Chandigarh

StateCommission

A/105/2022

Sahara Credit Cooperative Society Ltd. - Complainant(s)

Versus

Seeta - Opp.Party(s)

Vaibhav Narang & Nitin Sharma Adv.

01 Aug 2022

ORDER

STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,

U.T., CHANDIGARH

 

Appeal No.	:	105 of 2022
Date of Institution	:	08.07.2022
Date of Decision	:	01.08.2022

 

 

 

1. Sahara Credit Co-operative Society Ltd., Retd. Office: Sahara India Bhawan, 1, Kapoorthala Complex, Aliganj, Lucknow – 226204 through its Managing Director.
2. Sahara Credit Co-operative Society Ltd., SCO 1110-1111, Sector 22-B, Chandigarh through its Branch Manager.
3. Sahara Credit Co-operative Society Ltd., SCO 1110-1111, Sector 22-B, Chandigarh through its Regional Manager Sh. Arun Kumar Singh.

……Appellants/Opposite Parties.

Versus

Seeta wife of Sh. Uday Raj, resident of House No.215, Phase-2, Bapu Dham Colony, Sector, 26, Chandigarh. 

…..Respondent/Complainant.

 

BEFORE:    JUSTICE RAJ SHEKHAR ATTRI, PRESIDENT

                 MRS. PADMA PANDEY, MEMBER

                  MR. RAJESH K. ARYA, MEMBER

 

Argued  by:-      

Sh. Vibhav Narang, Advocate for the appellants (on VC).

 

PER  RAJESH K. ARYA, MEMBER

                 This appeal has been filed by the opposite parties, namely, Sahara Credit Co-operative Society Ltd. (appellants herein) against order dated 07.06.2021 passed by District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission-II, U.T., Chandigarh [in short ‘District Commission’], whereby consumer complaint bearing No.290 of 2020 filed by the complainant, namely, Seeta (respondent herein) has been allowed by the District Commission in the following manner:-

“9.    In the result, the complaint is allowed qua the OPs and the OPs are directed to :-

1. refund the maturity amount(s) to the complainant with interest @ 9% from the date of its maturity till its payment, as mentioned in the table aforesaid.   
2. to pay Rs.15,000/- to the complainant as compensation on account of mental agony and physical harassment.
3. To pay Rs.11,000/- as costs of litigation.

         This order be complied with by OPs within 30 days from the date of receipt of its certified copy, failing which the amount at Sr.No.(ii) shall also carry interest @ 9% per annum from the date of this order till actual payment besides compliance of other directions.”

2.              The brief facts as culled from the impugned order dated 07.06.2021 passed by the District Commission are that on the assurances of the agent of the appellants, the respondent invested a sum of Rs.3,52,770/-  with the appellants and they issued the following certificates dated 23.12.2017 as under:-

Sr. No.	Certificate No.	Deposited Amount in (Rs.)	Date of Maturity	Maturity Amount in (Rs.)
1.	787000479213	1,17,590/-	23.06.2019	1,39,603/-
2.	787000479216	1,17,590/-	23.06.2019	1,39,603/-
3.	787000479217	1,17,590/-	23.06.2019	1,39,603/-
	Total amount	3,52,770/-		4,18,809/-

 

After completion of 18 months, the respondent approached the appellants to release the maturity amount(s) by submitting the requisite documents but they started lingering the matter on one ground or the other.   It was further averred that the appellants failed to release the maturity amount(s) despite his repeated requests/visits, which led to the filing of the complaint before the District Commission alleging deficiency in service and unfair trade practice on the part of the appellants.   

3.              The appellants, in their reply, filed before the District Commission, besides raising some preliminary objections, pleaded that the respondent before opting contribution scheme of the company, duly understood the terms and conditions of the scheme and being a member of the Society, she contributed the amounts in question for furtherance of the objects of the society. It was further pleaded that under the Contribution Scheme, there was no provision of maturity or pre-maturity payment.  It was further pleaded that the complainant was not entitled to get Rs.4,18,809/- with interest etc.  It was further pleaded that as per Clause 12 of the Contribution Scheme Bye-laws, rules and regulation of the Society were binding upon the complainant and the member could avail the benefits of the same scheme as per its terms and conditions.

4.              The impugned order has been assailed by the appellants mainly on the grounds that the respondent, who is member herself in the society cannot be termed as a consumer and the Ld. District Commission has wrongly taken the aid of Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986; that Ld. District Commission has no jurisdiction as the question regarding jurisdiction of Consumer Court i.e. (whether respondent can, in any manner, be treated as a consumer), in such cases is already pending adjudication before Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in CWP No.5008 of 2022 titled as M/s Saharayan Universal Multipurpose Society Ltd. versus State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Punjab and others as well as in CWP No.6813 of 2022 titled M/s Saharayan Universal Multipurpose Society Ltd. versus State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Chandigarh and others; that the Ld. District Commission has not considered that the appellant(s) is a Society formed and duly constituted under the provisions of Multi State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002 (in short ‘the Act 2002’), which in itself provides for rights, obligations, privileges and duties of the Societies and their members and further Section 84 of the Act 2002, specifically provides mechanism for settlement of disputes amongst the societies and their members and that the Ld. District Commission has not considered that the activities of the Society does not fall under the purview of definition of ‘service’ as provided under section 2(42) of the Consumer Protection Act 2019 (in fact Section 2(1)(o) of Consumer Protection Act, 1986) as the respondent never hired any service of the appellants, therefore, the consumer case was not maintainable. Lastly prayer for setting aside of impugned order has been made.

5.              After giving our thoughtful consideration to the contentions raised by the Counsel for the appellants and going through the record and the impugned order very carefully, we are of the considered view that the appeal is liable to be dismissed at the preliminary stage for the reasons to be recorded hereinafter.

6.              First coming to the objection raised by the appellants with regard to the respondent, being the member of the society, cannot be termed as a consumer and the Ld. District Commission has wrongly taken the aid of Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, it may be stated here that we are not in agreement with the contention raised that a member cannot be a consumer vis-à-vis the Society of which she is a member. As a member, she has certain rights in the society like attending its meeting and right to vote. It may also be stated here that a landmark judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court is Lucknow Development Authority Vs. M. K. Gupta, [AIR 787, 1994 SCC (1) 243 ]. Per Section 2(1)(o) of Consumer Protection Act, 1986, ‘service’ means service of any description which is made avail­able to potential users. That case focused on the “services” and not on who was the service provider. It was held by Hon’ble Apex Court that a government or semi-government body or a local authority is as much amenable to this act as any other private body rendering similar service. It further observed that the test to be adopted is not the type of person or authority but it is the nature of duty and function performed by it regardless of status of person and authority. Thus, the relief under Consumer Protection Act is in addition to any other relief under any existing law and the consumer is free to approach Consumer Fora. In the process, Housing Societies have also been branded as service providers and its members as consumers in terms of provisions of the Consumer Protection Act 1986. There is no doubt that since the complainant is a member of the society, she was its consumer and the society was a service provider. Not only this, the Ld. District Commission, while placing reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Secretary, Thirumurugan Co-operative Agricultural Credit Society Versus M. Lalitha (Dead) through LRs and Others, 2004 (1) CLRT 456; that of Hon’ble National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in case Smt. Kalawati and others versus M/s United Vaish Co-operative Thrift and Credit Society Ltd., 2002 (1) CLT 101 and that of Hon’ble Apex Court in Virender Jain Versus Alaknanda Co op Group Housing Society Ltd., Civil Appeal No.64 of 2010 and connected matters decided vide order dated 13.04.2013, rightly observed that the complaint is maintainable and in our concerted view, the respondent is very much a consumer qua the appellants. Thus, the objection raised by the appellants in this regard stands rejected being not sustainable in the eyes of law.

7.              In view of observations made in the preceding paragraph, the contentions raised by the appellant that the Act 2002 itself provides for rights, obligations, privileges and duties of the Societies and their members and further Section 84 of the Act 2002, specifically provides mechanism for settlement of disputes amongst the societies and the activities of the Society does not fall under the purview of definition of ‘service’ as provided under Section 2(1)(o) of Consumer Protection Act, 1986 as the respondent never hired any service of the appellants, are not tenable. Since there is a relationship of service provider and consumer between the appellants and the respondent, the contentions raised stands rejected. The Ld. District Commission, while relying upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Alok Shanker Pandey Vs. Union of India & Ors., II (2007) CPJ 3 (SC), and holding in Para 8 of its order that the appellants, in their written version, clearly admitted that they floated a Scheme amongst its Members and, therefore, the Members who subscribe to the aforesaid Scheme also become its consumers and when there is a fault on behalf of the society in providing its services to its consumers, there is certainly deficiency on the part of the appellants, rightly allowed the complaint of the respondent by directing the appellants to refund the maturity amount(s) to the respondent along with interest from the date of its maturity till payment besides payment of compensation and costs of litigation.

8.              Therefore, in our concerted view, the impugned order, being legal and just, does not call for any interference and the present appeal is liable to be dismissed.

9.              For the reasons recorded above, this appeal being devoid of any merit is dismissed, at the preliminary stage, with no orders as to costs. All pending miscellaneous applications also stands dismissed having been rendered infructuous.

10.            Certified copies of this order be sent to the parties free of charge.

11.            File be consigned to Record Room after completion.

Pronounced

01.08.2022.

 [RAJ SHEKHAR ATTRI]

PRESIDENT

 

 

 

 (PADMA PANDEY)

          MEMBER

 

 

 

(RAJESH K. ARYA)

MEMBER

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