Order No. 4 Date: 06-04-2017

Sri Shyamal Gupta, Member

Record is put up today for passing order in respect of the petition filed on behalf of the Appellant seeking condonation of delay in filing this Appeal beyond the statutory period of limitation.

It is stated by the Appellant that following pronouncement of the impugned Order, certified copy of the said order was sent to its Legal department by post.  After going through the impugned order, the Legal department decided to make an Appeal before this Commission.  Accordingly, the order copy was further sent to the Ld. Advocate, who was stationed in New Delhi.  The said Ld. Advocate after preparing the draft Memo of Appeal,  sent it through e-mail.  However, due to some technical reasons, the e-mail did not reach its destination and the same was traced following due communication in this regard.  After collecting relevant details/documents from the Corporate Office situated at Gurgaon, the same was compiled and sent to the Legal Department which subsequently forwarded the same to the Ld. Advocate handling the present Appeal for finalizing the Memo of Appeal.  The entire process of collecting relevant documents further took time and hence, the instant Appeal could not be filed in time.

Ld. Advocate appearing on behalf of the Respondent No. 1 vehemently opposed the prayer of the Appellant and prayed for its summary rejection.

Having heard the submissions made on behalf of the parties concerned and perusing the relevant materials on record, we find that this Appeal has been filed with a delay of 169 days beyond the statutory period of limitation.

Before we deal with the issue, for proper understanding, let us first append below some of the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of condonation of delay.

In the decision of M/s. Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG. Co Vs. the Employees State Insurance Corporation [1971 (2) SCC 860], the Hon’ble Court held as under:

"The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to ensure that actions are commenced within a particular period, firstly to assure the availability of evidence documentary as well as oral to enable the defendant to contest the claim against him; secondly to give effect to the principle that law does not assist a person who is inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them when challenged or disputed to remain dormant without asserting then in a Court of law. The principle which forms the basis of this rule is expressed in the maximum vigilantibus, non dermientibus, jura sub-veniunt (the laws give help to those who are watchful and not to those who sleep). Therefore, the object of the statutes of limitations is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within a reasonable time as also to discourage and suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims”

In Ramlal and others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [AIR 1962 SC 361], the Hon’ble Court observed that, ‘It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone’.

          In this regard, reference may also be drawn from the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Anshul Agarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, reported in (2011) 14 SCC 678 and R.B. Ramlingam Vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, reported in I (2009) CLT 188 (SC). 

In fine, “sufficient cause” could not be construed liberally, if negligence in action or lack of bonafides are attributable to the party, praying for exercise of such discretion in its favour, and that what a statute provides for a particular period of limitation, it has to be applied with all its rigors, as an unlimited limitation leads to a sense of uncertainty.

Now coming to the petition under consideration, we find that primarily ‘procedural delay’ has been cited as the raison d'être  for delayed filing of this Appeal.  Significantly, no date has been mentioned when the stated developments with regard to the preparation of Appeal took place.  In absence of mentioning of specific dates and most importantly, due to non-filing of supporting documents, we are virtually left with no such opportunity to ascertain the veracity of Appellant’s claim in this regard. 

It is the settled position of law that day to day explanation should be given in case of delayed filing of an Appeal.  However, for the reasons best known to it, the Appellant has not treaded this path, but most casually prepared a formal application.  It is the settled position of law that ‘procedural delay’ is no ground at all to condone delayed filing of an Appeal.  When the legislative intent behind enactment of this beneficial legislation is to ensure expeditious disposal of cases, thereby ensure timely remedy, it seems, too much liberal view cannot be afforded. 

The delay is quite huge. There being no ‘sufficient cause’ shown, the petition under consideration, in our considered opinion, cannot be allowed.  Consequently, the Appeal stands dismissed being barred by limitation.