JUSTICE J. M. MALIK, PRESIDING MEMBER (ORAL) 1. Learned counsel for the petitioner present. Arguments heard. 2. The first appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed in default on 18.12.2013. The translated copy of the impugned order runs as under: “Case called out. This appeal is pending since 2003, parties to the case are absent for long time. -2- Appellant does not keep any interest to run the appeal. Appeal is dismissed for non-presence. Order Present appeal is dismissed. Parties to the case would bear the cost of the appeal. Copy of the judgment may be provided to the parties concerned. (C. B. Srivastava) (Bal Kumar) Presiding Member Member” 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that he received the copy of this order on 13.2.2014 and the appeal was filed on 30.7.2014 after the delay of 77 days plus prescribed time of 90 days, total being 167 days. To our mind, the time started running on 18.12.2013 when the case was dismissed in default. The petitioner was aware of that date. There is delay of 193 days. 4. The petitioner has moved an application for condonation of delay. The delay has been explained in paras 4 and 5, which are reproduced as under: “4. That thereafter vide letter 9.07.14 after verification of the order in respect of RPEC-Delhi assigned the cases to file RPs before NCDRC. 5. That as the two offices one at Kanpur 2nd one at the Delhi are involved in decision making process this delay in filing the instant revision petition.” -3- 5. This amounts to procedural and departmental delay. Day to day delay was not explained otherwise the case pertains to Provident Fund. It is required that the pensioners should be treated with kid gloves. However, the petitioner takes enough time to procrastinate the case on one pretext or the other. Moreover, there is huge delay in filing the present revision petition. 6. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ cannot be erased from Section 5 of the Limitation Act by adopting excessive liberal approach, which would defeat the very purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. There must be some cause which can be termed as sufficient one for the purpose of condonation of delay 7. This view neatly dovetails with the Supreme Court authorities in Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), R.B. Ramlingam v. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, I (2009) CLT 188 (SC)= I (2009) SLT 701=2009 (2) Scale 108; Ram Lal and Others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361 and Bikram Dass Vs. Financial Commissioner and others AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1221 and Office of the Chief Post Master General & Ors. Vs. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr. 2012 STPL(Web) 132 (SC). -4- 8. The Apex Court in a recent case i.e. Sanjay Sidgonda Patil vs. Branch Manager, National Insu. Co. Ltd. & Anr., Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 37183 of 2013 decided on 17.12.2013, confirmed the order of the National Commission and refused to condone the delay of 13 days. Likewise, delay of 78 days was not condoned by the Apex Court in the case of M/s Ambadi Enterprise Ltd. vs. Smt. Rajalakshmi Subramanian in SLP No. 19896 of 2013 decided on 12.7.2013. Again delay of 77 days was not condoned in case of Chief Off. Nagpur Hous. & Area Dev. Boa & Anr. vs. Gopinath Kawadu Bhagat, SLP No. 33792 of 2013 decided on 19.11.2013. The case is barred by time, therefore, the revision petition is dismissed. | 
