ORDER

1.   These three Appeals (Executions) No. 84 of 2018, No. 85 of 2018 and No. 86 of 2018 have been filed under section 27A of The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 in challenge to a common impugned Order dated 27.02.2018 passed by the State Commission in I.A. under Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedures (CPC) moved during the course of the E.A.s (Execution Applications) No. 06 of 2014, No. 07 of 2014 and No. 08 of 2014 arising out of three separate Orders dated 24.05.2012 passed in Consumer Complaints No. 223 of 2010, No. 224 of 2010 and No. 225 of 2010.

2.       It appears that three(3) separate complaints No. 223 of 2010, No. 224 of 2010 and No. 225 of 2010 were filed by the complainant-M/s. Aslam Carpets Pvt. Ltd. before the State Commission which were allowed vide its separate three Orders dated 24.05.2012 wherein the opposite parties were directed to deliver the possession and execute the registered sale deed in respect of schedule immovable property in favour of the complainant within eight weeks from the date of receipt of the Order along with the cost of proceedings of the complaints of Rs. 5,000/- in each case. 

3.     In order to get executed the said Order(s), the complainant-M/s. Aslam Carpets Pvt. Ltd. have filed three (03) separate E.A.s (Execution Application) No. 06 of 2014, No. 07 of 2014 and 08 of 2014 before the State Commission. During the pendency of the aforesaid Execution Applications, applicants-N. Muthappa Rai (Since Deceased) through his legal heirs & Anr. filed the I.A.s under Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedures (CPC) to implead themselves as objectors to restrict and obstruct the complainants / D.H.s in obtaining the possession of the subject property in question, which were dismissed vide common impugned Order dated 27.02.2018.

4.       Being aggrieved, now these three (03) Appeals (Executions) have been filed by applicants-N. Muthappa Rai (Since Deceased) through his legal heirs & Anr. before this Commission.  Since the grounds pleaded in all these memo of appeals are also identical and same, these three (3) Appeals (Executions) are hence being decided by this common Order. The Appeal (Execution) No. 84 of 2018 is being taken as a lead case.

5.       Heard the learned counsel for both the sides and perused the record   including inter alia the common impugned Order 27.02.2018 passed by the State Commission and the interlocutory applications (I.A.s) moved under Order 21 and Rule 97 of the C.P.C. by the applicants and the memo of appeals.

6.   It appears that the complaint was filed by the respondent / complainant which was allowed by the State Commission and the following award was passed:

                                                ORDER:

Complaint filed by the complainant is allowed. The Ops are directed to deliver possession and execute registered sale deed in respect of the schedule immovable property in favour of the Complainant within eight weeks from the date of receipt of the Order. The Ops are also directed to pay Rs.5,000/- as costs of this proceedings to the Complainant.

7.   In order to get the aforesaid Order executed the execution application was   moved which was pending before the State Commission, the executing forum. During the pendency of the same, application under Order 21 Rule 97 of the CPC seems to have been filed by the appellant seeking to implead themselves as objectors to resist and obstruct the Complainants / D.H.s in obtaining the possession of the subject property in question. Both the sides were heard and the State Commission did not find any merits in the application and found it fit to reject the same. In Order to facilitate better appreciation and put the things in perspective, the Order dated 27.02.2018 passed by the State Commission may be quoted herein below which read as follows:

27/02/2018

COMMON ORDER ON I.A.

                 As in all the three execution petition Nos. 6, 7 & 8 all of the year 2014 similar application is filed and similar objections are taken up by the decree holders, all the three applications are taken up together for consideration and a common order is passed.

2. Under Order 21 Rule 97 of Code of Civil Procedure the applicants have filed the present application seeking to implead themselves as objectors to resist and obstruct to the decree holder in obtaining the possession of the schedule property of the above petition.

3. In the affidavit filed in support of the said application GPA holder of Objector Nos. 1 & 2 contended that the decree holder is a Private Limited Company registered under the provisions of Indian Companies Act represented by its Director and Jdr. No. 1 is a partnership firm and other Jdrs. are partners of the firm; besides, Jdr. Nos. 4 & 5 are not only the partners, but, also builders and owners of the land bearing survey No. 178/2, Kenchanakuppe Village, Bidadi Hobli, Bangalore District. Further it is contended that for the reasons as detailed in the affidavit, complainant entered into an agreement to sell and construction agreement with Jdr. No. 1 and also narrated in detail with regard to the complaint lodged by the decree holder seeking relief by calling upon the OP to execute and register sale deed and handover possession in respect of the constructed building in the site No. 295 in survey No. 178/2 of Kenchanakuppe Village, Bidadi Hobli, Ramnagar. Further he has also narrated as to service of notice of the said case through paper publication and non- appearance of Jdrs. in the entire proceedings resulting in decree /order dated 24.05.2012 under execution; after filing of execution petition retired partner of M/s. Field Spring Builders telephoned and informed the objectors about the said order of this Commission and learnt that earlier Execution Petition Nos. 29/2012, 30/2012 and 31/2012 were dismissed and thereafter, once again the present execution petitions viz., 6/2014, 7/2014 and 8/2014 are filed.

4. With regard to the right of the objectors it is specifically contended by the said POA holder that Jdr. 1 is M/s. Field Springs Builders, a partnership business and its partners i.e., Jdr Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 are not the partners as on the date of filing of the complaint before this Commission; they retired from the partnership, this applicant / objector Nos. 1 & 2 took over the said firm, to that effect reconstitution of partnership deed was executed by Objector Nos. 1 & 2 and the same has been registered before the Sub-Registrar, Ramanagar on 11.07.2007; reconstitution of partnership deed executed on 26.03.2007.

5. The complainant initiated the present complaint in the year 2010 against Jdr. No. 1 and its partners, but, as on that date Jdr. Nos. 2 to 5 are no longer the partners of Jdr. No. 1, by that time applicant/objector took over the entire firm i.e., M/s Fields Springs Builders; in the proceedings the objector could not appear, likewise, even Jdr. Nos. 2 to 5 as notices were not served on them, besides, the parties were not residing in the address given by the complainant and without service of summons or notice the Dhr. by misleading the Commission obtained the order; Jdr. has lost the right of the property by executing retirement deed in favour of objectors.

6. It is further alleged that before passing of the order dated 24.05.2012, the Decree Holder did not reveal the true fact before this Commission; the Decree Holder ought to have made applicant as party to the complaint; decree holder ought to have filed suit for specific performance by paying court fee, instead filed complaint before this Commission against Jdrs. who are not the owners of the schedule property mentioned in the complaint; the real owners that is this applicants/objectors as on the date of filing of the complaint ought to have been made as parties to the complaint; the complaint ought to have been dismissed; the Commission has been mis-guided by the complainant without revealing the true fact before the Commission to know exactly whether the alleged Jdrs. are the real owners as on the date of filing of the complaint. Further the complainant failed to produce recent partnership deed, whether the Jdr. Nos. 2 to 5 are the same partners who are continuing to be partners or there is any changes in the partnership deed; the complainant initiated on the basis of some unenforceable agreement styled as agreement to sell which is completely time barred. Further it is contended that the Dhr. apart from filing three different complaints before this Commission, the complainants also filed three different suits in O.S. No. 91, 92 and 93 all of the year 2010 on the file of Civil Judge (Jr. Dv.) and JMFC, Ramanagar on 24.05.2010 seeking mandatory injunction directing the Jdrs. to deliver the vacant physical possession of the said property and also for interest at the rate of 24% p.a. on the amount paid and obtained decree from the hands of Civil Judge (Jr. Dv.) and JMFC, Ramanagara directing Jdrs. to deliver and vacate physical possession of the property in question before this Commission etc.; the said order was passed on 19.01.2012 earlier to obtaining order from this Commission; Jdrs. aggrieved by the said order preferred Regular Appeal Nos. 89, 90, 91 all of the year 2013 on the file of Principal Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Ramanagar now pending for adjudication. Further he has stated with regard to difference between M/s. Field Springs Builders and Field Spring Builder Pvt. Ltd. contending that M/s. Field Spring Builders is a partnership firm, whereas Field Springs Builders Pvt. Ltd. is a construction company; as per Ex. C1, agreement to sell dated 29.08.1994 entered into between the Field Springs Builders and decree holders, there are certain conditions to be fulfilled by Dhr. also; Dhr. did not make payment to the Field Springs Builders Pvt. Ltd.; the same is not concerned with the partnership firm etc. Further it is contended that as per condition No. 3 of the said agreement, in case purchaser failed to construct the residential unit on the plot through the builder within 3 years, the purchaser shall be deemed to have opted for termination and consequently, the agreement shall stands terminated and the vendor will be free to deal with the schedule properties and the Jdr. failed to fulfil the condition, hence, the agreement deemed to have terminated by operation of law etc. It is contended by the Objectors that reconstitution of partnership deed executed on 26.03.2007, where in the objector applicants became the new partners and the original partners retired from the partnership firm, the objectors are the real owners and in possession of the schedule properties; the complaint filed in the year 2010 without making real owners as parties to the complaint, orders passed is not enforceable etc. and thus, seeks allowing of the application and the objector applicants may be permitted to come on record to resist and object the dhr. in obtaining possession of the schedule property etc.

7. In the statement of objections filed amongst other pleas it is pleaded that the application filed under Order XX! Rule 97 is not applicable to the present case. Further it is pleaded that all other contentions on merits or otherwise of the case are already adjudicated upon and final order has been passed thereon; the e-mail confirmation sent by the Dhr. calling upon the Jdrs. for registration of sale deed was not acknowledged and OPs did not come forward for registration; finally, notices were served by way of substituted service through paper publication; neither their advocate nor the parties appeared; after a de-nova trial, an ex-parte order was passed; as per the reasons stated in the affidavit accompanying the application, it cannot be called upon for the purpose of interference with the present case. Further it is pleaded that the transaction is taken place during subsistence of the erstwhile partners and the present re- constituted firm does not have power to make the application to comply with the order and the application is liable to be rejected; the averments made in the affidavit does not call for any adjudication etc. and thus, seeks dismissal of the application.

8. Along with the application, applicants have also filed copy of the Constitution of Partnership Deed dated 26.03.2007. On perusal of the same it is seen that though it is contended by the Objector that it is registered on 11.07.2007, on perusal of the document it is seen that the said date refers to Certificate under Section 10A of Karnataka Stamp Act 1957 and the same does not amount registering the document as before sub-registrar.

9. Under Section 63 of the Partnership Act whenever there is change in the constitution of a registered firm by any incoming, continuing or outgoing partners the same shall be intimated to the Registrar of firms of such change or dissolution specifying the date thereof and the Registrar shall make a record of the notice in the entry relating to the firms in the register of firms etc.

10. Under Section 72 of the Partnership Act whenever there is retirement or expulsion of a partner from a registered firm the same shall be notified not only under Section 63 of the Act, but, also by publication in the Official Gazette and in at least one vernacular newspaper circulating in the District. Nowhere the Objectors/ applicants have furnished the due notice or change in the constitution of the firm. In the instant case applicant / objector contends that Jdr. 1/M/s. Field Springs Builders a partnership business and its partners i.e., Jdr. Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 are not the partners as on the date of filing of the complaint before this Commission, they retired from the partnership and this applicant/ objector Nos. 1 & 2 took over the said firm and to that effect reconstitution of partnership deed was executed by the Objector/applicant No. 1 and 2 and the same has been registered before the Ramanagar Sub-Registrar on 11.07.2007 and it is not the case of the objectors that same was duly notified with Registrar of firms and as required under Section 72 of the Partnership Act, public notice was taken in official gazette and in vernacular language in one of the local newspaper. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that such reconstitution was duly notified to the public by the jdr. The contention of the objector that Decree Holders are in the knowledge of involvement of objectors in the firm as evidenced by Ex. C25 and C26 cannot be accepted as due service of notice as nowhere in the Ex. C25 and C26 objectors are stated to be newly inducted directors of the firm and firm was reconstituted. Mere mentioning involvement in its business does not mean that they have become directors of the firm under Re-constitution and firm is reconstituted. Hence, application of the objector / applicant cannot be considered at this stage.

11. Even otherwise, it is seen that as directors of partnership firm they cannot be 3^rd party objector, they stepped into the shoes of the original Jdrs. in which case they have to honour the decree against the firm. With this above observation the above application is liable to be dismissed. Hence, the following:

ORDER

The application filed under Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the objector/applicant is dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs.

Keep the original of the order in E.P.No. 6/2014 and copies thereon in other two cases.

Call on 21.03.2018.

21.03.2018

Counsel for objector files memo seeking suspension of the order for period of one month and opportunity may be given to the objector for the above said reason.

Heard.

On perusal of the order passed on IA it is seen that the application is dismissed. Order cannot be suspended. However, case is adjourned to 19.06.2018.

8.    As the prayer to get themselves impleaded as objectors was disallowed, the appellants felt aggrieved and have filed the present appeal execution under Section 27-A of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

9.   Heard the learned counsels for both the sides and perused the record. 

      At the very outset, learned counsel was heard on the point of maintainability of the appeal execution. A specific query was put to the learned counsel for the appellants regarding the provision of the Consumer Protection Act under which the present appeal executions have been filed. According to the counsel the appeals (executions) have been filed under Section 27-A of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The perusal of the memo of appeal execution also confirms the same fact, as the appeal executions begin with the following language which may be quoted herein below:

APPEAL UNDER SECTION 27A OF THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 1986 FOR SETTING ASIDE OF THE ORDER DATED 27.02.2018 PASSED BY THE HON’BLE STATE COMMISSION, AT BANGALORE IN EXECUTION NO. 6/2014 OF COMPLAINT NO. 223/2010     

10.     Now at this stage, it may be pertinently apt to keep in perspective Section 27A of The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which reads as follows:

          27A. Appeal against order passed under section 27 - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), an appeal under section 27, both on facts and on law, shall lie from -  

(a)    the order made by the District  Forum to the State Commission;

(b)    the order made by the State Commission to the National Commission; and

(c)    the order made by the National Commission to the Supreme Court. 

(2)  Except as aforesaid, no appeal shall lie to any court from any order of a District Forum or a State Commission or the National Commission.

(3)  Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of an order of a District Forum or a State Commission or, as the case may be, the National Commission :

Provided that the State Commission or the National Commission or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days, if, it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days.

          It is too obvious to need any elaboration on the point that the appeal that may be filed under Section 27A of the Act, 1986 must relate to and would lie against the orders which may be passed under Section 27 of the Act, 1986 only. The bare perusal of the Section 27 of the Act, 1986 would show that this Section provides for punishment with imprisonment and fine. The impugned Order that has been passed by the State Commission has already been quoted herein before and a bare perusal of the same is sufficient to demonstrate that it is by no means an order passed under Section 27 of the Act, 1986 which essentially provides for penalties against those who fail or omit to comply with the order made by the concerned commission. Thus the appeal filed under section 27A appears to be a clear overreach impermissible under law.

11.     Having been confronted with the aforesaid legal quandary at this stage, learned counsel for the appellants took a brief interlude in order to seek instructions. After the interlude, learned counsel appeared and with all fairness and grace submitted that the impugned Order under challenge cannot be said to have been passed under Section 27 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. However, she still requested that the Bench may pass an order as it may deem fit as she does not have instruction to withdraw. Learned counsel has further tried to submit that the original order passed by the State Commission relating to which the execution proceedings are going on has not been correctly passed. It has also been submitted that if the complete facts were brought forth before the State Commission, the original Order which is being executed now could have been different and the State Commission would not have passed the Order which it did. Learned counsel has tried to assail the fairness of the complainants and its bonafides who according to the learned counsel, had not brought-forth the complete set of correct facts before the State Commission. The submission is that the appellant ought to have been impleaded in the execution proceedings and the application which was moved under Order 21 Rule 97 of the C.P.C. ought to have been allowed in order to enable the appellants to bring forth fuller facts and expose the incorrectness of the Order under execution.

12.     We have given our careful consideration on the submission made on behalf of the appellant but we feel constrained to observe that the submissions made on behalf of the appellants are not at all sustainable. Unless the order passed by the State Commission is set aside by a superior forum or unless operation of the same is stayed, the same has got to be put into effect and implemented. During the enforcement proceedings or during the execution proceedings that relate to an order which has attained finality or the operation of which has not been stayed by any superior court, it is not permissible to go behind the order. Raising the question of correctness of its findings or otherwise in an execution proceedings will be like putting the cart before the horse. We are not hearing any appeal filed against the original Order dated 24.05.2012 passed by the State Commission in relation to which the execution proceedings are going on. The present appeal execution has actually been filed against the Order dated 27.02.2018 which has been passed on the interlocutory application (purportedly moved under Order 21 Rule 97 of the C.P.C.) during the course of the execution proceedings which were pending in the executing forum, the State Commission. The only provision which confers the right to file an appeal regarding the orders passed during the course of the execution proceedings is Section 27A of the Act, 1986. But this provision, as has already been stated, relates only to the orders that may be passed under Section 27 of the Act, 1986 whereby the conviction or penalties are imposed on the non-compliant defaulter.

13.     It may be observed that the general provisions which provide for filing an appeal against the order passed by the State Commission can also not be resorted to in a matter like this. If the general provisions (Section 19 of the Old Act of 1986 and Section 51 of the New Act of 2019) would have been sufficient to give right to the aggrieved party to file the appeal against all kinds of orders that may be passed by the State Commission, there was no need or requirement to enact Section 27A of the Act, 1986 separately. It may do well to keep in perspective the background that Section 27A in the Act 1986 had been introduced and brought into effect in 2002. The very fact that an independent and separate provision of 27A of the Act, 1986 had got to be enacted to provide for the appeal against the order passed under Section 27 of the Act would sufficiently bring home the point that the general provisions providing for appeal do not relate to execution proceedings or the Orders that may be passed during its course.  In the New Act of 2019 also similar is the position in this regard wherein Section 73 finds its place and which specifically provides to file the appeal against the orders that may be passed under Section 72 of the Act imposing punishment of imprisonment or fine.

A complaint is filed with regard to a consumer dispute and after crossing various stages the same is concluded this way or that way and the consumer disputes gets adjudicated by its final order. If a complaint is allowed, the award is formulated and the decree is passed. The consumer dispute stands adjudicated thereby and a period is put to the same. The provisions which have been provided for ‘enforcement’ and ‘penalties’ do not contemplate adjudication on any consumer dispute anymore which already stands decided. The general provision providing for appeal relates only to the orders which may be passed regarding the consumer dispute or during the course of its adjudication or with regard to the final order which adjudicates the same.  The execution proceedings are not the continuation of the complaint or a consumer dispute and are completely independent of it. It is altogether a separate area which begins after the complaint has already been decided and adjudicated and pertains only to the enforcement of the order and to the penalties which may be imposed for its non-compliance.  

14.     In this context, reference may also be had to certain case laws which are as follows:

(i)        Masomat Narmada Devi & Anr. vs. Ram Nandan Singh & Ors.,

AIR 1987 PAT33

            (ii)        Guntupalli Rama Subbayya vs. Guntupalli Rajamma, 9 AIR1988 AP 226

1.   K.A. Nagamani vs. National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission &  
   • W.P.(C) 1746/2018 & C.M. No.7238/2018

2.   Karnataka Housing Board vs. K. A. Nagamani passed by Hon’ble the Apex

Court in SLP (Civil) No. 6276 of 2019

            While considering the nature of the execution proceedings and the nature of the original proceedings of the suit it was opined by the Full Bench of Hon’ble Andhra Pradesh High Court (supra) that the execution proceedings cannot be regarded as continuation of a suit. Similarly, a full Bench of Patna High Court (supra) too has held that the execution proceedings are not continuation of the suit. The Full Bench decisions given by Andhra Pradesh High Court as well as by Patna High Court have been affirmed by Hon’ble the Apex Court in Karnataka Housing Board Vs. K.A. Nagamani (supra). It may be apt to quote the relevant extract expressing the view taken by Hon’ble the Apex Court in this regard which reads as follows:

7.5.      On the other hand, the Respondent – Complainant has placed reliance on a Full   Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Guntupalli Rama Subbayya v. Guntupalli Rajamma⁹, wherein it was held that :

“Execution Proceedings, in our view, cannot be regarded as continuation of the suit in the sense in which the proceedings in appeal are treated.”

    (emphasis supplied)

7.6.      A Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Masomat Narmada Devi & Anr. v. Nandan Singh & Ors¹⁰., has similarly held that execution proceedings cannot be regarded as a continuation of the Suit.

7.7.      We affirm the view taken by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and Patna High Court. Execution proceedings even though they are proceedings in a suit, cannot be considered to be a continuation of the original suit. Execution proceedings are separate and independent proceedings for execution of the decree. The merits of the claim or dispute, cannot be considered during execution proceedings. They are independent proceedings initiated by the decree holder to enforce the decree passed in the substantive dispute.   

The view taken by Hon’ble Supreme Court lends an authentic imprimatur to the view that had been adopted by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of K.A. Nagamani Vs. National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission & Anr.  whereby it had been held as follows:

38. This Court is also of the view that as nature of enforcement proceedings is materially different from the proceedings for adjudication of the dispute. Any orders passed for enforcement of orders passed by the District Forum, State Commission or NCRDC cannot be construed as orders passed in a ‘consumer dispute’ that stands finally adjudicated.

15.     Keeping in perspective the view taken by Hon’ble the Apex Court in this regard as has been quoted above and also the views taken by various High Courts, we feel buttressed in our view that the orders that may be passed during the course of execution proceedings are on a different footing and cannot be equated to the orders that may be passed during the course of adjudication of the original complaint which stood adjudicated before the execution proceedings commenced. Therefore the general provisions which provide to file an appeal against the orders passed during the course of adjudication of a complaint cannot be brought into application to help the present appellants. Even otherwise if we cast a glance upon the provisions which provide to file the appeal, the language used therein is unambiguous. It may be of use to quote the Section 19 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which reads as follows:

          19.       Appeals.—Any person aggrieved by an order made by the State Commission in exercise of its powers conferred by sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 17 may prefer an appeal against such order to the National Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order in such form and manner as may be prescribed:

xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

            xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

16.     Similarly we may also extract out the relevant provision of Section 51 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 which provides for filing the appeal. It reads as follows:

51. (1) Any person aggrieved by an order made by the State Commission in exercise of its powers conferred by sub-clause (i) or (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 47 may prefer an appeal against such order to the National Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order in such form and manner as may be prescribed:

                xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

            xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

17.     It will not need any elaboration on the point that orders passed under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and the Order passed under Section 47 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 are the orders that may be passed during the course of the adjudication of a complaint and not the orders passed after the completion of such adjudication. The orders relating to which the appeals have been provided under Section 19 of the old Act of 1986 or under Section 51 of the new Act of 2019 do not relate to the orders passed during the course of execution proceedings which commence after the decree has been passed and the award stands finally formulated.

18.     The impugned Order against which the present Appeal Execution has been filed cannot be termed to be an Order passed under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 at all. The impugned Order had been passed during the course of the execution proceedings which are of independent nature and are the proceedings relating to ‘enforcement’ and ‘penalty’ only after the adjudication of the complaint was made complete. We felt persuaded to make this aspect of law clear at some length because it was vaguely suggested at the Bar that even if the present Appeal Execution filed under Section 27A may not be held maintainable then in the alternate, let it be treated to be an appeal under Section 19 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Such sort of proposition as suggested by the learned counsel for the appellants is wholly unacceptable for the reasons that have already been given hereinabove and hereinbefore and certainly does not go very far to help the appellants therefore.  

19 .    In view of the above discussion, the instant appeal executions filed  against the Order passed by the State Commission in the execution proceedings are held not maintainable. With these observations, all three (3) Appeal Executions are disposed of accordingly. 

It may be observed that even though we have held the appeal executions as not maintainable but it should not be construed to have divested the appellants from their right to take recourse to any other legal or constitutional remedy as may be available to them or permissible under law.