Chandigarh

StateCommission

CC/275/2015

Naresh Kumar Sharma - Complainant(s)

Versus

M/s Emaar MGF Land Private Limited - Opp.Party(s)

Pankaj Chandgothia, Adv.

04 Apr 2016

ORDER

STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,

U.T., CHANDIGARH

Complaint case No.	:	198 of 2015
Date of Institution	:	01.09.2015
Date of Decision	:	04.04.2016

 

 

1. Praveen Kumar Arora son of Late Sh.Anand Awarup, resident of House No.14, Type V, Sector 1, Vehicle Factory Estate, Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh.
2. Mrs. Shelly Arora wife of Praveen Kumar Arora, resident of House No.14, Type V, Sector 1, Vehicle Factory Estate, Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh.

 ……Complainants

V e r s u s

Emaar MGF Land Limited, through its Managing Director, Corporate Office 1^st Floor, SCO 120-122, Sector 17-C, Chandigarh.

              ....Opposite Party

Argued by:Sh.A.S. Walia, Advocate for the complainant.

                 Sh.Sanjeev Sharma, Senior Advocate for Sh.Sanjeev              Sharma, Advocate for the opposite party.

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Complaint case No.	:	234 of 2015
Date of Institution	:	05.10.2015
Date of Decision	:	04.04.2016

 

Yogesh Gupta son of Sh.Jagmohan Lal Gupta, resident of Himachal Flour Mills Pvt. Ltd., Tanda Road, Kangra (Himachal Pradesh).

……Complainant

V e r s u s

1. The Managing Director, Emaar MGF Land Limited, Corporate Office, ECE House, 28, Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi-110001.
2. The Manager/Incharge, Emaar MGF Land Limited, SCO No.120-122, First Floor, Sector 17-C, Chandigarh.

…..Opposite Parties

Argued by:Sh.Tribhawan Singla, Advocate for the complainant.

                 Sh. Sanjeev Sharma, Advocate for the opposite parties

                 

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Complaint case No.	:	257 of 2015
Date of Institution	:	02.11.2015
Date of Decision	:	04.04.2016

 

Mrs.Shamlee Singh wife of Mr.Harinderjit Singh, permanent resident of House No.3125, First Floor, Phase-VII, Mohali (Pb.)

……Complainant

V e r s u s

1. M/s Emaar MGF Land Limited, through its Managing Director, having its Registered Office at ECE-House, 28 Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi-110001
2. M/s Emaar MGF Land Limited, through its Branch Head, having its place of business at SCO No.120-122, First Floor, Sector 17-C, Chandigarh.

…..Opposite Parties

 

Argued by:Sh.Gaurav Bhardwaj, Advocate for the complainant.

                 Sh. Ashim Aggarwal, Advocate for opposite parties

                 

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Complaint case No.	:	261 of 2015
Date of Institution	:	03.11.2015
Date of Decision	:	04.04.2016

 

Mrs.Mandeep Saini wife of Sumeet Singh, #2039, Long Leaf Circle, San Ramon, America CA 94582 United States.

India Address:-

#2, Lajpat Nagar, Nawanshahar, S B S Nagar-144514.

 

……Complainant

V e r s u s

M/s Emaar MGF Land Private Limited, SCO 120-122, First Floor, Sector 17-C, Chandigarh-160017, through its Managing Director.

…..Opposite Party

Argued by:Sh.Pankaj Chandgothia, Advocate for the complainant.

                 Sh. Sanjeev Sharma, Advocate for the opposite party            

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Complaint case No.	:	262 of 2015
Date of Institution	:	03.11.2015
Date of Decision	:	04.04.2016

 

Mrs.Pradeep Pabla wife of Sh.Amar Pabla, #4613, Jankela Court, Loindsar N 9G3CM Ontario, Canada.

India Address:-

#2, Lajpat Nagar, Nawanshahar, S B S Nagar-144514.

……Complainant

V e r s u s

M/s Emaar MGF Land Private Limited, SCO 120-122, First Floor, Sector 17-C, Chandigarh-160017, through its Managing Director.

…..Opposite Party

 

Argued by: Sh.Pankaj Chandgothia, Advocate for the complainant.

                 Sh. Sanjeev Sharma, Advocate for the opposite party    

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Complaint case No.	:	268 of 2015
Date of Institution	:	10.11.2015
Date of Decision	:	04.04.2016

 

1. Dr Parvesh Jain son of Mr.Kalbhushan Kumar Jain, resident of Chitrakoot, GRB Market, Opposite Govt. Girls School Khanna (Pb.).
2. Mrs Rosy Jain wife of Dr Parvesh Jain, resident of Chitrakoot, GRB Market, Opposite Govt. Girls School Khanna (Pb.).

……Complainants

V e r s u s

1. M/s Emaar MGF Land Limited, through its Managing Director, having is Registered Office at ECE-House, 28, Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi-110001
2. M/s Emaar MGF Land Limited, through its Branch Head, having its place of business at SCO 120-122, First Floor, Sector 17-C, Chandigarh.

…..Opposite Parties

Argued by:Sh.Sunil Kalra, Advocate for the complainants.

                 Sh. Sanjeev Sharma, Advocate for the opposite parties.

 

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Complaint case No.	:	271 of 2015
Date of Institution	:	16.11.2015
Date of Decision	:	04.04.2016

 

1. Ms. Puran Kaur wife of Mr.V.P. Singh, resident of House No.705, Sector 8B, Chandigarh, U.T.
2. Mr.Gurjit Singh Ghuman son of S.Sawarn Singh, resident of #3146, Boston Street SE, Albany, Oregon, 97322, USA.

Through Attorney:- Inderjit Kaur (sister), wife of S.Sukhwinder Singh Sandhu, resident of House No.212, Sector 21A, Chandigarh, vide GPA dated 30.10.2015.

……Complainants

V e r s u s

1. M/s Emaar MGF Land Private Limited, through its Managing Director/Principal Officer, having its Registered Office at MGF House, 17-B, Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi-110002.
2. M/s Emaar MGF Land Limited, SCO No.120-122, First Floor, Sector 17-C, Chandigarh

…..Opposite Parties

Argued by:Sh.Kabir Sarin, Advocate for the complainants.

                 Sh. Sanjeev Sharma, Advocate for the opposite parties.

 

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Complaint case No.	:	272 of 2015
Date of Institution	:	16.11.2015
Date of Decision	:	04.04.2016

 

1. Mr.Kanwaldeep Kaur wife of Sh.Sukhminder Singh, resident of #100/1, Sector 18A, Chandigarh, U.T.
2. Sh.Sukminder Singh son of Sh.Mohinder Singh, resident of #100/1, Sector 18A, Chandigarh, U.T.

……Complainants

V e r s u s

1. M/s Emaar MGF Land Private Limited, through its Managing Director/Principal Officer, having its Registered Office at MGF House, 17-B, Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi-110002.
2. M/s Emaar MGF Land Limited, SCO No.120-122, First Floor, Sector 17-C, Chandigarh.

…..Opposite Parties

Argued by:Sh.Kabir Sarin, Advocate for the complainants.

                 Sh. Sanjeev Sharma, Advocate for the opposite parties.

=======================================================

 

Complaint case No.	:	274 of 2015
Date of Institution	:	16.11.2015
Date of Decision	:	04.04.2016

 

1. Mr.Isher Singh son of Sh.Harnam Singh, House No.745, Sector 43-A, Chandigarh.
2. Mr.Gurmeet Singh, son of S.Harjit Singh, House No.2794, Phase-VII, Mohali.
3. Mr.Harcharan Singh son of S.Kirpal Singh, House No.272, Phase-VII, Mohali.

……Complainants

V e r s u s

1. M/s Emaar MGF Land Private Limited, SCO 120-122, First Floor, Sector 17-C, Chandigarh-160017, through its Managing Director.

…..Opposite Party No.1

 

2. Panjab Urban Planning and Development Authority, PUDA Bhawan, Sector 62, Phase VIII, SAS Nagar.

              ....Opposite Party No.2

Argued by:Sh.Pankaj Chandgothia, Advocate for the complainants.

                 Sh. Sanjeev Sharma, Advocate for opposite party no.1.

                 Sh.Balwinder Singh, Advocate for opposite party no.2.

 

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Complaint case No.	:	275 of 2015
Date of Institution	:	16.11.2015
Date of Decision	:	04.04.2016

 

Mr.Naresh Kumar Sharma son of Sh.C.R. Sharma, House No.4189, Sector 68, SAS Nagar, Mohali.

……Complainant

V e r s u s

1. M/s Emaar MGF Land Private Limited, SCO 120-122, First Floor, Sector 17-C, Chandigarh-160017, through its Managing Director.
2. Panjab Urban Planning and Development Authority, PUDA Bhawan, Sector 62, Phase VIII, SAS Nagar.

              ....Opposite Parties

Argued by:Sh.Pankaj Chandgothia, Advocate for the complainant.

                 Sh. Sanjeev Sharma, Advocate for opposite party no.1.

                 Sh.Balwinder Singh, Advocate for opposite party no.2.

 

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Complaint case No.	:	282 of 2015
Date of Institution	:	18.11.2015
Date of Decision	:	04.04.2016

 

Rajiv Kumar Mohindroo son of Sh.Baldev Raj Mohindroo, resident of Flat No.204, Tower No.20, Royal Estate, Zirakpur-140603

.……Complainant

V e r s u s

1. Emaar MGF Land Limited, SCO No.120-122, First Floor, Sector 17-C, Chandigarh-160017, through its Managing Director/Authorized Signatory.
2. Emaar MGF Land Limited, ECE House, 28, Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi-110001, through Managing Director/Authorized Signatory.

              ....Opposite Parties

Argued by:Sh.Savinder Singh Gill, Advocate for the complainant.

                 Sh. Ashim Aggarwal, Advocate for the opposite parties.

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Complaints under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

BEFORE: JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.), PRESIDENT.

                MR. DEV RAJ, MEMBER.

                MRS. PADMA PANDEY, MEMBER.

 

PER JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.), PRESIDENT

            By this order, we propose to dispose of, following cases:-

	CC/198/2015	Praveen Kumar Arora	Vs	Emaar MGF Land Ltd.
	CC/234/2015	Yogesh Gupta	Vs	The Managing Director, Emaar MGF Land Ltd.
	CC/282/2015	Rajiv Kumar Mohindroo	Vs	Emaar MGF Land Ltd.
	CC/261/2015	Mrs. Mandeep Saini	Vs.	M/s Emaar MGF Land Ltd.
	CC/262/2015	Pradeep Pabla	Vs.	M/s Emaar MGF Land Pvt. Ltd.
	CC/274/2015	Isher Singh	Vs.	M/s Emaar MGF Land Pvt. Ltd.
	CC/275/2015	Naresh Kumar Sharma	Vs.	M/s Emaar MGF Land Pvt. Ltd.
	CC/257/2015	Shamlee Singh	Vs.	M/s Emaar MGF Ltd. Pvt. Ltd.
	CC/271/2015	Puran Kaur	Vs.	M/s Emaar MGF Land Private Ltd.
	CC/272/2015	Kanwaldeep Kaur	Vs.	M/s Emaar MGF Land Pvt. Ltd.
	CC/268/2015	Dr.Parvesh Jain	Vs.	M/s Emaar MGF Land Limited

 

2.       Arguments were heard in common, in all these cases, alongwith some other complaints against real estate developers namely PUMA Realtors Private Limited, Unitech Limited and Sushma Buildtech Limited.
3.       The issues involved in all these cases, except minor variations, here and there, of law and facts are the same. The primary disputes are with regard to the applicability of Section 8 (amended) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and also, as to whether, when possession of the plot/residential unit was offered to the complainants, development at the site was complete or not and further, as to whether, the transaction, in question, was only purchase of a piece of land, without their being any promise to provide further basic amenities or not. Other issues like, that the complainants were not consumers, as they have invested the money only to earn profit, in future etc. were also raised in all these cases. The objection qua applicability of Section 8 (amended) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was pressed as a preliminary issue, in the reply filed, however, when arguments were concluded on 15.03.2016 and complaint was reserved for orders, the following order was passed. Relevant portion of the order reads thus:-

“Counsel for the parties are in agreement that issue regarding applicability of Section 8 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, be decided when passing order on merits in the complaint”

4.       Under above circumstances, to dictate order, facts are being taken from consumer complaint bearing no.198 of 2015, titled as Praveen Kumar Arora and another Vs. Emaar MGF Land Limited. It is case of the complainants that they hired services of the opposite party by purchasing a plot bearing no.109-MLU-32-300, in Mohali Hills, Sector 109, Mohali, Punjab. An application was moved by the complainants on 07.01.2014. Rs.5 lacs were paid by the complainants, as booking amount. The said plot was allotted in favour of the complainants, vide Provisional Allotment letter dated 10.01.2014 Annexure C-1. Admittedly, the said project is a part of approved Mega Housing Project. Plot Buyer’s Agreement (in short the Agreement) Annexure C-2 was executed between the parties, on 30.01.2014. Total sale price of the plot was fixed at Rs.67,52,100/- which included External Development Charges (EDC), Preferential Location Charges (PLC) etc. For making payment, possession linked payment plan was accepted by the complainants and they were required to make payment of Rs.10,12,815/- by 09.02.2014, Rs.6,75,210/- by 10.03.2014 and the remaining amount of Rs.50,64,075/- at the time of intimation of possession. It is further alleged that as per Clause 8 of the Agreement, after development, physical possession of the plot was to be delivered to the complainants within 18 months from the date of execution of the same (Agreement). It is further stipulated in the Agreement, that, in case, the opposite party failed to deliver possession of the plot within 24 months, from the date of execution of the Agreement, it was liable to pay penalty @Rs.50/- per square yard, per month, for the period of delay. Thus, possession of the plot was to be delivered on or before 29.01.2016. It is stated that vide letter dated 15.01.2015, intimation of possession in respect of the plot, in question, was given by the opposite party stating that possession of the plot, complete in all respects, will be handed over within 60 days, from 15.01.2015.
5.       An amount of Rs.58,50,332/- was demanded by the opposite party, towards various heads, which was paid by the complainants, on 12.02.2015, by raising loan, from the HDFC Bank. In this manner, the total amount of Rs.75,38,355/- was paid by the complainants to the opposite party, towards price of the said plot. However, letter of offer of possession was finally issued by the opposite party, on 19.05.2015. Vide email dated 11.05.2015, the complainants informed the opposite party that they will visit its office, to take over possession of the plot on 21^st/22^nd May 2015.
6.       It is stated by the complainants that, they visited the project site on 21.05.2015, and were surprised to see that main entrance of the same was closed/sealed with barbed wires. On inquiry, it was informed that due to some pending issue with the Government of Punjab, entry to the project, in question, has been restricted. However, the complainants were taken to the site, where the plot is situated, through some alternative/temporary road, which took about 25 minutes to reach there. On reaching the site, it was found that level of the plot was lower than the road level. There was no development at the site. In those circumstances, the complainants refused to take possession of the plot. Various irregularities/deficiencies were pointed out by the complainants, which were brought to the notice of the opposite party, vide email dated 22.05.2015 Annexure C-6. It was clearly told to the opposite party that the complainants would move further for registration and execution of sale deed of the plot, only after rectification of the irregularities/deficiencies pointed out by them. 
7.       It is averred that not only this, later on, it came to the knowledge of the complainants that the opposite party has not even obtained necessary approvals/ sanctions from the Competent Authorities. Approval from the Forest Department was not obtained, as a result whereof, main entrance of the project, in question, has been sealed by the said Department. Even, the plans with regard to natural ground level, sewerage layout, water supply, drainage, electrical and street lighting, in respect of the project, in question, have not been submitted by the opposite party, to the Departments concerned, for approval.
8.       It is averred that in the absence of aforesaid permissions/approvals from the Competent Authorities; development work at the site; and also the fact that main entry points of the project has been sealed by the Forest Department, for want of necessary permission from it, and also litigation is pending before the Civil Court, Kharar, the opposite party issued offer of possession, which has no value. Even, basic amenities such as club house etc. are  not in sight.
9.       When the grievance of the complainants was not redressed, left with no alternative, they, vide email dated 30.06.2015, sought refund of the amount deposited, but the opposite party failed to do so. By stating as above, refund of the amount deposited was sought, besides claiming compensation for mental and physical harassment and litigation expenses, by way of filing the instant complaint.
10.       Upon notice, reply was filed by the opposite party, taking numerous preliminary objections, stating that in view of issuance of notice of offer of possession dated 19.05.2015, this complaint has become infructuous and that in the face of existence of arbitration clause in the Agreement to settle disputes between the parties, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the same (complaint). To say so, reliance was placed on Clause 42 of the Agreement. It is averred that as per Clause 8 of the Agreement, possession of the plot was to be delivered within a maximum period of 24 months i.e. by 29.01.2016, whereas, since intimation of possession was, for the first time, given on 15.01.2015, and, thereafter, it was offered on 19.05.2015, as such, the complaint having been filed on 01.09.2015 i.e. before 29.01.2016 (the promised date), is premature. It is further stated that the complainants are not consumers, as there was no promise to provide any service, as alleged and also disputes with regard to housing/ construction, did not fall within the ambit of Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (in short 1986 Act). It is also asserted that the plot, in question, was purchased for future gain, as such, the complainants would not fall within definition of a consumer, as defined under Section 2 (1) (d) of 1986 Act. It is further stated that since the plot, in question, is situated in Mohali, as such, this Commission has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain this complaint. It is averred that jurisdiction issues be decided as preliminary issues and only thereafter, decision be taken on merits.
11.       On merits, it is admitted that the complainants had purchased a plot, from the opposite party. Fact qua basic price of the plot, as mentioned in the complaint is admitted. Charges qua EDC, PLC etc. were also admitted, as a matter of record. The amount paid by the complainants, as mentioned in the complaint was not disputed. It is stated that the complainants had made timely payments, which meant that they were satisfied with the development work, being carried out, at the site, at the relevant time. It is averred that it appears that the present complaint has been filed by the complainants, only to harass the opposite party, as it (opposite party) had refused to give discount to the complainants, sought by them. Offer to handover physical possession of the plot was made after completion of development work at the site. It is stated that amount demanded from the complainants towards club is only with regard to its membership charges and not towards its development. Qua non-availability of completion certificate, it is stated that the opposite party had already obtained partial completion certificate, in respect of the project, in question. It is further stated that otherwise also, the project, in question, was exempted under the provisions of Punjab Apartment and Property Regulation Act, 1995. However, it is frankly admitted by the opposite party, in its written reply that the Forest Department has served notice upon it, on account of illegal access having been created through the Forest land. It is stated that the opposite party had applied permission to the Forest Department vide letter dated 10.01.2014, to allow access from main entry, but the same was refused by it, vide letter dated 18.11.2014, on account of pending litigation, before the Civil Court, Kharar. It is further stated that, thereafter, vide letter dated 15.04.2015, the opposite party requested the Chief Administrator, GMADA, to take up the said issue, with the Forest Department, however, despite that, it (Forest Department) sealed entry points of the project, in question. It is also frankly admitted that certain permissions with regard to sewerage, storm water drainage and water supply lines, electricity etc. are pending to be given by the Competent Authorities,  which the opposite party had already applied for. It is averred that many allotteess have taken over possession of the plots in the said project, and after construction of houses, are residing therein. It is prayed that the complaint having no substance, be dismissed.
12.       In the rejoinder filed by the complainants, they reiterated all the averments, contained in the complaint and repudiated those, contained in the written version of the opposite party.
13.       The parties led evidence in support of their cases, alongwith which, number of documents were attached. 
14.       On completion of the proceedings, arguments of the parties in all the cases, were heard, in detail. Though in some cases, alternative relief i.e. either delivery of possession of the unit or refund was sought, yet, at the time of final arguments, request with regard to refund of the deposited amount was only made, by Counsel for the complainant(s) concerned.
15.        Counsel for the complainants has addressed his arguments, in terms of the facts stated in earlier part of this order. It is further stated that within the period of 18 months to provide possession of plot, development was not completed at the site, possession could have been delayed further by 06 months, only if there existed force majeure circumstances, delaying providing of infrastructure at the site and further that amended provisions of Section 8 of 1996 Act, are not applicable in the face of existence of Section 3 of 1986 Act. Many more arguments were addressed, which will be referred to, in the later part of this order.
16.       Sh. Sanjeev Sharma, Senior Advocate, on behalf of the opposite party/builder, has vehemently contended that in the face of existence of arbitration clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint. It was further argued that, may be, taking note of un-amended provisions of Section 8 of 1996 Act vis-à-vis Section 3 of 1986 Act, it had earlier been said that the Consumer Foras have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint, as Section 3 provides additional remedy to the consumers and existence of arbitration clause in the agreement would not bar jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras, however, with amendment in Section 8 of the 1996 Act, position has changed. In a way, he made an attempt to say that amendment in Section 8 of 1996 Act, leaves no power, with the Consumer Foras to entertain any consumer complaint, in cases, wherein provisions for settlement of disputes is provided through arbitration. To buttress his arguments, he has referred to Clause 42 of the Agreement, which reads thus:-

“In the event of any dispute arising out of or touching upon or in relation to the terms of this Agreement or its termination, including the interpretation and validity thereof and the respective rights and obligations of the Parties shall be settled amicably by mutual discussion, failing which the same shall be settled through arbitration of an Arbitrator to be appointed the Company. The arbitration proceedings shall be governed by the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, or any statutory amendments, modifications or re-enactment thereof for the time being in force and shall be held at New Delhi. The Courts at Mohali alone shall have the territorial jurisdiction in all matters arising out of/touching and/or concerning this Agreement”.

17.       He further argued that the Agreement was only to sell a piece of land, without making any further promise to provide facilities like water, electricity, sewerage, roads etc. No service was to be provided by the opposite party to the complainants. In the alternative, he asserted that, of its own, the opposite party provided many facilities like construction of link roads, laying down sewerage, electricity, water and harvesting lines etc., however, the same would not mean that there was any undertaking to provide those facilities. He submitted that development was complete at the spot, when possession was offered to the complainants on 19.05.2015.
18.       Above arguments were controverted by Counsel for the complainants, in rebuttal.
19.       The principal question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, in the face of existence of arbitration clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of  1996 Act, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint. It may be stated here that under similar circumstances, in a case titled as Abha Arora Vs. Puma Realtors Pvt. Ltd. and another, consumer complaint No.170 of 2015, decided on 01.04.2016, this Commission, brushed aside above argument, raised by Senior Counsel for the builder, while holding as under:-

 

“24 Before dealing with the legal issues, it is necessary to note down amended and unamended provisions of Section 8 of 1996 Act and other provisions, which were added in the 1996 Act (principal Act), by the Arbitration and Conciliation Amendment Act, 2015, which was signed by the Hon’ble President of India on 31.12.2015.

            Unamended provisions of Section 8 of 1996 Act, reads thus:-

“8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement.—

(1) A judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration.

(2) The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof.

(3) Notwithstanding that an application has been made under sub-section (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued and an arbitral award made.”

25.        After amendment, Section 8 of 1996 Act, reads as under:-

“8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement.—

(1) A judicial authority, before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming through or under him, so applies not later than the date of submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, then, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of the Supreme Court or any Court, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that prima facie no valid arbitration agreement exists.”

26. The provisions which needs interpretation/ explanation, as added in the principal Act, have been underlined, in the above extracted paragraph. Vide the 2015 Act, in principal Act, Fourth Schedule was added with it, scale of fee, to be charged by an Arbitrator has been prescribed. Besides as above, by making amendment in Section 11 of 1996 Act, it is provided that any application of the contesting parties to appoint an Arbitrator is to be decided by the High Court/its nominee expeditiously as possible and an effort be made to dispose of the same, within 60 days, from the date of service of notice upon the opposite party. Further, by making an amendment in the principal Act, Section 29 A has been added providing that an Arbitrator is supposed to make an award within 6 months from the date the Arbitral Tribunal enters upon the reference. There is a provision for extending the time period for 6 months more, with consent of the parties. Thereafter, the Court has been given power to extend it, in case of need. As per Section 34 of 1996 Act, the award so passed, can be challenged before the Court. As per amended provisions added in the principal Act, the Court is supposed to dispose of the said dispute within a period of one year, from the date, on which the notice is served upon the opposite party. As per law, the matter can further be challenged in the High Court and may be, thereafter, it will go to the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.

27.  Now, we would like to deal with applicability of Section 8 (amended) of the principal Act, to the proceedings before this Commission. It is to be decided, as to whether, in the face of existence of an arbitration clause in the Agreement, it is open to this Commission, to entertain a consumer complaint, in terms of provisions of Section 3 of 1986 Act or not.

            Here, it is necessary to reproduce the provisions of Section 3 of 1986 Act, for consideration:-

“3. Act not in derogation of any other law.—The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.”

28   Such issue was also raised, when unamended provisions of Section 8 of 1996 Act, was in existence. Similar argument was raised that when settlement of disputes is provided through arbitration in the Agreement, the consumer complaint is not maintainable. In umpteen number of cases, it is held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, National Commission and various State Commissions, that Section 3 of 1986 Act provides additional remedy and existence of arbitration clause, in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties, is not a bar to entertain a complaint filed by the consumer, alleging deficiency in providing service etc.

            A similar issue came up before this Commission in Sh.Dharam Pal Gupta Vs. M/s Emaar MGF Land Limited and another, Consumer Complaint No.147 of 2015, decided on 13.10.2015. After noting the ratio of judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in various cases, and also of the National Commission, it was observed as under:-

It was next vehemently argued by Counsel for Opposite Parties No.1 and 2 that the complaint filed under Section 17 of the Act, was not maintainable, before this Commission, on account of existence of an arbitration Clause in the Buyer’s Agreement. To say so, reference was made to Clause 42 of the Buyer’s Agreement, which reads thus:-

“42. In the event of any dispute arising out of or touching upon or in relation to the terms of this Agreement or its termination, including the interpretation and validity thereof and the respective rights and obligations of the Parties shall be settled amicably by mutual discussion, failing which the same shall be settled through arbitration of an Arbitrator to be appointed(by?)the Company. The arbitration proceedings shall be governed by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, or any statutory amendments, modifications or re-enactment thereof for the time being in force and shall be held at New Delhi. The Courts at Mohali alone shall have the territorial jurisdictions in all matters arising out of/touching and/or concerning this Agreement”

It is stated that in case of dispute, an attempt will be made to settle the same, in an amicable manner, failing which, the same shall be referred to an Arbitrator in terms of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short the 1996 Act). Heavy reliance has been placed on judgment of Calcutta High Court titled as Sudarshan Vyapar Pvt. Ltd. and another’s case (supra). Further reliance was placed on a judgment rendered by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Punjab, at Chandigarh, titled as Raj Kumar Singal Vs. M/s Puma Realtors Private Limited and another, Miscellaneous Application Nos.1226 and 1227 of 2014, in Consumer Complaint No.60 of 2014 and also upon a case titled as M/s S.B.P. and Co. Vs. M/s Patel Engineering Limited and another, AIR 2006 SC 450.

On the other hand, it is stated by Counsel for the complainant that in terms of Section 3 of the 1986 Act, above plea supported by the said judgments, needs to be rejected.

In the case of M/s S.B.P. and Co.’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with altogether a different issue i.e. what is the nature of function of the Chief Justice or his designate, under Section 11 of the 1996 Act. Whether it is purely an administrative function or the Chief Justice or his designate, has the power to adjudicate upon the issues like existence of Arbitration clause in the Agreement/its validity. None of the provisions of 1986 Act were under consideration. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s S.B.P. and Co.’s case (supra) discussed in detail, the provisions of the 1996 Act, and then gave a finding that powers of the Chief Justice of India or the High Court, under Section 11 (6) is not an administrative power but it is a judicial power. When discussing the question, as to who would fall within the definition of Judicial Authority, in terms of Section (8) of the 1996 Act, by making reference to ratio of judgment in the case Fair Air Engineers Pvt. Ltd.  &  anr. Vs. N.K. Modi, III (1996) CPJ 1 (SC) = (1996 (6) SCC 385, it was only said that judicial authority will include the Courts, and also specific Tribunals like Consumer  Fora. Whether the Consumer Fora is bound to refer the matter to the Arbitrator, was not under consideration, in the above case.

The part of ratio of judgment in case Fair Air Engineers Pvt. Ltd.  &  anr.’s case(supra) dealing with above aspect, was not discussed in M/s S.B.P. and Co.s case (supra). In the former judgment besides opining that Consumer  Fora have all the trappings of the judicial authority, further, by making reference to the provisions of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act,1940 viz a viz Section 3 of 1986 Act, in Fair Air Engineers Pvt. Ltd.  &  anr.’s case (supra),it was observed as under:-

“It would, therefore, be clear that the Legislature intended to provide a remedy in addition to the consentient arbitration which could be enforced under the Arbitration Act or the civil action in a suit under the provisions of the CPC. Thereby, as seen, Section 34 of the Act does not confer and automatic right nor create an automatic embargo on the exercise of the power by the judicial authority under the Act. It is a matter of discretion. Considered from this perspective, we hold that though the District Forum, State Commission and National Commission are judicial authorities, for the purpose of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, in view of the object of the Act and by operation of Section 3 thereof, we are of the considered view that it would be appropriate that these forums created under the Act are at liberty to proceed with the matters in accordance with the provisions of the Act rather than relegating the parties to an arbitration proceedings pursuant to a contract entered into between the parties. The reason is that Act intends to relieve the consumers of the cumbersome arbitration proceedings or civil action unless the forums on their own and on their own and on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the particular case, come to the conclusion that the appropriate forum for adjudication of the disputes would be otherwise those given in the Act.”

It was specifically opined that the remedy under Section 3 of the 1986 Act, is in addition to and not in derogation to any other remedy available to an individual.

The above question was again dealt with, by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in National Seeds Corporation Ltd. Vs. M. Madhusudhan Reddy  &  anr., I (2012) CPJ 1 (SC).  Taking note of the provisions of 1996 Act and Section 3 of the 1986 Act, it was observed as under:-

“29. The remedy of arbitration is not the only remedy available to a grower. Rather, it is an optional remedy. He can either seek reference to an arbitrator or file a complaint under the Consumer Act. If the grower opts for the remedy of arbitration, then it may be possible to say that he cannot, subsequently, file complaint under the Consumer Act. However, if he chooses to file a complaint in the first instance before the competent Consumer Forum, then he cannot be denied relief by invoking Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Moreover, the plain language of Section 3 of the Consumer Act makes it clear that the remedy available in that Act is in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. In Fair Air Engineers (P) Ltd. v. N.K. Modi (supra), the 2-Judge Bench interpreted that section and held as under:

“the provisions of the Act are to be construed widely to give effect to the object and purpose of the Act. It is seen that Section 3 envisages that the provisions of the Act are in addition to and are not in derogation of any other law in force. It is true, as rightly contended by Mr. Suri, that the words ‘in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force’ would be given proper meaning and effect and if the complaint is not stayed and the parties are not relegated to the arbitration, the Act purports to operate in derogation of the provisions of the Arbitration Act. Prima facie, the contention appears to be plausible but on construction and conspectus of the provisions of the Act we think that the contention is not well founded. Parliament is aware of the provisions of the Arbitration Act and the Contract Act, 1872 and the consequential remedy available under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, i.e., to avail of right of civil action in a competent Court of civil jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the Act provides the additional remedy.

30. In Skypak Couriers Limited v. Tata Chemicals Limited (supra), this Court observed:

“Even if there exists an arbitration clause in an agreement and a complaint is made by the consumer, in relation to a certain deficiency of service, then the existence of an arbitration clause will not be a bar to the entertainment of the complaint by the Redressal Agency, constituted under the Consumer Protection Act, since the remedy provided under the Act is in addition to the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.”

31. In Trans Mediterranean Airways v. Universal Exports (supra), it was observed:

“In our view, the protection provided under the CP Act to consumers is in addition to the remedies available under any other statute. It does not extinguish the remedies under another statute but provides an additional or alternative remedy”.

Ratio of the judgments have left nothing to chance. It was mandated that even in the case of special legislation, it is permissible for an individual to avail remedy, under the 1986 Act. The National Commission, in a case titled as DLF Limited Vs Mridul Estate (Pvt.) Ltd., Revision Petition No.412 of 2011 (alongwith other 11 connected cases), decided on 13.05.2013 after taking ratio of judgment in the case of M/s S.B.P. and Co.’s case (supra), came to a specific conclusion that remedy provided under Section 3 of the 1986 Act is in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law, for the time being in force. It was specifically stated that ratio of judgment passed in M/s S.B.P. and Co.’s case (supra), will not debar a Consumer Fora from entertaining the complaint, even in cases where an alternative remedy of Arbitration is provided. Vide that judgment many Revision-Petitions were decided.

Feeling aggrieved against the order dated 13.05.2013, passed by the National Commission, Rosedale Developers Private Limited/Opposite Party challenged above order in the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In the case of Rosedale Developers Private Limited Vs. Aghore Bhattacharya and others, (Civil Appeal No.20923 of 2013), the  Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, by making reference to the ratio of  judgment in the case M/s S.B.P. and Co.’s case (supra),  observed that the judgment has no bearing on the issue, as to whether in the face of an Arbitration Clause, Jurisdiction  can be exercised by the Consumer  Fora or not. In that judgment, the Supreme Court had not interpreted the provisions of 1996 Act in the light of the provisions contained in 1986 Act. It was further observed that the observation made in that judgment that Section 8 of the 1996 Act is mandatory, cannot lead to an inference that the Consumer  Fora is bound to make a reference to the Arbitral Tribunal. As such, the facts of Sudarshan Vyapar Pvt. Ltd. and another’s and Raj Kumar Singal’s cases (supra) relied upon by Counsel for Opposite Parties No.1 and 2, cannot be applied to the facts of the present case.

The position has further been clarified by the National Commission, in the latest Judgment titled as Shri Satish Kumar Pandey and another Vs. M/s Unitech Limited, Consumer Complaint No.427 of 2014 (alongwith other 23 connected cases), decided on 08.06.2015. It was observed as under:-

“It was also contended by the learned counsel for the opposite party that since the agreements between the parties contains arbitration clause, arbitration and not a complaint before this Commission is the appropriate remedy. I, however, find no merit in this contention. As provided in Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act, the provision of this Act are in addition to the other remedies available to a consumer. Therefore, the availability of arbitration as a remedy does not debar the complainant from approaching a consumer forum in a case of deficiency in the services rendered to him by the service provider or adoption of unfair trade practices by him. This issue came up for consideration of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in National Seeds Corporation Vs. M. Madhusudhan Reddy  &  anr. (2012)2 SCC 506 and after taking into consideration the provisions of the Section 8 of the Arbitration Act of 1996 and the Section 3 of the C.P. Act it was held that the plain language of Section 3 of the C.P. Act makes it clear that the remedy available in that Act is in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.  The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held that the complaint filed by a consumer before the consumer fora would be maintainable despite their being an arbitration clause in the agreement to refer the dispute to the Arbitrator. In view of the above referred authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which was later followed by a Three Members Bench of this Commission in DLF Ltd. Vs. Mridul Estate Pvt. Ltd., R.P. No.412 of 2011 decided on 13-05-2013, the aforesaid contention advanced by the learned counsel for the opposite party is liable to be rejected.”

Reading of ratio of the judgments referred to above, make it clear that in case of  M/s S.B.P. and Co.’s case (supra), the issue before the Supreme Court of India was altogether different. The provisions of 1986 Act were not under consideration viz. a viz. the provisions of 1996 Act.  As such, the ratio of judgments referred to above, makes it very clear that the judgments in Sudarshan Vyapar Pvt. Ltd. and another’s and Raj Kumar Singal’s cases (supra), were given by wrongly interpreting the ratio of M/s S.B.P. and Co.’s case (supra). 

In view of the above, it is held that the submission of Counsel for Opposite Parties No.1 and 2, that  the complaint filed under Section 17 of the Act, was not maintainable, before this Commission, on account of existence of an arbitration Clause in the Buyer’s Agreement, being devoid of merit, stands rejected.

29.     Not only this, in the latest judgment titled as Mahindra Holidays & Resorts India Ltd. Vs. Adnan Samoon Rassiawala & 6 Ors., First Appeal No. 127 of 2016, decided on 18.03.2016, the National Commission observed as under:-

“The short question for consideration in this Appeal is as to whether the Maharashtra State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission at Mumbai (for short “the State Commission”) was justified in dismissing the application filed by the Appellant, the Opposite Party in the Complaint, under Section-8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking stay of the proceedings in the Complaint and for referring the matter to arbitration, in view of the fact that there was an Arbitration Agreement between the parties.

Though Mr. Pattjoshi, learned Senior Counsel, has made valiant attempt to convince us that in the light of the decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in HDFC Bank Ltd. v. Satpal Singh Bakshi, 2013 (134) DRJ 566 (FB), the parties were bound by the Arbitration Agreement and in view of the clear provision of Section-8 of the said Act, the dispute, subject matter of the Complaint, ought to have been referred to arbitration, yet we are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the learned Senior Counsel.  The issue sought to be raised is no more res integra as stands concluded by a number of authoritative pronouncements by the Hon’ble Supreme Court (see Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society v. M. Lalitha (dead) through LRs & Ors., (2004) 1 SCC 305; Skypak Couriers Ltd. v. Tata Chemicals Ltd., (2000) 5 SCC 294; and National Seeds Corporation Ltd. v. Madusudan Reddy, (2012) 2 SCC 506).

In light of the said decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, directly on the point, decision of the High Court cannot be relied upon, particularly when none of the afore-noted decisions have been noticed in the High Court’s decision, on which reliance has been placed by the learned Senior Counsel.

We do not find any illegality in the impugned order, warranting our interference.

Consequently, the Appeal fails and is dismissed in limine”.

30.    Now it is to be seen, whether, after making amendment in Section 8 of the principal Act, any additional rights have accrued to the service provider(s), to say that on account of existence of arbitration agreement, for settling disputes through an Arbitrator, this Commission is not empowered to entertain a consumer complaint.

            As has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in various cases, and also of the National Commission, in large number of judgments, Section 3 of the 1986 Act, provides additional remedy, notwithstanding any other remedy available to a consumer. The said remedy is also not in derogation to any other Act.

31.  Now, we will have to see what difference has been made by effecting amendment, in the provisions of Section 8 of 1996 Act. After amendment, it reads that a Judicial Authority is supposed to refer the matter to an Arbitrator, if there exists an arbitration clause in the agreement, notwithstanding any judgment, decree, order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, or any other Court, unless it finds that prima facie, no valid arbitration agreement exists. The legislation was alive to the ratio of the judgments, as referred to above, in earlier part of this order. Vide those judgments, it is specifically mandated that under Section 3 of 1986 Act, an additional remedy is available to the consumer(s), which is not in derogation to any other Act. As and when any argument was raised, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and the National Commission in the judgments, referred to above, have made it very clear that in the face of Section 8 of 1996 Act and existence of arbitration agreement, it is still opened to Consumer Foras  to entertain the consumer complaints. None of the judgments ever conferred any jurisdiction upon the Consumer Foras to entertain such like complaints. Only the legal issues, as existed in the Statute Book, were explained vide different judgments. If we look into amended provisions of Section 8 of the principal Act, it explains  that judicial Authority needs to refer dispute, in which arbitration agreement exist for arbitrator, notwithstanding any judgment/decree or order of any Court. That may be true where in a case,  some order has been passed by any Court, making arbitration Agreement non-applicable to a dispute/parties. However, in the present case, the above said argument is not available. The jurisdiction of Consumer Foras to entertain consumer complaints, in the face of arbitration clause in the Agreement, is in-built in 1986 Act. It was not given to these Foras, by any judgment ever. The provisions of Section 3 of 1986 Act interpreted vide judgments vis a vis Section 8 of un-amended 1996 Act, were known to the legislature, when the amended Act 2015 was passed. If there was any intention on the part of the legislature then it would have been very conveniently provided that notwithstanding any remedy available in 1986 Act, it would be binding upon the judicial Authority to refer the matter to an Arbitrator, in case of existence of arbitration agreement, however, it was not so said. Otherwise also, as has been stated in the earlier part of this order, where there is any ambiguity in understanding meaning of provision of law, or where two interpretations are possible, one beneficial to the consumer would be accepted.

32.    We can deal with this issue, from another angle also. If this contention raised is accepted, it will go against the basic spirit of 1986 Act. The said Act (1986) was enacted to protect poor consumers against might of the service providers/multinational companies/ traders. As in the present cases, the consumers/ complainants have spent their entire life savings to get a plot, so that they can construct a house thereon. Their hopes were shattered. Litigation in the Consumer Fora is cost effective. It does not involve huge expenses and further it is very quick. A complaint in the State Commission can be filed, by making payment between Rs.2000/- to Rs.4000/- (in the present case Rs.4000/-). As per the mandate of 1986 Act,  the complaint is supposed to be decided within three months, from the date of service of the opposite party. In cases involving ticklish issues (like the present one, maximum not more than six months to seven months time can be consumed), whereas, to the contrary, as per the principal Act,  the consumer will be forced to (as in the present case) pay huge expenses. As in the present case, the complainant is claiming refund of Rs.65,56,513/- alongwith interest, compensation and litigation costs, aggregate value whereof, if added may be near about Rs.1 crore. In that event, the complainant will be forced to pay an amount of Rs.1,68,750/-  towards her share of Arbitrator fees. Not only as above, it is admissible to an Arbitrator, to decide the dispute within one year. Thereafter, the Court wherever it is challenged may also take upto one year and then there is likelihood that the matter will go to the High Court or the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. Such an effort will be a time consuming and costly one. Taking note of fee component and time consumed in arbitration, it can safely be said that if the matter is referred to an Arbitrator, as prayed, in the present case, it will defeat the very purpose of General Assembly Resolution No.39/248 and the provisions of 1986 Act. In view of above, the ground raised by Counsel for opposite party no.1, stands rejected.”

20.       The 1986 Act provides for better protection of interests and rights of the consumers. For the said purpose, the Consumer Foras were created under the Act. In Section 3 of 1986 Act, it is clearly provided that the said provision is in addition to and not in derogation of any provisions of any other law, for the time being in force. The 1986 Act is special legislation qua the consumers. The poor consumers are not expected to fight the might of multinational companies/traders, as those entities have lot of resources at their command. In the present case, the complainants have spent their entire life earnings to purchase a plot, in a housing project, launched by the opposite party. It was their hope that they will construct a house on the said plot and live therein. However,  their hopes were shattered, when despite making payment of entire amount towards price, they failed to get possession of a plot, in a developed project. As per established ratio of the judgment in Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society v. M. Lalitha (2004) 1 SCC 305 and also in the judgment of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. M/s Pushpalaya Printers, I (2004) CPJ 22 (SC),  and LIC of India and another Vs. Hira Lal, IV (2011) CPJ 4 (SC), it was said that the consumers are always in a weak position, and in cases where two interpretations are possible, the one beneficial to the consumer be accepted. The opinion expressed above, qua applicability of Section 8 (amended) of  1996 Act, has been given keeping in mind the above said principle.
21.       In view of the above, the argument raised by Senior Counsel for the opposite party that in the face of existence of arbitration clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint, being devoid of merit, is rejected.
22.       It is argued with vehemence by Sh.Sanjeev Sharma, Senior Advocate, that there is a contract to sell piece of land only to the complainants. No service was to be provided as alleged, to the complainants, by the opposite party, as such, they would not fall within the definition of consumer and thus complaint deserves to be dismissed.

            This plea has been refuted by Counsel for the complainants. He has referred to Clause 25 of the Agreement dated 30.01.2014, which reads thus:-

“The Company shall be responsible to provide internal services, which, inter alia, incudes laying of the roads, water lines, sewer lines, electric lines etc. However, it is understood that external or peripheral services such as water lines, sewer lines, storm water drains, roads electricity, horticulture and other such services integral to the infrastructure are to be provided by the State Government authorities and or the Local Authorities.”

23.       It is specifically stated that Company shall carry out internal development within the project, which included laying of roads, water lines, sewer lines, electrical lines etc., however, external development thereof, will be the responsibility of State Government. Above provision leaves no doubt that possession of the fully developed plot over which construction can be raised, was a promise made by the opposite party, to the complainants. Not only as above, Emaar MGF project is a part of Mega Housing Project. If it is so, it cannot be said that piece of land will be sold to a consumer, without making any development. Under similar circumstances, such a plea was rejected by this Commission, in a case titled as Sh.Aditya Sharma Vs. DLF Universal Limited, Consumer Complaint No.235 of 2015 decided on 09.03.2016, by holding as under:-

“No doubt, to defeat the claim of the complainant, a stand was also taken by the opposite parties, that they were only liable to deliver possession of plot, in question, to the complainant, and as far as the provision of basic amenities is concerned, he cannot claim the same, as per the terms and conditions contained in the Agreement.  This stand of the opposite parties has no legs to stand. It may be stated here that, had only possession of plot was to be delivered to the complainant, without providing any basic amenities in the project, then why the opposite parties need 24 months, to deliver possession thereof, as per Clause 32 of the Agreement is not explained. Whether it is mentioned in the Agreement or not, the basic amenities/ facilities such as roads, sewerage, drinking water, electricity, street lights, drainage,  etc. etc. are mandatory to be provided to an allottee, before delivering him possession of a plot, so that he is able to start construction work accordingly and live a smooth life. Even otherwise, it is of common knowledge, that if basic amenities such as roads, water, electricity, are not in existence at the site, how could an allottee start construction work on a plot. The complainant was not allotted a plot on an island. In Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board vs. Bishamber Dayal Goyal and Ors., Civil Appeal No.3122 of 2006, decided on 26.03.2014, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while placing reliance on Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh & Ors. vs. Shantikunj Investment (P) Ltd. & Ors., (2006) 4 SCC 109, held that though it was not a condition precedent but there is an obligation on the part of the Administration to provide necessary facilities such as roads, drainage, drinking water, sewerage, street lighting etc. etc., for full enjoyment of the same by allottees.”

24.       Provisions of the Agreement and contents of written reply filed by the opposite party, makes it very clear that there was a promise to make internal development, in the project, where plot is situated. In the present case, an area measuring 300 square yards was purchased for an amount of Rs.67,52,100/-.  If it was only a case of  sale of piece of a land, nobody will like to purchase such a small plot, at such a higher price. In the written reply, it is specifically stated that all the facilities (this fact is denied by the opposite party at the time of arguments) did exist, at the spot. If it is so, it doesn’t lie in the mouth of the opposite party to say that it was a contract for sale only of piece of a land, without doing anything further. In para 9 of the written reply, it is specifically stated as under:-

“That the contents of paragraph number 9 of the complaint are denied as incorrect. The possession is always offered on the natural ground level, which was explained to the customer on the scheduled possession date. The company had offered possession on completion of laying of services as per terms of the buyer’s agreement”-

25.       In other parts of the written reply, it has also been stated that laying of water and sewer lines is complete at the spot. Sewerage Treatment Plant stood installed. Electricity is available at the spot. It is not expected that any builder will provide those facilities, unless committed, simply for nothing. As and when, it is alleged by the complainants that above facilities are not available, a categorical reply has been given by the opposite party asserting existence of those.
26.       It is therefore held that in the present case, there was not only a contract to sell a piece of land to the complainants, but also services, as contained in Clause 25 of the Agreement and extracted above, were to provided by the opposite party. The complainants thus fall, within the definition of consumer. In view of above facts, argument raised by Counsel for the opposite party, stands rejected.
27.       Whether the development of project was complete in all respects; basic amenities were provided at the site; and also that the opposite party possessed all the requisite permissions, before intimation and offer of possession of the plot, was given to the complainants, vide letters dated 15.01.2015 and 19.05.2015, is the next question, which needs consideration.

            It may be stated here that not an iota of evidence, has been placed on record, to prove that before offering possession of the plot, in question, by the opposite party, development of the project was complete in all respects or that basic amenities were provided at the site. At the same time, it has been candidly admitted by the opposite party, in its written version, that the Forest Department had served notice upon it (opposite party), on account of illegal access having been created through the Forest land, into the project and that it had applied permission to the Forest Department vide letter dated 10.01.2014 to give access to its project, but the same was refused vide letter dated 18.11.2014, on account of pending litigation, before the Civil Court, Kharar. Thereafter, vide letter dated 15.04.2015, the opposite party requested the Chief Administrator, GMADA, to take up that issue with the Forest Department, however, despite that it (Forest Department) sealed entry points of the project, in question. Not only this, it has also been frankly admitted by the opposite party, in para no.12 (mentioned in the chart given) of its written reply that till date, NOC/Sanctioned Public Health and Engineering Design Scheme (Sewerage, storm water drainage and water supply lines) of Sector 109 plotted MLU plotted land parcel, in which the plot is located, is pending with GMADA. Further, it has also been admitted by the opposite party that NOC from the Central Ground Water Boards Authority to supply underground portable water supply to residents has not yet been got renewed, as it has applied for the same, only on 19.12.2014 i.e. after about one year from the date of signing of the Agreement on 30.01.2014. Further, even release/energization of permanent electricity connection of Sector 109, is pending with the Punjab State Power Corporation Limited (PSPCL). The admission of the opposite party, itself, to the effect that there is pending litigation, in respect of the project, in question, as also, various permissions, referred to above, are still pending to be received from various Departments/Competent Authorities, like Sanctioned Public Health and Engineering Design Scheme (Sewerage, storm water drainage and water supply lines);  NOC/Permission from Central Ground Water Boards Authority to supply underground portable water supply; release/energization of permanent electricity connection of Sector 109 from PSPCL etc., makes it very clear, that even as on today, the opposite party is not in a position to offer/deliver legal possession of the plot, in question. Not only this, as stated above, even the entry points of the project have been sealed by the Forest Department, as the opposite party  failed to take requisite permissions/sanction from it (Forest Department), which fact has also been admitted by the opposite party. The said fact is further corroborated from the letter dated 15.04.2015 Annexure R-5 (at page 145 of the file), sent by the opposite party to the Chief Administrator, GMADA, requesting it to take up the matter regarding sealing of entry points of the project, in question, with the Forest Department, as the same had been stated to be “illegal access”. It has been clearly mentioned by the opposite party in the said letter that “…….we are bound by the agreement to give delivery within time bound manner to our various restive customers, we had applied for grant of access with your good self”. Admittedly, till date, the issue with regard to the said sealing of main entry points of the project, in question, has not been resolved, and is pending litigation. A similar question fell for determination, before this Commission, against the same builder i.e. Emaar MGF, in the same Sector i.e. Sector 109, in a case titled as Dr. Manuj Chhabra Vs. M/s Emaar MGF Land Limited, Consumer Complaint No. 140 of 2015 decided on 05.11.2015. Under similar circumstances, this Commission ordered refund of the amount paid, alongwith interest and compensation, while holding as under:-

“As a matter of fact, possession of the plot was offered only on 09.03.2015, and that too has been held to illegal, as the Opposite Parties have not taken requisite permissions/sanctions from the Forest Department, as a result whereof, entry points of the project have been sealed, stating to be “illegal access”, which fact is apparent from the letter dated 15.04.2015, referred to, in earlier part of this order. The Opposite Parties, therefore, had no right, to retain the hard-earned money of the complainant, deposited towards price of the plot, in question. In our considered opinion, the complainant is entitled to the refund of amount of Rs.64,63,090/-,  deposited by him, towards price of the said plot. The complainant was, thus, caused financial loss.  Hard-earned money, deposited by the complainant, towards the plot, in question, was utilized by the Opposite Parties, for a number of years. In case of delay, in deposit of installment(s), the Opposite Parties had been charging interest @15% P.A., compounded at the time of every succeeding installment, from the complainant, as per Clause 3 of the Agreement. It is, therefore, held that the Opposite Parties, by neither delivering physical possession of the plot, in question, complete in all respects, by the stipulated date, nor refunding the amount to the complainant, were not only deficient, in rendering service, but also indulged into unfair trade practice. The complainant, is, thus, entitled to the refund of Rs.64,63,090/-, alongwith interest compounded quarterly @15%, from the respective dates of deposits.”

28.       Thus, it could very well be said that even till date, the opposite party is not in a position, to deliver actual physical possession of the plot(s) to their customers, including the complainants, in the said project, on account of reasons, referred to above. It is therefore held that despite the fact that the opposite party was not in a position, to issue legal offer of possession, in respect of the plot, in question, on account of the reasons, referred to above, yet, it did so, which act amounts to unfair trade practice, on its part.
29.       No doubt, a plea is taken by Counsel for the opposite party that since the opposite party has already obtained partial completion Certificate in respect of the project, in question, as such, it could very well be said that the development at site was complete and that the opposite party was in possession of all the necessary approvals/sanctions and was ready to offer/deliver possession of the units to the allottees, including the complainants. It may be stated here that perusal of partial completion certificate dated 16.10.2015 Annexure R-9 (obtained after filing of this complaint) clearly goes to show that the same was issued subject to certain conditions i.e. the opposite party shall abide by all the necessary permissions/sanctions/approvals from the PSPCL, PPCB, etc. It was also made clear in the said partial completion certificate that the opposite party shall comply with all the conditions, mentioned therein, before seeking final completion certificate. However, on the other hand, as stated above, admittedly, the project is under litigation, for want of necessary approval(s) from the Forest Department, as also, various permissions, are still pending with the Departments/Competent Authorities, like Sanctioned Public Health and Engineering Design Scheme (Sewerage, storm water drainage and water supply lines);  NOC/Permission from Central Ground Water Boards Authority to supply underground portable water supply; release/energization of permanent electricity connection of Sector 109 from PSPCL etc. Thus, mere obtaining partial completion certificate by the opposite party on 16.10.2015, without complying with the conditions contained therein by it (opposite party), is of no help to it. Otherwise also, the said partial completion certificate dated 16.10.2015, was obtained by the opposite party, after about five months, from the date (19.05.2015) of offer of possession and also when the complainants had already filed this complaint on 01.09.2015. Thus, it could very well be said that the offer of possession made by the opposite party on 19.05.2015, was mere a paper possession and nothing more than that. The plea taken by opposite party, to the contrary, in this regard, therefore, being devoid of merit, is rejected.
30.       An objection was also raised by Counsel for the opposite party that since as per Clause 8 of the Agreement dated 30.01.2014, possession of the plot was to be delivered within 18 to 24 months, from the date of execution of the same i.e. on or before 29.01.2016, as such, the present complaint, having been filed on 01.09.2015, is premature. This objection raised by the opposite party, does not merit acceptance. It may be stated here that it is not the case of the opposite party that despite the fact that possession of the plot was to be delivered on or before 29.01.2016, the complainants instead of waiting for the same, approached this Commission, for refund of the amount deposited by them.

            Admittedly, the Agreement was signed on 30.01.2014. Possession of the plot, was to be delivered within 18 months plus 6 months i.e. upto 29.01.2016. In the payment plan (Annexure C-1 forming part of the Agreement), to make payment, following schedule was provided:-

 

Sl.	Linked Stages	Description	Due Date	Total	Service Tax	Total amount
1.	On Booking and within 30 days of booking	15% of BASIC, 15% of PLC, 15% of EDC	09-Feb-14	1012815.00	0.00	1012815.00
2.	Within 2 Month of Booking	10% of EDC, 10% of PLC, 10% of BASIC	10-Mar-14	675210.00	0.00	675210.00
3.	Intimation of Possession	75% of BASIC, 75% of PLC, 75% of EDC	-	5064075.00	0.00	5064075.00
			Total	6752100.00	0.00	6752100.00

 

                It is apparent that 15% of BASIC price, 15% of PLC, 15% of EDC was to be paid on booking and within 30 days of booking; 10% of BASIC price, 10% of PLC and 10% of EDC was to be made within two months of booking and 75% of BASIC price, 75% of PLC and 75% of EDC was to be made on receiving intimation of possession. Intimation of possession would mean that actual possession would be offered thereafter, in a short span of time and not that the purchaser will have to wait till the end of two years. In the present case, the complainants have performed their obligations by depositing an amount of Rs.58,50,332/- on 12.02.2015. Alleged paper possession was offered in the month of May 2015.  By above said act, the opposite party has virtually pre-poned the date of delivery of possession of the plot. After having received the entire sale consideration, including EDC, PLC etc., it was bounden duty of the opposite party, to handover possession, after making development at the site, within the reasonable time, from the date of intimation of possession i.e. 15.01.2015. It has already been held, in earlier part of this order that development in the project is not complete, even as on today. Offer of possession was farce. Without discharging its liability, the opposite party made the complainants to make payment of entire sale consideration, including other charges. When despite communication sent, no improvement was found by the complainants at the site, qua development, they were justified in filing the consumer complaint, seeking refund of the amount deposited alongwith interest and compensation, as such, the complaint cannot be rejected, as premature.

31.       To defeat claim of the complainants, another objection was raised by Counsel for the opposite party that since the complainants have purchased the plot, in question, for earning profits i.e. for resale, as and when there is escalation in the prices of real estate, as such, they would not fall within the definition of consumer, as defined by Section 2 (1) (d) (ii) of the Act, or not.

            It may be stated here that there is nothing, on the record to show, that the complainants are property dealers, and are indulged in sale and purchase of property, on regular basis. In the absence of any cogent evidence, in support of the objection raised by the opposite party, mere bald assertion to that effect, cannot be taken into consideration. Otherwise also, in a case titled as  Kavita Ahuja Vs. Shipra Estate Ltd. and Jai Krishna Estate Developer Pvt. Ltd. Consumer Complaint No.137 of 2010, decided on 12.02.2015, by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, it was held that the buyer(s) of the  residential unit(s), would be termed as consumer(s), unless it is proved that he or she had booked the same for commercial purpose. The principle of law, laid down, in Kavita Ahuja’s case (supra) is fully applicable to the present case. Under these circumstances, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the plot, in question, was purchased by the complainants, by way of investment, with a view to earn profit, in future. The complainants, thus, fall within the definition of ‘consumer’, as defined under Section 2(1)(d) of the Act. Such an objection, taken by the opposite party, in its written reply, therefore, being devoid of merit, is rejected.  

32.       Another frivolous objection was taken by Counsel for the opposite party, by stating that the plot, in question, is situated at Mohali, as such, only the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Punjab, has territorial Jurisdiction to entertain and decide the complaint.

            According to Section 17 of the Act, a consumer complaint can be filed, by the complainants, before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, within the territorial Jurisdiction, whereof a part of cause of action arose to them. In the instant case, the Agreement, in respect of the plot, in question, was executed, at Chandigarh. Not only this, perusal of record reveals that except one or two, almost all other letters, were sent by Chandigarh office of the opposite party, as the same bore the address “Emaar MGF Land Limited, SCO 120-122, First Floor, Sector 17-C, Chandigarh-160017”. It means that a part of cause of action arose to the complainants, within the territorial Jurisdiction of this Commission. This Commission has, therefore, got territorial Jurisdiction to entertain and decide the complaint. The objection taken by Counsel for the opposite party, also stands rejected.

33.       Another objection was raised by Counsel for the opposite party that since the complainants sought enforcement of the Agreement, in respect of the immoveable property, only a Civil Court can decide the complaint, and as such, consumer complaint was not maintainable. It may be stated here, that the complainants hired the services of the opposite party, for purchasing the plot, in question, in the manner, referred to above. According to Clause 8 of the  Agreement,  subject to force majeure conditions and reasons, beyond the control of the opposite party, it was to deliver physical possession of the unit, within a period of 18 months and not later than 24 months, from the date of execution of the same (Agreement), with complete basic amenities, as provided in Clause 25. Section 2 (1) (o) of the Act, defines service as under:-

“service” means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes, but not limited to, the provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both,  housing construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service”

34.       From the afore-extracted Section 2(1)(o) of the Act, it is evident that housing/construction, also comes within the definition of a service. In Narne Construction P. Ltd., etc. etc. Vs.  Union Of India and  Ors. Etc., II (2012) CPJ 4 (SC),  it was held that when a person applies for the allotment of a building or site or for a flat constructed by the Development Authority and enters into an agreement with the Developer, or the Contractor, the nature of transaction is covered by the expression ‘service’ of any description. Housing construction or building activity carried on by a private or statutory body constitutes ‘service’ within the ambit of Section 2(1)(o) of the Act. Similar principle of law, was laid down, in Haryana Agricultural Marketing Board Vs. Bishambar Dayal Goyal & Ors. (AIR 2014 S.C. 1766). Under these circumstances, the complaint involves the consumer dispute, and the same is maintainable. Not only this, as stated above, Section 3 of the Act, provides an alternative remedy. Even if, it is assumed that the complainants have a remedy to file a suit, for specific performance, in the Civil Court, the alternative remedy provided under Section 3 of the Act, can be availed of by them, as they fall within the definition of consumer, as stated above. In this view of the matter, the objection of the opposite party, in this regard, being devoid of merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.
35.       As far as the objection raised by Counsel for the opposite party, with regard to pecuniary jurisdiction, on the ground that if interest sought on the deposited amount is added, only the National Commission can entertain the said complaint, needs rejection. It may be stated here, that the complainant has sought refund of the amount of Rs.75,38,355/-, paid by him, towards price of the said plot, alongwith interest @12% p.a, from the respective dates of deposits, till realization; and compensation to the tune of Rs.5 lacs, for mental agony and  physical harassment; and cost of litigation, to the tune of Rs.50,000/-, aggregate value whereof [excluding the interest claimed] came to be around Rs.80,78,355/- and, as such, fell below Rs.1 crore. Thus, this Commission has got pecuniary Jurisdiction, to entertain and decide the complaint, for the reasons given hereinafter.
36.       The question, that arises for consideration, is, as to whether, interest @12% p.a, claimed by the complainant, on the amount of Rs.75,38,355/- aforesaid, was required to be added, to the value of the reliefs claimed, or not, for determining the pecuniary Jurisdiction of this Commission.  In Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. II (2003) CPJ 81 (NC), a case decided by a three Member Bench of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, the facts were that the complainant filed a Consumer Complaint, before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Haryana, claiming an amount of Rs.18,33,000/-, with interest @18% per annum, on this amount, from the date of claim, till realization. It also claimed suitable damages, on account of loss caused to it. The State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, vide order dated 08.08.2002, disposed of the complaint, with liberty reserved to the complainant, to approach the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, holding that if interest @18% P.A. was allowed, on the amount of Rs.18,33,000/- it (amount) will exceed Rs.20 lacs (at that time the pecuniary Jurisdiction of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission was upto Rs.20 lacs), for which it had no pecuniary Jurisdiction. Feeling aggrieved, the complainant/appellant filed the aforesaid appeal. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, in the aforesaid appeal, held as under:-

“Bare reading of the prayer made would show that the interest claimed by appellant pertains to the period upto the date of filing complaint, pendente lite and future. Rate and the period for which interest has to be allowed, is within the discretion of State Commission and the stage for exercise of such a discretion would be the time when the complaint is finally disposed of. Thus, the State Commission had acted erroneously in adding to the amount of Rs.18,33,000/- the interest at the rate of 18% per annum thereon till date of filing of complaint for the purpose of determination of pecuniary jurisdiction before reaching the said stage. Order under appeal, therefore, deserves to be set aside. However, in view of change in pecuniary jurisdiction w.e.f. 15.3.2003, the complaint is now to be dealt with by the District Forum instead of State Commission.

Accordingly, while accepting appeal, the order dated 8.8.2002 is set aside. On complaint being returned by the State Commission, the appellant is permitted to file it before the appropriate District Forum for being decided on merits in accordance with law. No order as to costs”.

37.       Not only this, a similar question regarding pecuniary Jurisdiction, fell before this Commission, in a case titled as Karnail Singh  and another Vs. M/s Emaar MGF Land Limited, Consumer Complaint No.05 of 2014 decided on 09.04.2014. In that case also, an objection was raised by the Opposite Parties (Emaar MGF Land Limited) that since the complainants,  had sought refund of amount of Rs.62,60,750/- alongwith interest @24% P.A., from the respective dates of deposits, alongwith compensation and litigation costs, as such, if the reliefs are clubbed together alongwith interest claimed, the aggregate value therefore fell above Rs.1 crore, and as such, this Commission had no pecuniary Jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. In that case, while rejecting the said objection of the Opposite Parties, this Commission, while placing reliance on Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd.’ case (supra),  came to the conclusion that it had pecuniary Jurisdiction to entertain the complaint, and ordered refund of the amount alongwith interest, compensation and litigation costs, vide order dated 09.04.2014. Appeal filed by the Opposite Parties (Emaar MGF Land Limited) against the order dated 09.04.2014, before the National Commission, was dismissed with punitive damages of Rs.5 lacs. Still feeling aggrieved, the Opposite Parties, filed Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.29392 of 2014, which was also dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in limine, vide order dated 14.11.2014. In this manner, the findings given by this Commission in Karnail Singh and another’s case (supra), while placing reliance on Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd.’s case (supra), to the effect that it has pecuniary Jurisdiction to entertain and decide the complaint, in the manner, referred to above, were upheld by the National Commission, and also the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. Recently, in the case of Enis Exports Pvt. Ltd Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd, Consumer Case No. 196 of 2016, decided On 08 Mar 2016, it was clearly held that interest component being imaginary, will not be added in the reliefs sought by the consumers, for determining pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras. The principles of law, laid down, in the cases referred to above, are fully applicable, to the facts of the instant case. In view of the above, the submission of Counsel for Opposite Parties, that this Commission lacks pecuniary Jurisdiction, being devoid of merit, must fail and the same stands rejected.
38.       Whether the complainants are entitled to refund of the entire amount deposited by them. It may be stated here that that intimation of possession sent vide letter dated 15.01.2015, followed by offer of possession 19.05.2015, has been held to be a mere paper possession. It has also been held by this Commission, in the preceding paragraph of this order that even as on date, the opposite party is not in a position to deliver actual legal physical possession of the plot, in question, on the account of the reasons, mentioned in earlier part of this order. As such, as a matter of fact, possession of the plot so offered has been held to illegal, as the opposite party has not even taken requisite permissions/sanctions from the Forest Department, as a result whereof, entry points of the project have been sealed, stating to be “illegal access”, which fact is apparent from the letter dated 15.04.2015, referred to, in earlier part of this order, as also various permissions are pending to be obtained from the Competent Authorities. Not only this, admittedly the project is under litigation, before the Civil Court, Kharar, and it is not known, as to for how long, it will continue. The complainants cannot be made to wait for an indefinite period, for delivery of actual physical possession of the plot. The opposite party, therefore, had no right, to retain the hard-earned money of the complainants, deposited towards price of the plot, in question. The complainants are, thus, entitled to get refund of amount deposited by them. In view of above facts of the case, the opposite party is also under an obligation to compensate the complainants, for inflicting mental agony and causing physical harassment to them, as also escalation in prices.
39.       It is to be further seen, as to whether, interest, on the amount refunded can be granted, in favour of the complainants. It is not in dispute that an amount of Rs.75,38,355/- was paid by the complainants, without getting anything, in lieu thereof. The said amount has been used by the opposite party, for its own benefit. There is no dispute that for making delayed payments, the opposite party was charging heavy rate of interest, for the period of delay in making payment of instalments.  It is well settled law that whenever money has been received by a party which ex ae quo et bono ought to be refunded, the right to interest follows, as a matter of course. The obligation to refund money received and retained without right implies and carries with it, the right to interest. It was also so said by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in UOI vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd (Supreme Court), (2014) 6 SCC 335 decided on March 20th, 2014 (2014) 6 SCC 335). In view of above, the complainants, in all the cases, are certainly entitled to get refund of the amount deposited by them, alongwith interest compounded quarterly, from the respective dates of deposits (the opposite party is charging interest @24% compounded quarterly, in case of delayed payment(s), as per Clause 3 of the Agreement), till realization.
40.       No doubt, is some other connected cases, it was argued by Counsel for the opposite party(s)/ builder/ Emaar MGF that since the complainant(s) was/were defaulter in making payment of installments, and even some of the complainants have stopped making further payments, as such, they cannot seek refund of the amount deposited, as they have breached the terms and conditions of the Agreement. It may be stated here that in case of delay in making payments of installments, the opposite party has been charging heavy penal interest thereon. As far as the question of stoppage of making further payments by the complainants, after making payment of substantial amount in respect of their respective units, is concerned, it may be stated here that the opposite party failed to prove any circumstance, beyond its control, due to which development at the site, could not be completed. In Prasad Homes Private Limited Vs. E.Mahender Reddy and Ors., 1 (2009) CPJ 136 (NC), it was held that when development work was not carried out at the site, the payment of further installments was rightly stopped by the complainants. It was, under these circumstances, held that the builder could not be allowed to take shelter, under the agreement clause, to usurp the money, deposited by the complainants. It was further held that the builder cannot forfeit the money, paid by the complainants, on account of their own fault, in not carrying out the development work. Ultimately, the Hon’ble National Commission ordered the refund of amount with interest. The principle of law, laid down, in Prasad Homes Private Limited’s case (supra), is fully applicable to the facts of the instant case. It is, therefore, held that the plea, referred to above, taken up by the opposite party, in its written reply, as also during arguments before this Commission, appears to be false.  The said plea was taken up, just with a view to cover up its lapse by the opposite party, and to deny the refund of amount, claimed by the complainant(s). The said plea being devoid of merit, is rejected. 
41.       No other point, was urged, by Counsel for the parties.     
42.       For the reasons recorded above, this complaint is partly accepted, with costs. The opposite party/ builder(s), is directed as under:-

1. To refund the amount of   Rs.75,38,355/- to  the complainants, alongwith interest compounded quarterly @12% (rate of interest sought by the complainants in the relief clause) from the respective dates of deposits onwards.
2. To pay compensation, in the sum of Rs.3 lacs, for causing mental agony and physical harassment, to the complainants, as also escalation in prices.
3. To pay cost of litigation, to the tune of Rs. 50,000/-, to the complainant.

 

Consumer Complaint No. 234 of 2015 titled as Yogesh Gupta Vs. The Managing Director, Emaar MGF Land Limited and another. The opposite parties are jointly and severally directed as under:-

1. To  refund the amount of   Rs. 40,98,556/- to  the complainant,  alongwith interest compounded quarterly @15% from the respective dates of deposits onwards.
2. To pay compensation, in the sum of Rs.3 lacs, for causing mental agony and physical harassment, to the complainant, as also escalation in prices.
3. To pay cost of litigation, to the tune of Rs.33,000/-, to the complainant.

 

Consumer Complaint No. 257 of 2015 titled as Mrs.Shamlee Singh Vs. M/s Emaar MGF Land Limited and another. The opposite parties are jointly and severally directed as under:-

1. To  refund the amount of   Rs. 40,24,471/- to  the complainant,  alongwith interest compounded quarterly @15% from the respective dates of deposits onwards.
2. To pay compensation, in the sum of Rs.3 lacs, for causing mental agony and physical harassment, to the complainant, as also escalation in prices.
3. To pay cost of litigation, to the tune of Rs.50,000/-, to the complainant.

 

Consumer Complaint No. 261 of 2015 titled as Mrs.Mandeep Saini Vs. M/s Emaar MGF Land Private Limited. The opposite party is directed as under:-

1. To  refund the amount of   Rs. 52,04,750/- to  the complainant,  alongwith interest compounded quarterly @15% from the respective dates of deposits onwards.
2. To pay compensation, in the sum of Rs.3 lacs, for causing mental agony and physical harassment, to the complainant, as also escalation in prices.
3. To pay cost of litigation, to the tune of Rs.50,000/-, to the complainant.

 

Consumer Complaint No. 262 of 2015 titled as Mrs.Pradeep Pabla Vs. M/s Emaar MGF Land Private Limited. The opposite party is directed as under:-

1. To  refund the amount of   Rs. 52,04,750/- to  the complainant,  alongwith interest compounded quarterly @15% from the respective dates of deposits onwards.
2. To pay compensation, in the sum of Rs.3 lacs, for causing mental agony and physical harassment, to the complainant, as also escalation in prices.
3. To pay cost of litigation, to the tune of Rs.50,000/-, to the complainant.

 

Consumer Complaint No. 268 of 2015 titled as Dr Parvesh Jain  and another Vs. M/s Emaar MGF Land Limited and another. The opposite parties are jointly and severally directed as under:-

1. To  refund the amount of   Rs. 87,81,465/- to  the complainants,  alongwith interest compounded quarterly @15% from the respective dates of deposits onwards.
2. To pay compensation, in the sum of Rs.3 lacs, for causing mental agony and physical harassment, to the complainants, as also escalation in prices.
3. To pay cost of litigation, to the tune of Rs.50,000/-, to the complainants.

 

 

Consumer Complaint No. 271 of 2015 titled as Ms. Puran Kaur and another Vs. M/s Emaar MGF Land Private Limited and another. The opposite parties are jointly and severally directed as under:-

1. To  refund the amount of   Rs.43,97,011/- to the complainants,  alongwith interest compounded quarterly @15% from the respective dates of deposits onwards.
2. To pay compensation, in the sum of Rs.3 lacs, for causing mental agony and physical harassment, to the complainants, as also escalation in prices.
3. To pay cost of litigation, to the tune of Rs.70,000/-, to the complainants.

 

Consumer Complaint No.272 of 2015 titled as Mr.Kanwaldeep Kaur and another Vs. M/s Emaar MGF Land Private Limited and another. The opposite parties are jointly and severally directed as under:-

1. To  refund the amount of   Rs.49,00,176/- to  the complainants,  alongwith interest compounded quarterly @15% from the respective dates of deposits onwards.
2. To pay compensation, in the sum of Rs.3 lacs, for causing mental agony and physical harassment, to the complainants, as also escalation in prices.
3. To pay cost of litigation, to the tune of Rs.70,000/-, to the complainants.

 

Consumer Complaint No. 274 of 2015 titled as Mr.Isher Singh and others Vs. M/s Emaar MGF Land Private Limited and another. Opposite party no.1 is directed as under:-

1. To  refund the amount of   Rs.36,19,104/- to  the complainant, alongwith interest compounded quarterly @15% from the respective dates of deposits onwards.
2. To pay compensation, in the sum of Rs.3 lacs, for causing mental agony and physical harassment, to the complainant, as also escalation in prices.
3. To pay cost of litigation, to the tune of Rs.50,000/-, to the complainant.
4. Complaint against opposite party no.2 is dismissed with no order as to costs.

 

Consumer Complaint No. 275 of 2015 titled as Mr.Naresh Kumar Sharma Vs. M/s Emaar MGF Land Private Limited and another. Opposite party no.1 is directed as under:-

1. To  refund the amount of   Rs. 37,91,603/- to  the complainant, alongwith interest compounded quarterly @15% from the respective dates of deposits onwards.
2. To pay compensation, in the sum of Rs.3 lacs, for causing mental agony and physical harassment, to the complainant, as also escalation in prices.
3. To pay cost of litigation, to the tune of Rs.50,000/-, to the complainant.
4. Complaint against opposite party no.2 is dismissed with no order as to costs.

 

Consumer Complaint No. 282 of 2015 titled as Rajiv Kumar Mohindroo  Vs. Emaar MGF Land Limited and another. The opposite parties are jointly and severally directed as under:-

1. To  refund the amount of   Rs.35,41,654/- to  the complainant, alongwith interest compounded quarterly @15% from the respective dates of deposits onwards.
2. To pay compensation, in the sum of Rs.3 lacs, for causing mental agony and physical harassment, to the complainant, as also escalation in prices.
3. To pay cost of litigation, to the tune of Rs.70,000/- to the complainant.

 

43.       The payment of awarded amounts (in all complaints) mentioned at sr.nos.(i) to (iii), shall be made by the opposite party, within a period of 45 days, from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, failing which, they shall be liable to pay the amount mentioned at sr.no.(i), alongwith penal interest compounded quarterly @18% instead of @15%/12%, from the respective dates of deposits onwards, and interest compounded quarterly @15%, on the amounts mentioned at sr.nos.(ii) and (iii), from the date of filing of this complaint, till realization.
44.       However, it is made clear that in the cases, where the complainant(s) has/have availed loan facility from any financial institution(s), it shall have the first charge of the amount payable, to the extent, the same is due to be paid by him/her (complainant(s).
45.       Certified Copies of this order be sent to the parties, free of charge.
46.       The file be consigned to Record Room, after completion.

Pronounced.

 04.04.2016

Sd/-

 [JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.)]

PRESIDENT

 

 

Sd/-

(DEV RAJ)

MEMBER

 

 

Sd/-

(PADMA PANDEY)

        MEMBER

 

 

Rg.