This appeal has been filed with delay of 768 days. When the matter last came up on 12.10.2012, counsel for the appellant Mr. Chandra Shekhar Yadav was present. He was heard and thereafter, notice was issued to the respondent on the application for condonation of delay. Mr. M.N. Singh, Advocate present on behalf of the respondent-United India Insurance Co. Ltd. 2. When the matter was taken up today, neither any representative of appellant-Uniword Telecom Ltd. nor the counsel Mr. Chandra Shekhar Yadav are present. Mr. S.K. Mohanty, Advocate appears but only to explain that Mr. Yadav is out of Delhi and therefore unable to attend the proceedings. While accepting this information, I find it necessary to record that the counsel for the appellant having known on 20.03.2013 itself that the matter was come up today, had full two months’ notice, yet he has chosen to absent himself without any prior intimation to the Commission. 3. The application for condonation is taken up and respondent counsel heard with reference to the same. He points out that the application for condonation does not mention the date on which the authorized representative of the appellant Shri Kishan Kumar Gogia left the service of the company. The relevant para merely mention, July, 2010. In the background of the fact that the impugned order itself was received on 26.07.2010, it was necessary for condonation to disclose the date of departure of Shri Kishan Kumar Gogia. In the absence of the same, an adverse inference can be drawn that even with his departure in July, 2010, the appellant cannot be permitted to say that he did not come into the knowledge of the impugned order. The application for condonation gives no details of how time was spent between July, 2010 to July, 2012 when it abruptly claims in para-5 that the new Directors came to know of the matter while scrutinizing records of various cases in July, 2012. 4. Para-6 of the condonation application once again makes a part statement when it informs that the certified copy of the impugned order was subsequently obtained on 12.07.2012. There is no mention of date on which application for the copy was moved before the State Commission. However, a perusal of the copy of the impugned order on record would show that the first/free copy of the order f 15.07.2010 would have been received by or on behalf of the appellant on 26.07.2010 itself. 5. From the chronological details submitted by the Registry, it is clear that the computing the time consumed in filing the appeal, with 26.07.2010 as the date of receipt of the order, the total delay in filing the appeal would come to 768 days and not 43 days as claimed in the application for condonation. In fact, the application does not even make an attempt to explain how the delay would be 43 days and the impugned order was passed on 15.07.2010 and the appeal has been filed on 01.10.2012. 6. Condonation of delay is neither automatic nor a matter of right. The law on the subject of delay in the context of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 has been fully enunciated in the following decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court: “In Ram Lal and Others V. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, it has been observed “It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If ‘sufficient cause’ is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If ‘sufficient cause’ shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bonafides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the inquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant.” In Balwant Singh Vs. Jagdish Singh & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 1166 of 2006) decided by the Apex Court on 08.07.2010, it was held: “The party should show that besides action bonefide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the Court without any unnecessary delay. The test is whether or not a cause is sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention. [Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edition, 2005]” In Anshul Aggarwal V. New Okhla Industrial development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), it has been held that “It is also opposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras.” 7. Applying the law laid down above, it is found that the application for condonation fails completely to meet the requirement. Let alone making of genuine effort to explain the delay involved, the application does not even accept the quantum and plays it down by putting an unexplained figure of 43 days quantum of delay. On behalf of the appellant, reliance is sought to be placed on the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. In this decision delivered on 19.02.1987, Hon’ble Apex Court took a view that when substantial justice and technical considerations are taken against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of non-deliberate delay. This was a decision rendered in the context of matter arising under the Limitation Act. In the context of matters arising under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, Hon’ble Apex Court has looked at the matter differently. As observed in one of the decisions cited above, it has been categorically held that the Court has to keep in mind the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. 8. After detailed consideration of the application for condonation and hearing the two sides, the inescapable conclusion remains that the application falls well short of constituting reasonable explanation of this mammoth delay of 768 days. The application for condonation is therefore dismissed; consequently, the first appeal No. 600/2012 stands dismissed. | 
