BEFORE:

HON’BLE MR. SUBHASH CHANDRA, PRESIDING MEMBER          

HON'BLE AVM J. RAJENDRA, AVSM VSM (RETD.), MEMBER

For the Complainants   :       Mr. Aditya Parolia, Advocate

                                        Ms. Sumbul Ismail, Advocate

                                        Mr. Pranjal Mishra, Advocate

                                        Ms. Anvita Priyadarshi, Advocate

For the Opposite Party :       Ms. Laxmi Singh, Advocate

ORDER

PER SUBHASH CHANDRA

1.      This complaint filed under Section 21(a) (i) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (in short, the “Act”) alleges deficiency in service by the Opposite Party in delay in handing over possession of the villa booked by the Complainants in a project promoted and executed by the Opposite Party and prays for the delivery of possession of the villa booked along with compensation for the delay.               

2.     This common order will dispose of Consumer Complaint Nos. 3408 of 2017 and 3409 of 2017 as the facts and grievances in both complaints are similar and relate to the same Complainants and the same project of the Opposite Party.  For reasons of convenience, Consumer Complaint No. 3409 of 2017 is taken as the lead case.

3.      Upon notice, Opposite Party contested the complaint by way of written statement. Complainants thereafter filed their rejoinder.  Parties filed their evidence by way of affidavit. Short synopsis of arguments was also filed by both the parties.

4.      We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the records carefully.

5.      The relevant facts of the case, in brief, are that the Complainants, who are husband and wife, had stepped into the shoes of one Mr. Maneesh Mohan who was an allottee of a villa in the Opposite Party’s project “Signature Villa 2” (previously known as “Bellevue Residences”), Sector 82, Gurgaon on 01.02.2013 by virtue of transfer of allotment in their names that was duly approved by the Opposite Party.  Villa No.29/240/Duplex/BR, which was initially allotted to the said Mr. Maneesh Mohan on 20.01.2012 and was subsequently changed to Villa No.19/240/Duplex/ST-82D1-3 vide Allotment Letters dated 20.01.2012 and 23.02.2012, was transferred, vide letter dated 01.02.2013, in the name of the present complainants. The Opposite Party recorded an endorsement of transfer in favour of Complainants in respect of Villa No.19 from the original allottee, Mr. Maneesh Mohan. A fee of Rs 67,416/- for reassignment of property was paid to the Opposite Party and an Addendum dated 05.04.2013 was executed. 

6.      A Builder Buyer Agreement (in short, the “Agreement”) dated 10.03.2011 had been executed by the initial allottee with the Opposite Party as per which the sale consideration of the said villa was Rs 1,27,09,438/- and as per Clause 11.1 possession was promised within three years from the date of Agreement, i.e. by March 2015.  A sum of Rs 82,76,540/- was paid by the Complainants in various instalments.  However, as possession had not been offered, they have preferred this Complaint on the ground that despite payment of a substantial amount towards the sale consideration and frequent follow-up including reminders, with the Opposite Party to obtain an indication of the status of the project, no information regarding handing over of the villa was being made available.  It was stated that vide another Addendum dated 16.01.2016 executed with the Opposite Party, Villa No.19 had been changed to Villa No. 31 which had been agreed to by them in the interest of receiving early possession.  Earlier, on 05.04.2013 also, the Complainants were reallocated to a new location in view of the dispute regarding the land where the earlier Villa had been allotted to them.  It is contended by the Complainants that in July 2017 it was conveyed by a member of the Opposite Party’s CRM Team in Gurgaon that the date for delivery of the villa had been extended to December 2017. A Legal Notice was issued on 04.08.2017 seeking, inter alia, compliance of the obligations under the Agreement dated 10.03.2011.  However, the Opposite Party, vide its reply dated 23.08.2017, denied the claims and therefore, the Complainants are before this Commission with the prayer to:   

(i)      Direct the Opposite Party to grant possession of Villa No.19 in Signature Villa 2 (earlier referred as “Bellevue Residences”) to the Complainants along with compensation/damages owing to delay, compensation for mental agony and harassment and litigation costs amounting to Rs54,62,520.50/-, Rs2,50,000/- and Rs1,00,000/- respectively;

OR IN THE ALTERNATE, to direct the Opposite Party to refund the entire amount paid along with interest owing to delay, compensation for mental agony and harassment and litigation costs;

(ii)     Award pendent lite and future interest; and

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(iii)    Pass any or such orders as may be deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

7.      During the pendency of these proceedings, learned Counsel for the Opposite Party had filed a Statement of Account as well as letter dated 17.02.2022 had also been issued in Consumer Complaint No.3409 of 2017 in respect of Unit No.HSG-008/Plot No.31/ST.82D1-3/240/Duplex/82D1/Vatika India Next.  A similar letter dated 21.10.2021 in Consumer Complaint No.3408 of 2017 as per which possession of Unit No.HSG-008/Plot No.39/ST.82D-1-3/240/Duplex/82D-1/Vatika India Next was offered to the Complainant. Order dated 21.04.2023 of the Commission also noted that the Complainant was willing to take possession after deposit of the admitted amount and was directed to do so within a period of one month. The Complainants have filed proof of deposit of Rs 80,63,002/- paid on 23.05.2023 towards the final demand to the Opposite Party. During oral submissions it was confirmed by both parties that the balance amount had been paid. However, possession of the villas had not been handed and taken over respectively as a consequence of the order dated 21.04.2023 of this Commission.

8.      In view of the admitted payment of the balance amount by the complainants, the only issue which remains is that of possession and compensation for delayed possession as claimed by the Complainants.

9.      The case of the Complainants, put succinctly, is that the Opposite Party had approved the transfer of the allotment of the villa originally made in the name of one Maneesh Mohan, to the Complainants on 10.03.2011 (on which date the Agreement was also signed) against the requisite transfer fee of Rs 67,416/- which was duly paid. They were requested to accept changes of allotment of villas by the Opposite Party twice on the same terms and conditions of the re-allotment on the assurance that the possession would be handed over. However, the offer of possession was delayed by the Opposite Party without any reason being provided despite several efforts by them to follow up the matter. In view of the delay on part of the Opposite Party, the Complainants filed the instant complaint seeking possession of the villa, or in the alternative, sought refund of the amount deposited with various compensations. In view of possession having been ordered subject to payment of the balance amount, which stands paid, the only issue that now remains outstanding is of the compensation for the delay and other damages as prayed.

10.    Learned counsel for the Opposite Party contended, by way of preliminary objections, that (i) the Complainants were not ‘consumers’ as per Section 2(1)(d) of the Act as they had multiple residences and had booked the villa as an investment and (ii) the complaint did not fall within the scope of a consumer complaint and its IA No. 1516 of 2018 seeking arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was pending. It was contended, on merits, that the delay on its part was due to reasons beyond its control and was attributable to force majeure circumstances on account of (a) delay in finalization of the alignment of GAIL’s pipeline over the subject land, (b) shifting of a defunct 66 KVA electricity line passing over the land in question, and (c) imposition of restrictions by the National Green Tribunal (NGT) over use of ground water and sand for construction purposes in the National Capital Region (NCR) and labour issues. Reliance was placed on the following judgements to contend that the Complainant were not “consumers” under the Act:-

(a) Jagmohan Chhabra & Anr. Vs DLF Universal Ltd, (2007) 4CPJ 199 (NC).

(b)   Manohar Damecha Vs. Lavasa Corporation Limited (NCDRC):2016 (10 CLT 489.

(c)   Dr. Asok Cheriyan Vs. Kerala Trade Centre, (NCDRC)(New Delhi):2017(1) CLT 9.

11.    From the foregoing, it is evident that there is an admitted delay in the handing over of the villa in question. While the Opposite Party has stated that the Complainants failed to deposit the instalments on time, the delay is justified by the Complainants on account of the changes in the villa allotted by the Opposite Party on two occasions and the lack of clarity in the indication of a firm date of the handing over of possession. The cancellation of allotment by the Opposite Party after receiving a substantial amount of the sale consideration and without adhering to its part of the contractual obligations of handing over possession timely has been alleged to be an unfair trade practice. However, the cancellation notice is now of no relevance as the consideration stands paid in view of order dated 21.04.2023.

12.    As for the claim of the Opposite Party that the delay was justified on account of force majeure circumstances, it has failed to bring on record any evidence to establish how these, including the ban by the NGT impacted the project specifically. The argument that the delay was due to force majeure circumstances and factors beyond its control have been considered in light of this Commission’s orders in Anil Kumar Jain & Anr. Vs. M/s Nexgen Infracon Pvt. Ltd., Consumer Complaint No. 1605 of 2018 dated 23.12.2019 wherein it was held that in the absence of any proof to substantiate how the NGT’s orders adversely caused delay in completion of the project in question and impacted the date of handing over of units, such reliance on force majeure conditions was not justifiable. In the present case, opposite party has failed to substantiate its contention with any specific evidence on record as to how the factors cited as force majeure events impacted the instant project and whether any steps to mitigate or overcome them were taken. As per this Commission’s orders in Manoj Kawatra & Ors. Vs. Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd., in CC no.1442 of 2018 decided on 01.11.2021, a developer cannot take shelter under the force majeure clause unless it is able to show that the event was unforeseen and unexpected. In Anil Kumar Jain (supra) it was held that if the NGT had restrained builders from extracting underground water, they were expected to arrange water from alternative sources so as to fulfil their contractual obligation to the flat Buyers. It is not as if no construction took place during the period that the interim order passed by the NGT remained in force. There is no evidence brought on record that transportation vehicles eligible to ply were not available in the market.  Therefore, it cannot be accepted that the Opposite Party could not arrange adequate transportation of building materials including water required for timely completion of the project, and hence these constitute a force majeure event. In the absence of such evidence, mere reliance on a bald assertion is not sustainable and cannot be accepted.

13.    In so far as the issue of the GAIL pipeline and the shifting of the HT overhead electrical line is concerned, the Opposite Party had obtained consent of the Complainants to relocate them to alternate locations. As submitted by the Complainants, they had agreed to the proposal of the Opposite Party on two occasions in the interest of early completion and possession. However, there has been a delay even despite this.

14.    It is apparent from the admitted facts that the villa allotted underwent two changes by the Opposite Party.  The reasons for the re-allotments are reasons now cited as force majeure circumstances. These changes were consented to by the complainants in the expectation that this would enable the Opposite Party to ensure early delivery of the villas booked by them. There is no dispute with regard to payments in as much that the payment towards the sale consideration was paid by the Complainants, including the amount paid subsequent to the order of the Commission on 21.04.2023. Against the stipulated date of delivery of March 2015 as per Clause 11.1 of the Agreement, possession has not been handed over even after orders of this Commission dated 21.04.2023 as per which the balance amount stands paid by the Complainants. Thus, the prayer with regard to handing over of possession, compensation for delay, damages and costs are valid and remain outstanding.

15.    As per the Statement of Account prepared by opposite party placed on record by complainants Rs.1,28,37,757.51 stands paid as on 26.06.2023. This is not contested by the Opposite Party. Therefore, against the sale consideration of Rs.1,35,99,923/- an amount of Rs.1,28,37,757.51 stood received by the Opposite Party on 26.06.2023. On 21.04.2023 before this Commission Opposite Party had agreed to hand over possession subject to payment of the balance amount. As per oral submission on the day of final arguments, it was evident that possession as agreed to be handed over had not been done despite the Complainants depositing the balance amount. Opposite Party, however, contends that a sum of ­­­­­­­­Rs.90,96,936/- towards Sale Consideration is still receivable by it. On the other hand, the Complainants contest this demand on the ground that they are entitled to being compensated for the delay in the offer of possession.

16.    The preliminary objections of the Opposite Party that the Complainants were not ‘consumers’ under the ambit of the Act has been considered. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has in Laxmi Engineering Works Vs P.S.G Industrial Institute, (1995) 3 SCC 583, held that commercial purpose has to be defined on the basis of the facts of each case and laid down that:

….19 the word used in Section 2(1)(d)(i) ‘for commercial purpose’ have to be given a precise and restrictive meaning: commercial purpose has to be distinguished from commercial production and commercial activity. The sub-sections 2(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Consumer Protection Act have to be interpreted harmoniously. The interpretation of the words ‘commercial purpose’ in Section 2(1)(d)(i) must be logical and equitable so as to avoid patent anomalies and inconsistencies in the application of the law. Viewed in this background, the various tests for determining whether the goods have been purchased for a commercial purpose would be:

(i) The goods are not for immediate final consumption but that there is only transfer of goods, i.e., resale.

(ii) There should be a direct nexus between the purchase of goods and the profit or loss from their further disposal. Such a direct nexus is absent when the goods or services are converted for producing other goods or services. After conversion there is no direct nexus between the kind of goods purchased and the kind of goods sold.

(iii) There is nexus of form and kind between the goods purchased and the goods sold. Such a direct nexus of form and kind ceases when the goods undergo transformation or conversion.

In brief the immediate purpose as distinct from the ultimate purpose of purchase, the sale in the same form or after conversion and a direct nexus with profit or loss would be the determinants of the character of a transaction — whether it is of a ‘commercial purpose’ or not. Thus buyers of goods or commodities for ‘self consumption’ in economic activities in which they are engaged would be consumers as defined in the Act.”

The contentions of the Opposite Party that complainants are not ‘consumers’ cannot be considered since the Opposite Party has not established that the Complainants had not purchased the villa for their own use but for the purpose of resale. Further, in the light of this Commission’s order in Kavita Ahuja Vs. Shipra Estate & Jai Krishna Estate Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., I (2016) CPJ 31 (NC), the onus to prove that the Complainants were engaged in the business of real estate and involved in the buying and selling of property lay upon the Opposite Party. Addressing the issue of whether a person who buys more than one residential unit is a ‘consumer’, it was held as under:

….9        In any case, it is not appropriate to classify such acquisition as a commercial activity merely on the basis of the number of houses purchased by a person, unless it is shown that he was engaged in the business of selling and purchasing of houses on a regular basis. If, for instance, a person has two-three children in his family and he purchased three houses one for each of them, it would be difficult to say that the said houses were purchased by him for a commercial purpose. His intention in such a case is not to make profit at a future date but is to provide residential accommodation to his children on account of the love and affection he has for his children. To take another example, if a person has a house say in Delhi but he has business in other places as well and, therefore, purchases one or more houses at other places where he has to live presently in connection with the business carried by him, it would be difficult to say that such acquisition is for commercial purpose. To give one more example, a person owning a house in a Metropolitan City such as Delhi, or Mumbai, may acquire a house at a hill station or a place, which is less crowded and more peaceful than a Metropolitan City, in my view, it cannot be said that such acquisition would be for commercial purpose. In yet another case, a person may be owning a house but the accommodation may not be sufficient for him and his family, if he acquires one or more additional houses, it cannot be said that he has acquired them for commercial purpose. Many more such examples can be given. Therefore, it cannot be said that merely because of the complainant had agreed to purchase three flats in the same complex the said acquisition was for a commercial purpose.

The mere fact of owning multiple properties therefore, does not establish that the Complainants are engaged in the business of real estate. No evidence to this effect has been brought on record by the Opposite Party. The onus of proof has, therefore, not been discharged with evidence and hence this contention does not sustain.

17.    The contention that the complaint was not maintainable in view of the fact that the matter required to be considered under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has also been considered. The Opposite Party’s contention for the adjudication of the matter under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 cannot be sustained in view of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019/1986 being a beneficial legislation and as stated in the Act itself, the provisions being in addition and not in derogation of any other Act in force. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held in Emaar MGF Land Ltd. Vs. Aftab Singh, (2019) 12 SCC 751 that the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is not restrained by the existence of an arbitration clause and that the remedy under the Act is in addition to other provisions under the law. It has also reiterated this view in M/s Imperia Structures Ltd. Vs. Anil Patni & Anr., (2020) 10 SCC 783 decided on 02.11.2010 that “remedies under the Consumer Protection Act were in addition to the remedies available under special statutes (and) the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force”. Hence, this argument cannot be sustained.

18.    It is evident from the submissions and written synopsis filed by the Opposite Party that the delay in the execution of the project is admitted. It is not in dispute that the Opposite Party changed the allotment of villas on two occasions. It is also not in dispute that the Complainants agreed to the proposed change in allotments in the interest of early execution and completion of the project. However, even after the Complainants agreeing to the re-allotments on 20.01.2012 and 23.02.2012, it is manifest that the project was neither completed on time, nor an offer of possession made. The Opposite Party has relied on force majeure circumstances to justify the delay with regard to construction activities. It has not, however, established how these impacted the project specifically or brought out whether it took ameliorative steps to mitigate them. The contentions of the Opposite Party that the project was delayed due to factors beyond its control cannot therefore be accepted.

19.    From the facts of the case it is evident that the Complainants have been waiting for possession of the villa since March 2015. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in Kolkata West International City Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Devasis Rudra, Civil Appeal No. 3182 of 2019 decided on 25.03.2019 that “It would be manifestly unreasonable to construe the contract between the parties as requiring the buyer to wait indefinitely for possession”. In the present case, the delay is of nearly 8 years. The delay of 8 years in offering possession cannot be construed as reasonable. Delay in the offer of possession has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court to be deficiency in service, in Wg Cdr Arifur Rahman Khan & Anr. Vs. DLF Southern Homes Pvt. Ltd., (2020) 16 SCC 512 as under:

……28 A failure of the developer to comply with the contractual obligation to provide the flat to a flat purchaser within a contractually stipulated period amounts to a deficiency. There is a fault, shortcoming or inadequacy in the nature and manner of performance which has been undertaken to be performed in pursuance of the contract in relation to the service. The expression “service” in Section 2(1)(o) means a service of any description which is made available to potential users including the provision of facilities in connection with (among other things) housing construction. Under Section 14(1)(e), the jurisdiction of the Consumer Forum extends to directing the opposite party inter alia to remove the deficiency in the service in question. Intrinsic to the jurisdiction which has been conferred to direct the removal of a deficiency in service is the provision of compensation as a measure of restitution to a flat buyer for the delay which has been occasioned by the developer beyond the period within which possession was to be handed over to the purchaser. Flat purchasers suffer agony and harassment, as a result of the default of the developer. Flat purchasers make legitimate assessments in regard to the future course of their lives based on the flat which has been purchased being available for use and occupation. These legitimate expectations are belied when the developer as in the present case is guilty of a delay of years in the fulfilment of a contractual obligation. To uphold the contention of the developer that the flat buyer is constrained by the terms of the agreed rate irrespective of the nature or extent of delay would result in a miscarriage of justice. Undoubtedly, as this Court held in Dhanda [DLF Homes Panchkula (P) Ltd. v. D.S. Dhanda, (2020) 16 SCC 318], courts ordinarily would hold parties down to a contractual bargain. Equally the Court cannot be oblivious to the one-sided nature of ABAs which are drafted by and to protect the interest of the developer. Parliament consciously designed remedies in the CP Act, 1986 to protect consumers. Where as in the present case, there has been a gross delay in the handing over of possession beyond the contractually stipulated debt, we are clearly of the view that the jurisdiction of the Consumer Forum to award just and reasonable compensation as an incident of its power to direct the removal of a deficiency in service is not constrained by the terms of a rate which is prescribed in an unfair bargain.

20.    It is admitted that the sale consideration of the villa in question was Rs.1,35,99,923/-. An amount of Rs.45,47,708.15 stood paid by the Complainants on 23.05.2023 pursuant to this Commission’s order dated 21.04.2023. As per the statement of the Opposite Party also, a sum of Rs.45,47,708/- already stood paid. Therefore, a total of Rs.1,28,37,757.51 was paid by the Complainants towards the sale consideration as on 26.06.2023. The Opposite Party in its Account Statement admits to have received Rs.1,28,37,757.51 towards sale consideration of Rs.1,35,99,923/-. However, according to the Opposite Party, Complainants are still required to pay Rs.90,96,936/- including holding charges of Rs.32,39,778.50. In other words, a sum of Rs.58,57,158/- is being charged by the opposite party towards interest and overdue amount till 27.06.2023.

21.    In view of the foregoing discussion, the complaint is found to have merits. The Opposite Party is held liable for deficiency in service in the delay in handing over the villa booked by the Complainants. It is also evident that despite the direction of this Commission on 21.04.2023, and the Complainants complying with the directions to it to pay the balance amount, no offer of possession has been made by the Opposite Party. The Opposite Party has also not brought on record whether it has obtained an Occupation Certificate and/or a Completion Certificate from the concerned statutory authority in respect of the villa. The Opposite Party is under obligation to offer possession with statutory clearances in order to convey clear legal title.

22.   The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s Laureate Buildwell Pvt. Ltd., vs Charanjeet Singh in Civil Appeal no. 7042 of 2019 decided on 22.07.2021 held that as the complainant had stepped into the shoes of the original allottee with due endorsement of the opposite party, he was entitled to compensation in the form of interest for delay in possession from the date of such transfer.

23.    In view of the discussion above, the Opposite Party is held liable for deficiency in service in not making an offer of possession and handing over possession of the villa in question within the stipulated period of time or a reasonable period thereafter. It is also liable for the continued delay even after undertaking to hand over possession before this Commission subject to the payment of the balance consideration by the Complainants which was paid on 26.06.2023. Complainants shall pay the requisite dues payable at the time of possession. However, the Opposite Party shall not charge any interest for delayed payment or holding charges in view of the admitted delay on its part.

24.   In view of the foregoing, it is apparent that the opposite has levied holding charges of Rs.32,39,778/- without having made an offer of possession to the complainants. It has also not brought on record any completion/ occupancy certificate to indicate whether he was entitled to make a legally valid offer of possession to the complainant. Levying of holding charges in the absence of an occupancy or completion certificate being on record cannot be sustained. Levying of holding charges can considered to be valid, only if occupation certificate is available and offer of possession made to the allottee has not been acted upon to take the possession. The Opposite Party has failed to establish that in the instant case, he had made an offer of possession based on an occupation certificate which had not been acted upon by the Complainants. In the absence of any evidence relating to offer of possession or completion certificate/ occupation certificate being brought on record by the opposite party, its contention that the complainants were in default in paying the holding charges is not considered to be valid. Further, as regards payment of interest on over dues being levied by the opposite party on the complainants, it is evident that the completion has been delayed. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Charanjeet Singh (supra), the complainants having stepped into the shoes of original allottee on 05.04.2013, were entitled to being offered possession from this date after factoring in 36 months mentioned in the Agreement, i.e., by 04.04.2016. It is further evident that beyond this date, when possession was required to be handed over, no offer of possession had been made by the opposite party. This is despite the complainants having complied with the directions of this Commission dated 21.04.2023 to make necessary payment and to take possession subject to the settlement of other dues/ demands. As held in Wg Cdr Arifur Rehman Khan (supra) the delay in offer of possession constitutes deficiency in service for which the Complainants are entitled for compensation for the delay in the offer of possession @ 6% per annum. We are of the view that the Opposite Party is not entitled to levy holding charges for the reasons stated above. As regards charging of interest on delayed payments, it would appear that the rate levied by the Opposite Party as per clause ‘M’ of the Agreement, i.e.,6% simple interest.  In view of the fact that the Agreement between the parties constitutes a contract the terms of which cannot be altered at this stage, the complainants are liable to pay the same. Complainants are however entitled to seek compensation for the delay in the offer of possession with effect from 01.02.2016 on the deposited amount till that date @ 6% per annum till the date of offer of possession. In view of the fact that the possession has not been offered despite the payment of substantial amount of money as on 24.05.2023, they are also entitled for delay compensation on this amount till the actual date of offer of possession. Therefore, Opposite Party shall pay compensation for the delay @ 6% per annum on this amount till the date of offer of possession. Complainants shall however, pay balance of the dues, if any, as on the date of offer of possession within a reasonable period of time.

25.    Accordingly, the complaint is partly allowed and disposed of with the following directions:

(i)     Opposite Party shall make an offer of possession to the Complainants in respect of the villa in question within 2 weeks of this order along with an Occupation and Completion Certificate.

(ii)    Complainants shall not be liable for holding charges levied by the Opposite Party of Rs.32,39,778/- as no offer of possession has been made. Complainant shall also not be liable for charges towards maintenance for the period till the possession is offered or any interest for the delayed payment for the same reason. The complainant shall also settle all other statutory dues within a period of four weeks as per the demand raised by the Opposite Party in respect of handing over formalities;

(iii)    Opposite Party shall compensate the Complainants by way of interest @ 6% per annum on the deposited amount till the date of handing over of possession, including on the amount deposited on 23.05.2023 within 6 weeks of this order, failing which the applicable rate of interest shall be 9% till realization;

(iv)   Opposite Party shall also pay litigation costs of Rs 50,000/- to the Complainants along with the above;

(v)    Costs of Rs 25,000/- imposed vide order dated 25.07.2024 shall also be paid, if not already complied with;

(vi)   In view of this Commission’s order in New Park Elite Welfare Association vs BPTP Limited an Anr., CC 1395 of 2016, there shall be no deduction towards TDS on any payments.

26.    Consumer Complaint no.3408 of 2017 also stands disposed of in the above terms.

27.    Pending IAs, if any, also stand disposed of by this order.