APPEARED AT THE TIME OF ARGUMENTS For the Appellant | : | Mr. Rahmat Ali, Authorised Representative | | | |
PRONOUNCED ON: 29th AUGUST 2016 ORDER PER DR. B.C. GUPTA, PRESIDING MEMBER The appellant/complainant Phool Chandra Kureel has filed this appeal under Section 19 read with Section 21(a)(ii) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, challenging the impugned order dated 03.05.2016, passed by the U.P. State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, (hereinafter referred to as “the State Commission”), vide which, the Consumer Complaint no. 88/2006, Phool Chandra Kureel vs. M/s. Delhi Development Authority, filed by the appellant/complainant was dismissed by the said Commission on grounds of lack of territorial jurisdiction. 2. The consumer complaint was filed against the respondent, Delhi Development Authority (DDA), saying that the complainant was allotted HIG Flat no. 802, block E-2, pocket 2, Sector- 18B, Dwarka, Delhi by the DDA on 18.04.2011, for which he had submitted an application on 24.12.2010 in response to the advertisement of the DDA in 2010, under self-financing scheme and deposited Rs. 1.5 lakhs by way of demand draft No. 1247498. The demand-cum-allotment letter dated 28.03.2012, issued by the DDA was not received by him, as per the version of the complainant and he obtained a copy of the same, when he filed an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005. The complainant was informed through show-cause notice no. 312 dated 23.01.2013 that because of non-receipt of the balance amount in response to their demand letter dated 28.03.2012, the allotment stood cancelled automatically. The complainant filed the consumer complaint in question, seeking directions to the OP, DDA to hand over the said property to him or allot some other similar flat in the same vicinity, in lieu of, or to refund the entire amount deposited by him alongwith interest. 3. The State Commission, vide impugned order, dismissed the complaint as non-admissible on the ground of territorial jurisdiction, saying that no cause of action had arisen at Lucknow. Being aggrieved against the said order, the appellant is before this Commission by way of the present first appeal. At the time of admission hearing, the authorised representative of the appellant argued that under Section 17(2)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act, the complaint was maintainable with the State Commission at Lucknow, because the cause of action had arisen at that place. He argued that subsections (a), (b) and (c) of Section 17(2) of the Act were not supplemental to each other. Since the allotment letter as well as the letter of cancellation etc. had been sent by the DDA to the address at Lucknow, the cause of action had arisen in Lucknow. The State Commission had, therefore, erred in dismissing the said complaint. In support of the arguments, the authorised representative has produced copies of the orders passed by this Commission in Y. P. Das & Anr. vs. Shimla Development Authority in Revision Petition No. 424/1992, decided on 08.09.1993 and the order passed by the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) in The Secretary, Home Dept., Govt. of Maharashtra vs. Bansidhar & Ors., 1981 LAB. I. C. 833. 4. I have given thoughtful consideration to the grounds of appeal and the documents submitted as well as the arguments led at the time of admission hearing. 5. Section 17(2) with regard to the territorial jurisdiction of the State Commission states as follows:- “(2) A complaint shall be instituted in a State Commission within the limits of whose jurisdiction,— (a) the opposite party or each of the opposite parties, where there are more than one, at the time of the institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or has a branch office or personally works for gain; or (b) any of the opposite parties, where there are more than one, at the time of the institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business or has a branch office or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the permission of the State Commission is given or the opposite parties who do not reside or carry on business or have a branch office or personally work for gain, as the case may be, acquiesce in such institution; or (c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. 6. In this regard, reference may also be made to Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in which it has been stated as follows:- 16. Suits to be instituted where subject-matter situate.-Subject to the pecuniary or other limitations prescribed by any law, suits,- (a) for the recovery of immovable property with or without rent or profits, (b) for the partition of immovable property, (c) for foreclosure, sale or redemption in the case of a mortgage of or charge upon immovable property. (d) for the determination of any other right to or interest in immovable property, (e) for compensation for wrong to immovable property. (f) for the recovery of movable property actually under distraint or attachment, shall be instituted in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situate:” 7. Since the property in question is situated at Dwarka, New Delhi, the consumer complaint could have been filed at Delhi and not at Lucknow. 8. In the present case, it is abundantly clear that the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) has its headquarters at Delhi and it does not have any branch office at Lucknow. It is very clear, therefore, that the complaint in question could not be filed at Lucknow under Section 17(2)(a) or Section 17(2)(b) of the Act. Now coming to Section 17(2)(c), it is to be examined whether the cause of action, wholly or in part, arose at Lucknow in any manner. It is clear that the property in question is situated at Delhi and an application for getting allotment of the said property was also filed with the office of the DDA at Delhi, although the money was sent by the complainant from Lucknow. The fact that the letters of allotment, cancellation or any other correspondence was sent by the DDA to the address of the complainant at Lucknow does not mean that the cause of action had arisen at Lucknow. In so far as the order passed by this Commission in Y. P. Das & Anr. vs. Shimla Development Authority (supra) is concerned, the same does not benefit the complainant at all, because in that case, the application for allotment of the property was received by the Bank at Ambala on behalf of the Shimla Development Authority. This Commission took the view that part of the cause of action had arisen at Ambala. In the other case, The Secretary, Home Dept., Govt. of Maharashtra vs. Bansidhar & Ors. (supra), it was held that service of order of dismissal at a particular place resulted in cause of action and hence, the suit was maintainable at other place. In the present case, the mere receipt of letters regarding cancellation of allotment and other communications does not mean that the cause of action had arisen at Lucknow. It is held, therefore, that there is no illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional error in the orders passed by the State Commission and the same is upheld. This first appeal is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. |
