which vide the impugned Order dated 26.02.2021 dismissed the same in limini and affirmed the Order of the District Forum. The relevant extracts of the impugned Order are set out as below -

“14. It is admitted case of the parties that the plot, in question, was allotted to the complainant in the year 1976. Possession of the plot was taken over by him and the Sale Deed was also executed in favour of the complainant on 13.11.1984. The complainant had duly paid the compounding charges of ₹910/-, vide receipt dated 28.07.1983, on account of some irregularities in raising the construction. He also paid the enhanced charges of ₹15,666/- to the opposite party, vide receipt dated 15.03.1999, after the first enhancement made by the Land Acquisition Tribunal in the year 1987. At the time of applying for grant of "No Due Certificate" by the complainant, the opposite party raised a demand of ₹42,959/-, vide Memo dated 25.11.2014, on the basis of second enhancement made, in view of the order dated 02.05.2006 passed by the Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in CWP No. 1599 of 02.05 1996. However, it needs to be noticed that the opposite party had passed Resolution No 4 dated 21.05.2009 to charge ₹199/- per sq.yd. only after expiry of three years of the decision of the Hon'ble High Court. Even the publication notice about said enhancement resolution was published in the newspaper on 12.12.2012, i.e. after more than three and a half years. The opposite party failed to explain the details of calculations to charge 199/- per sq.yd. either in the demand notice or in the publication notice. Therefore, the District Commission, vide order dated 27.09.2016 passed in the earlier complaint filed by the complainant, had quashed the said demand notice dated 25.11.2014, observing the that the opposite party had the right to re-fix the enhance chargeable amount per sq.yd., in view of enhancement made by the Land Acquisition Tribunal and the Hon'ble High Court. The appeal filed by the opposite party against that order was dismissed by this Commission, vide order dated 04.08.2017. During the pendency of the Execution Application filed by the complainant before the District Commission, copy of Resolution No.13 dated 09.01.2018 was produced by the opposite party. As per that Resolution, the opposite party admitted to charge 64.21 per sq.yd. towards enhancement charges. However, it also claimed a sum of 20.51 per sq.yd. towards interest for the period of 11 years and 7 months e. from 01.06.2006 to 31.12.2017. Keeping in view the fact that the earlier demand raised by the opposite party, vide demand notice dated 25.11.2014, was already set aside by the District Commission, vide order dated 27.09.2016 and the demand of interest at the rate of ₹20.51 per sq.yd. has been raised only, vide Resolution No.13 dated 09.01.2018, i.e. after a huge delay of more than 11 years, the charging of above said interest for the intervening period is also not sustainable in the eyes of law, as the opposite party failed to take prompt and accurate action at the appropriate stage immediately after enhancement of the price. The District Commission rightly relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in case Charanjit Bajaj v. State of Haryana 1986 PLJ 601 in this regard. Furthermore there is no default on the part of the complainant, as he had been complying with each and every demand raised by the opposite party, such as compounding fee of ₹910/- paid by him, vide receipt dated 28.07.1983 and enhancement charges of ₹15,666/- paid by him, vide receipt dated 15.03.1999 etc. Therefore, the complainant cannot be forced to pay the interest charges of 20.51 per sq.yd for the intervening period and he is liable to pay only the basic charges of ₹64.21 per sq.yd. for the area of the plot, in question. There is no legal flaw in the impugned order passed by the District Commission…..”

 

7. Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner has argued that the main issue is whether an allottee is liable to pay enhancement charges arising from Court-mandated compensation increases, as stipulated in the allotment letter’s Clause 3. This clause explicitly states that the price of the plot is subject to variation in cases of Court-determined compensation increases, obliging the allottee to pay any such additional amounts within 30 days of demand; Further, the Consumer Fora do not have jurisdiction over issues concerning plot pricing adjustments, as these fall under statutory duties mandated by the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922. Under this Act, any enhancement approved by the High Court obligates allottees to pay the increased charges. It is contended that the Consumer Protection Act’s definitions of ‘complaint’ and ‘deficiency’ do not encompass disputes regarding statutorily set prices and that pricing matters are universally applied to allottees and should not be adjudicated on an individual basis. Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner also argued that because enhancement payments are ultimately governed by the State’s approval, the Complaint should have included the State Government as a necessary party.

8. The Complainant appearing in-person has argued that during the course of proceedings, this Commission vide Order dated 02.09.2021 had directed the Petitioner to pay Rs. 20,000/- to him within four weeks for travel and other expenses. However, he received no such payment by the deadline. Additionally, despite receiving notice from the Registry, he was not served personally; That the Petitioner has acknowledged its miscalculations by amending the enhancement rate to Rs. 85/- per sq. yd. (comprising Rs. 64.21/- as the base rate, inclusive of solatium and 30 years’ interest, plus an additional Rs. 20.51/- as interest for the period 2006–2017). The Punjab Government formally approved this rate, which the LIT notified to all allottees in 2020 as the final amount for the second enhancement. The Complainant has already paid Rs. 10,059/-, calculated at Rs. 64.21/- per sq. yd. per the District Commission's order.

9. We have heard the Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner and the Respondent appearing in-person, and perused the  available material on record.

10. We are of the opinion that the Petitioner has only reiterated its contentions already presented before the State Commission and the District Forum, without justifying any interference with the well-reasoned Orders of both the Ld. For a below. It is seen from the record that the Complainant had booked a plot in the year 1976 and the Sale Deed was executed in the year 1984. The Complainant paid the compounding charges of Rs.910/- on account of some irregularities in raising the construction. Further, Rs.15,666/- was paid by him as enhanced charges in 1999. However, a demand of Rs.42,959/- was raised  after the Complainant applied for grant of “No Due Certificate” on 19.08.2014. 

11. As per Resolution No. 13 dated 09.01.2018 (Annexure P-6, Pg. 72-A of the Paperbook), it is seen that Petitioner admitted to charging Rs. 64.21/- per sq.yd. towards enhancement charges which amounts to Rs.10,059/-. It is seen that the demand of interest at the rate of Rs. 20.51/- per sq.yd. has been raised after Resolution No. 13 dated 09.01.2018 i.e., after a huge delay of more than 11 years. The Petitioner’s failure to promptly and accurately raise demands for enhanced charges and interest within a reasonable period renders the subsequent demand of Rs. 20.51 per sq.yd. as interest (for over 11 years of delay) unjustifiable. Any claim of interest arising on account of the Petitioner’s own delay cannot be imposed on the Complainant. The Complainant cannot be penalized with interest charges when he has consistently complied with all lawful demands made by the Petitioner, including compounding charges and previously enhanced charges, within the stipulated time. The Petitioner’s delayed actions in raising interest demands violate the principles of fairness and reasonableness and such conduct negates the legitimacy of their claim for interest charges.

12. It is also well-established that this Commission has limited jurisdiction to interfere in the concurrent findings of the District Forum and State Commission except for any patent illegality, material irregularity or jurisdictional error. 

13. In “Rajiv Shukla v. Gold Rush Sales & Services Ltd., (2022) 9 SCC 31 decided on 08.09.2022, it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as under -

“In exercising of revisional jurisdiction the National Commission has no jurisdiction to interfere with the concurrent findings recorded by the District Forum and the State Commission which are on appreciation of evidence on record. Therefore, while passing the impugned judgment and order [Goldrush Sales and Services Ltd. v. Rajiv Shukla, 2016 SCC OnLine NCDRC 702] the National Commission has acted beyond the scope and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction conferred under Section 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act.”

14. In “Narendran Sons v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1760, decided on 07.03.2022”; it was observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court inter alia -

“The NCDRC could interfere with the order of the State Commission if it finds that the State Commission has exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise its jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. However, the order of NCDRC does not show that any of the parameters contemplated under Section 21 of the Act were satisfied by NCDRC to exercise its revisional jurisdiction to set aside the order passed by the State Commission. The NCDRC has exercised a jurisdiction examining the question of fact again as a court of appeal, which was not the jurisdiction vested in it”

15. In “Mrs. Rubi (Chandra) Dutta Vs. M/s United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2011) 11 SCC 269 decided on 18.03.2011, it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as under-

“23. Also, it is to be noted that the revisional powers of the National Commission are derived from section 21(b) of the Act, under which the said power can be exercise only if there is some prima facie jurisdictional error appearing in the impugned order, and only then, may the same be set aside. In our considered opinion there was no jurisdictional error or miscarriage of justice, which could have warranted the National Commission to have taken a different view than what was taken by the two Forums. The decision of the National Commission rests not on the basis of some legal principle that was ignored by the court below, but on a different (and in our opinion, an erroneous) interpretation of the same set of facts. This is not the manner in which revisional powers should be invoked. In this view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the jurisdiction conferred on the National Commission under Section 21(b) of the Act has been transgressed. It was not a case where such a view could have been taken, by setting aside the concurrent findings of two fora.” 

16. Similarly, in “Lourdes Society Snehanjali Girls Hostel and Ors Vs. H & R Johnson (India) Ltd. and Ors. ( 2016 8 SCC 286) decided on 02.08.2016”, the Hon’ble Apex Court had observed -

 “23. The National Commission has to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it only if the State Commission or the District Forum has failed to exercise their jurisdiction or exercised when the same was not vested in their or exceeded their jurisdiction by acting illegally or with material irregularity. In the instant case, the National Commission has illegally or with material irregularity. In the instant case, the National Commission has certainly exceeded its jurisdiction by setting aside the concurrent finding of fact recorded in the order passed by the State Commission which is based upon valid and cogent reason” 

17. Again, in “Sunil Kumar Maity Vs. SBI, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 77 decided on 21.01.2022” , it was held - 

“9. It is needless to say that the revisional jurisdiction of the National Commission under Section 21(b) of the said Act is extremely limited. It should be exercised only in case as contemplated within the parameters specified in the said provision, namely when it appears to the National Commission that the State Commission had exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or had failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested, or had acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. In the instant case, the National Commission itself had exceeded its revisional jurisdiction by calling for the report from the respondent-Bank and solely relying upon such report, had come to the conclusion that the two fora below had erred in not undertaking the requisite in-depth appraisal of the case that was required. .....”

18. In view of the reasons noted above, we find no grounds to interfere with the well-reasoned Orders of both the Ld. Fora below.  The Revision Petition is therefore dismissed.  Parties to bear their own costs.

19. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed off having been rendered infructuous.