Chandigarh

StateCommission

CC/29/2017

Rakesh A Jagtiani - Complainant(s)

Versus

M/s Emaar MGF Land Ltd. - Opp.Party(s)

Savinder Singh Gill, Adv.

28 Aug 2017

ORDER

STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,

U.T., CHANDIGARH

 

Complaint case No.	:	29 of 2017
Date of Institution	:	11.01.2017
Date of Decision	:	28.08.2017

 

Rakesh A Jagtiani S/o Mr.Ashok V.Jagtiani, r/o 66/2253, Gurudwara Road, IInd Floor, Karol Bagh, New Delhi.

 

……Complainant

V e r s u s

M/s Emaar MGF Land Ltd., SCO No.120-122, First Floor, Sector 17-C, Chandigarh through its Managing Director/ Authorized Signatory.  

                                                    .... Opposite Party

                                                     

BEFORE:         JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.), PRESIDENT

                        MR. DEV RAJ, MEMBER.

                        MRS. PADMA PANDEY, MEMBER

 

Argued by:      

Sh. Savinder Singh Gill, Advocate for the complainant.

Sh. Sanjeev Sharma, Advocate for the Opposite Party.

 

PER PADMA PANDEY, MEMBER

 

              The facts, in brief, are that the complainant booked a plot in Sector 109 in Augusta Greens having approximate super area of 300 square yard, as launched by the Opposite Party in the year 2007 for the total consideration of Rs.40,50,354/- inclusive of EDC & PLC charges. Thereafter, plot No.183 in Sector 109 was allotted to the complainant vide provisional allotment letter (Annexure A-2). Plot Buyer’s Agreement was executed between the parties on 30.06.2007 (Annexure A-4). At the time of registration, the Opposite Party had given assurance that possession of the said plot would be delivered to the complainant within a period of 2 years but not later than 3 years. Believing on the assurance, the complainant kept waiting and did not enquire about the progress of the abovesaid project. It was further stated that the Opposite Party office vide letter dated 04.02.2009 confirmed the complainant about his qualification for 5% incentive program (Annexure A-13). The complainant visited the site to know about the progress on the project but no progress was found. Even the Partial Completion Certificate has not been received by the Opposite Party, despite receipt of 95% of the total consideration. It was further stated that the complainant levied maintenance charges illegally and arbitrarily, without getting any completion certificate. Ultimately, the complainant sent a legal notice dated 23.07.2016 (Annexure A-21) but to no avail. It was further stated that the aforesaid acts, on the part of the Opposite Party, amounted to deficiency, in rendering service, and indulgence into unfair trade practice. When the grievance of the complainant, was not redressed, left with no alternative, a complaint under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (in short the ‘Act’ only), was filed.

2.           The Opposite Party, in its written version, has taken objection regarding arbitration clause in the Agreement, and also it separately, moved an application u/s 8 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 taking a specific objection in this regard for referring the matter to the Arbitrator in terms of the agreed terms and conditions of the Agreement. It was further stated that the complainant did not fall within the definition of “Consumer” as envisaged in the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, as he is a resident of New Delhi and is residing at his own house. It was further stated that the plot was purchased by the complainant in 2007 in resale, as such, he is a subsequent purchaser, so he purchased the plot solely for speculation purposes. It was further stated that the complainant had defaulted in making the payments of the due installments, as being apparent from statement of accounts, as such, the complainant is not eligible for waiver of amount as well as payment of delayed compensation/penalty. It was further stated that the Opposite Party already offered possession vide possession letter dated 28.12.2009 but the complainant is avoiding to take possession for gaining undue advantages. It was further stated that in the present case, refund of the amount to the complainant is not maintainable and if refund is made to the complainant then forfeiture clause would come into operation. It was further stated that this Commission has no territorial jurisdiction as well as pecuniary jurisdiction to try and entertain the complaint. It was admitted regarding purchase of the unit, allotment of unit No. 109-AG-183-300 vide provisional allotment letter dated 05.05.2007. It was further stated that Buyer’s Agreement was executed between the parties on 30.06.2007 and as per Clause 8 of the Agreement, Opposite Party “endeavor” to give possession of plot within a period of 2 years from the date of execution of the Agreement but not later than 3 years. It was further stated that the complainant paid an amount of Rs.38,77,855/- and an amount of Rs.7,40,962/- is due towards balance (Exhibit OP-5). It was further stated that the complainant has been eligible for OTPR subject to submission of undertaking for OTPR. The same has also been duly confirmed to the complainant vide email dated 07.08.2015 (Exhibit OP-6). However, the complainant has failed to clear the future amounts and the other formalities, in order to avail discount. Thus, the complainant is not entitled to any discount.  It was denied that the complainant visited the site or there is no progress. It was denied that the partial completion certificate has not been obtained and stated that the said certificate has already issued by the competent authority. It was further stated that the alleged case with Forest Department has come to an end, as case has been withdrawn by Forest Department. Copy of the order as well as other communications with Forest Department are annexed as Exhibit OP-10 colly. It was denied that the complainant had issued legal notice.  It was further stated that neither there was any deficiency, in rendering service, on the part of the Opposite Party, nor they indulged into unfair trade practice.

3.           The complainant, filed rejoinder to the written statement of the Opposite Party wherein he reiterated all the averments, contained in the complaint, and refuted those, contained in the written version of the Opposite Party. 

4.           The Parties led evidence, in support of their case.

5.           We have heard the Counsel for the parties, and have gone through the evidence and record of the case, carefully. 

6.           The first question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, in the face of existence of arbitration clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint. This question has already been elaborately dealt with by this Commission in case titled Mrs.Anjani Dass Vs. DLF Universal Limited, Complaint Case No.295 of 2017, decided on 19.07.2017. Para No.12 of the said order, inter-alia, being relevant, is extracted hereunder:-

“12.  At the time of arguments, it was also argued by Counsel for the opposite parties that in view of Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint and let the matter be referred to an arbitrator for adjudication.

                We are not going to agree with the argument raised. This Commission, in a case titled as ‘Sarbjit Singh Vs. Puma Realtors Private Limited’, IV (2016) CPJ 126 has already elaborately dealt with this question, while relying upon ratio of judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, titled as Fair Air Engg. Pvt. Ltd. & another Vs. N. K. Modi (1996) 6  SCC 385, C.C.I Chambers Coop. Housing Society Ltd. Vs Development Credit Bank Ltd. (2003) 7 SCC 233, Rosedale Developers Private Limited Vs. Aghore Bhattacharya and others, (Civil Appeal No.20923 of 2013), Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society v. M. Lalitha (2004) 1 SCC 305 and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. M/s Pushpalaya Printers, I (2004) CPJ 22 (SC),  and LIC of India and another Vs. Hira Lal, IV (2011) CPJ 4 (SC), and held that even in the face of existence of arbitration clause in an Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, this Commission has jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint. Furthermore, under similar circumstances, the National Commission, in a case titled as Lt. Col. Anil Raj & anr. Vs. M/s. Unitech Limited, and another, Consumer Case No.346 of 2013, decided on 02.05.2016, held as under:-

“In so far as the question of a remedy under the Act being barred because of the existence of Arbitration Agreement between the parties, the issue is no longer res-integra.  In a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it has been held that even if there exists an arbitration clause in the agreement and a Complaint is filed by the consumer, in relation to certain deficiency of service, then the existence of an arbitration clause will not be a bar for the entertainment of the Complaint by a Consumer Fora, constituted under the Act, since the remedy provided under the Act is in addition to the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. The reasoning and ratio of these decisions, particularly in  Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society Vs. M. Lalitha  (Dead) Through LRs. & Others  - (2004) 1 SCC 305; still holds the field, notwithstanding the recent amendments in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986.  [Also see: Skypak Couriers Ltd. Vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd. - (2000) 5 SCC 294 and National Seeds Corporation Limited Vs. M. Madhusudhan Reddy & Anr. - (2012) 2 SCC 506.] It has thus, been authoritatively held that the protection provided to the Consumers under the Act is in addition to the remedies available under any other Statute, including the consentient arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986.”

Furthermore, the National Commission in a case titled Omaxe Limited Vs. Dinesh Lal Tarachandani, First Appeal No.1433 of 2016, decided on 24.11.2016, while dismissing the appeal filed by the builder (Omaxe), held as under:-

“We are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the Learned Counsel.  In our opinion, the decision of the State Commission being based on the authoritative pronouncements by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and also on the decision dated 02.05.2016, rendered by this Bench in the case of Lt. Col. Anil Raj & Ors. Vs. M/s Unitech Limited & Ors. in CC No. 346/2013, in which we have held that notwithstanding the amendments in the Arbitration Act, the reasoning and ratio of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society Vs. M. Lalitha (Dead) Through LRs. & Ors.  (Supra) still holds good, no fault can be found with the view taken by the State Commission. 

Consequently, the Appeal fails and is dismissed accordingly.”

                Recently, the larger Bench of the National Commission in a case titled as Aftab Singh  Vs. Emaar MGF Land Limited & Anr., Consumer Case No. 701 of 2015, vide order dated 13.07.2017, has held that an Arbitration Clause in the Agreements between the complainants and the Builder cannot circumscribe the jurisdiction of a Consumer Fora, notwithstanding the amendments made to Section 8 of the Arbitration Act.

                In view of the above, argument raised by Counsel for the opposite parties, in this regard, being devoid of merit is rejected.”

            In view of the above, the objection raised by Counsel for the Opposite Parties, being devoid of merit, is rejected.

7.           The objection taken by the Opposite Party, to the effect that the complainant did not fall within the definition of “Consumer”, as per the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, as he is resident of New Delhi and is residing at his own house, so he purchased the unit for speculation purposes. After going through the record, we do not find any merit in the contention of the Opposite Party because the complainant in para No.2 of his rejoinder has clearly stated that “The complainant has purchased the said plot for residential purposes only.”So, in view of the above averments of the complainant, it is clearly proved that the said unit was purchased by him (complainant) exclusively for residential purposes.  It may be stated here that there is nothing, on the record, that the complainant is the property dealer, and deals in the sale and purchase of property, on regular basis, and as such, the unit, in question, was purchased by him, by way of speculation, with a view to resell the same, as and when, there was escalation in the prices thereof. Thus, in the absence of any cogent evidence, in support of the objection raised by the Counsel for the Opposite Party, mere bald assertion to that effect, cannot be taken into consideration. In a case titled as Kavita Ahuja Vs. Shipra Estate Ltd. and Jai Krishna Estate Developer Pvt. Ltd. Consumer Complaint No.137 of 2010, decided on 12.02.2015, by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, it was held that the buyer(s) of the residential unit(s), would be termed as consumer(s), unless it is proved that he or she had booked the same for commercial purpose. Similar view was reiterated by the National Commission, in DLF Universal Limited Vs Nirmala Devi Gupta,  Revision Petition No. 3861 of 2014, decided on 26.08.2015. The principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid cases, is fully applicable to the present case. Under these circumstances, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the unit, in question, was purchased by the complainant for speculation purposes. The complainant, thus, falls within the definition of a ‘consumer’, as defined under Section 2(1)(d) of the Act. Such an objection, taken by the Counsel for the Opposite Party in this regard, being devoid of merit, is rejected.

8.           The next question that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, this Commission has territorial jurisdiction to entertain and decide the complaint or not.

              According to Section 17 of the Act, a consumer complaint can be filed, by the complainant, before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, within the territorial Jurisdiction whereof, a part of cause of action arose to them. In the instant case, it is evident from the record, that provisional allotment letter dated 05.05.2007 (Annexure A-2), receipts (Annexures A-5 to A-12) and letter (Annexure A-13) annexed by the complainant was sent by the Opposite Party from its Chandigarh Office, as the same bore the address of the Company as “SCO 120-122, First Floor, Sector 17-C, Chandigarh 160017”. Since, as per the documents, referred to above, a part of cause of action arose to the complainant, at Chandigarh, this Commission has got territorial Jurisdiction to entertain and decide the complaint.  The objection taken by the Opposite Party, in its written version, in this regard, therefore, being devoid of merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.

9.           Another objection taken by the Opposite Party, with regard to pecuniary jurisdiction, also deserves rejection.  As per admitted facts, the complainant has sought refund of amount of Rs.39,52,855/- alongwith interest @16% p.a. from the date of receipt of payments till realization ; compensation to the tune of Rs.5 lacs, on account of mental agony and harassment etc. and cost of litigation to the tune of Rs.55,000/-. Even the issue, whether interest is to be counted when looking into pecuniary jurisdiction of this Commission, came up for consideration in the case of Surjit Singh Vs. M/s Emaar MGF Land Pvt. Ltd. and another, Consumer Case no. 484 of 2016 decided on 15.12.2016, wherein, after noting similar objections it was observed as under:-

“13.        Now we will deal with another contention of the opposite parties that for want of pecuniary jurisdiction, it is not open to this Commission to entertain and adjudicate this complaint.  As per admitted facts, the complainant has sought refund of amount paid i.e. Rs.48,95,264/- alongwith interest @12% p.a. from the respective date of deposits; compensation to the tune of Rs.5 lacs, for mental agony and physical harassment and cost of litigation to the tune of Rs.55,000/-. It is argued by Counsel for the opposite parties that if his entire claimed amount is added, alongwith interest claimed, it will cross Rs.1 crore and  in that event it will not be open to this Commission to entertain and adjudicate this complaint, for want of pecuniary jurisdiction. To say so, reliance has been placed upon ratio of judgment of a Larger Bench of the National Commission, in the case of Ambrish Kumar Shukla (supra). In the said case, it was specifically observed that when determining pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras, it is the value of the goods and services, which has to be noted and not the value of deficiencies claimed. Further, that interest component also has to be taken into account, for the purpose of determining pecuniary jurisdiction.

14.        In the first blush, if we look into the ratio of the judgment, referred to above, it appears that this Commission will not have pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain this complaint.  However, on deep analysis, we are going to differ with the argument raised by Counsel for the opposite parties.  Judgment in the case of Ambrish Kumar Shukla (supra) was rendered by Three Judges Bench of the National Commission, without noting its earlier view of the subject. This issue, whether, when determining pecuniary jurisdiction of the State Commission/ Consumer Foras, interest is to be added with other relief claimed or not, came up for consideration, before the Three Judges Bench of the National Commission in Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. And Ors., II 2003 CPJ 81 (NC). In the said case, noting similar arguments, it was observed as under:-

“3. Complaint (at pp 17-36) was filed with the following prayer :

“It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that the complaint be allowed and the opposite parties be directed to pay the claim to the tune of Rs. 18,33,000/- plus interest @ 18% from the date of claim till its realization. Also the suitable damages caused to the complainant be ordered to be paid to the complainant.”

4. Bare reading of the prayer made would show that the interest claimed by appellant pertains to the period upto the date of filing complaint, pendente lite and future. Rate and the period for which interest has to be allowed, is within the discretion of State Commission and the stage for exercise of such a discretion would be the time when the complaint is finally disposed of. Thus, the State Commission had acted erroneously in adding to the amount of Rs. 18,33,000/- the interest at the rate of 18% per annum thereon till date of filing of complaint for the purpose of determination of pecuniary jurisdiction before reaching the said stage. Order under appeal, therefore, deserves to be set aside. However, in view of change in pecuniary jurisdiction w.e.f. 15.3.2003, the complaint is now to be dealt with by the District Forum instead of State Commission.”

15.       It was specifically stated that interest claimed by appellant/complainant pertained to the period upto the date of filing complaint, pendente lite and future, need not be added in the relief claimed, to determine pecuniary jurisdiction of the State Commission/Consumer Foras. It was rightly said that the rate and period for which the interest has to be allowed, is within the discretion of the particular Consumer Fora, and the stage for exercise of such discretion would be the time, when final order is passed. We are of the considered opinion that the view taken is perfectly justified. There may be cases, where the complainant may not be entitled to claim any interest upon the amount paid, like the one, where he is rescinding his contract and  further at what rate interest is to be granted will be determined by the competent Consumer Fora, by looking into the facts of each case. All cases cannot be put into a straitjacket formula, to add interest claimed, to determine pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras. The interest, which is a discretionary relief, cannot be added to the value of the goods or services, as the case may be, for the purpose of determining the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras. As per provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (Act) value of the goods purchased or services plus (+) compensation claimed needs to be added only, for determining pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras.

                As per ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd., Civil Appeal No.10941-10942 of 2013, decided on 04.12.2015, we would like to follow the view expressed by Three Judges Bench (former Bench) of the National Commission in Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. case (supra), in preference to the ratio of judgment passed by a Bench of co-equal strength (subsequent Bench) of the National Commission in the case of Ambrish Kumar Shukla case (supra).

                In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. case (supra), it was specifically observed by the Supreme Court that when a former Bench of co-equal strength has given a finding qua one legal issue, it is not open to the subsequent Bench of co-equal strength to opine qua that very legal issue and give a contrary finding. At the maximum, the subsequent Bench of co-equal strength can refer the matter to the President/Chief Justice of India to constitute a bigger Bench, to look into the matter and reconsider the legal proposition. It was further specifically held that, in case, there are two contrary views by the former and later co-equal strength Benches, the former will prevail. It was so said by looking into the ratio of judgment rendered by the Five Judges Bench of the Supreme Court of India, in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2005) 2 SCC 673, wherein, when dealing with similar proposition,  it was observed as under:-

 “12. Having carefully considered the submissions made by the learned senior counsel for the parties and having examined the law laid down by the Constitution Benches in the abovesaid decisions, we would like to sum up the legal position in the following terms :-

 (1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or co-equal strength.

 (2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent from the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has come up for consideration. It will be open only for a Bench of coequal strength to express an opinion  doubting the correctness of the view taken by the earlier Bench of coequal strength, whereupon the matter may be placed for hearing before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than the one which pronounced the decision laying down the law the correctness of which is doubted.

 (3) The above rules are subject to two exceptions : (i) The abovesaid rules do not bind the discretion of the Chief Justice in whom vests the power of framing the roster and who can direct any particular matter to be placed for hearing before any particular Bench of any strength; and

 (ii) In spite of the rules laid down hereinabove, if the matter has already come up for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum and that Bench itself feels that the view of the law taken by a Bench of lesser quorum, which view is in doubt, needs correction or reconsideration then by way of exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons given by it, it may proceed to hear the case and examine the correctness of the previous decision in question dispensing with the need of a specific reference or the order of Chief Justice constituting the Bench and such listing. Such was the situation in Raghubir Singh and Hansoli Devi.”

16.         In Ambrish Kumar Shukla case (supra), ratio of judgment-Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. (supra) was not even discussed and considered. In view of above proposition of law laid down by the Five Judges Bench in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community & Anr.`s and also Three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court, in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. case (supra), it is not open to the Bench of co-equal strength to give contrary findings, to the view already expressed by a Former Bench of same strength. In Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. case (supra), decided on 02.04.2003, it was specifically observed by Three Judges Bench of the National Commission that when determining pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras, interest component claimed by the complainant/party, is not to be added. We are of the considered view that in view of proposition of law, as explained above, the view taken in Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. case (supra), to determine pecuniary jurisdiction without taking interest claimed, will prevail. As such, in the present case, we are not looking into the interest claimed by the complainant, when determining pecuniary jurisdiction of this Commission.  If the interest part is excluded, the amount claimed in the relief clause fell below Rs.1 crore and above Rs.20 lacs. Hence, this Commission has pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and decide the present complaint. In view of above, the objection raised by the opposite parties, in this regard, being devoid of merit, must fail and the same stands rejected.”

              In view of above, this objection taken by the Opposite Party that this Commission lacks pecuniary jurisdiction, being devoid of merit, fails and the same stands rejected.

10.         Another objection raised by Counsel for the Opposite Party at the time of arguments that since it was mentioned in the Agreement that the Company shall endeavour to deliver possession of the unit within maximum period of three years, as such, time was not the essence of contract, is also devoid of merit. It may be stated here that it was clearly mentioned in Clause 8 of the Agreement that possession of the unit will be delivered by the Opposite Party, within a maximum period of three years, subject to force majeure circumstances or reason beyond the control of the Opposite Party. In the instant case, the Opposite Party did not raise any force majeure circumstances, if any, encountered by it. In the absence of any force majeure circumstances having been faced by the Opposite Party or any other valid and legal reason beyond its control, the stand taken by it, in this regard, for condonation of delay in delivery of possession of the unit, to the complainant, cannot be taken into consideration. Thus, under these circumstances, since as per Clause 8 of the Agreement, the Opposite Party was bound to deliver possession of the unit, within a maximum period of three years from the date of execution of the same, as such, time was,  unequivocally made the essence of contract.

              Even otherwise, the Opposite Party cannot evade its liability, merely by saying that since the word tentative/ proposed/endeavor was mentioned in the Agreement, for delivery of possession of the unit, as such, time is not to be considered as essence of the contract. Non-mentioning of exact date of delivery of possession of the unit(s) in the Buyer’s Agreement, is an unfair trade practice, on the part of the Builder. The builder is bound to mention the exact/specific date of delivery of possession of the unit(s) to the allottees/purchasers thereof.  It was so said by the Hon`ble National Commission, in Rajeev Nohwar & Anr. V/S Sahajanand Hi Tech Construction Pvt Ltd, 2016 (2) CPR 769. Relevant portion of the said case reads thus:-

“Merely making possession by a particular date will also not meet the requirement of law and the promotor is under a legal mandate to stipulate a specific date for delivery of possession of the flat in the agreement which he executes with the flat buyer”.

In view of above, the plea of the Opposite Party in this regard also stands rejected.

11.          The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to within which period, the delivery of possession of the plot, was to be given to the  complainant. According to Clause 8 of the Plot Buyer’s Agreement dated 30.06.2007 (Annexure C-3), subject to force majeure conditions and reasons, beyond the control of the Opposite Party, possession was to be delivered within a period of 2 years, from the date of execution of the Agreement, but not later than 3 years. It is, thus, evident, from this Clause, that the Opposite Party was required to deliver possession of the unit, in question, in favour of  the complainant,  within the maximum period of 3 years, from the date of execution of the Agreement dated 30.06.2007, i.e. latest by 29.06.2010 and not more than that.

12.          The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether the Opposite Party offered possession of the unit, in question, to the complainant, complete in all respects or not. As per Clause 8 of the Agreement, possession of the unit was to be delivered to the complainant within a period of 2 years from the date of execution of the Agreement but not later than 3 years. So, the period of 3 years from the date of execution of the Agreement dated 30.06.2007 has expired on 29.06.2010. According to the Opposite Party, it sent letter of intimation to the complainant vide letter dated 28.12.2009 (Annexure OP-4) i.e. within the stipulated period of the Agreement. At the time of arguments, Counsel for the complainant stated that the possession offered by the Opposite Party is only a paper possession and not more than that because the Opposite Party only sent updation letter regarding the construction. To prove this fact, the complainant has pointed out Exhibit OP-4, the relevant portion of the said letter reads thus :-

“This has reference to the Plot allotted to you in the Project. We take this opportunity to update you on the status of the development work of the Project and in particular about the Plot situated in Augusta Greens, Sector 109 of the Project.

X x x x x x x x”

A bare perusal of the aforesaid letter clearly reveals that it is only an updation letter and not more than that. Even Counsel for the complainant stated that the Opposite Party even failed to deliver possession of the unit to the complainant due to lack of amenities. Moreover, Counsel for the complainant stated that the authority issued Partial Completion Certificate in favour of the Opposite Party only on 16.10.2015. It is also relevant to mention here that intimation of possession letter sent to the complainant vide letter dated 28.12.2009 and Partial Completion Certificate obtained by the Opposite Party vide memo dated 16.10.2015 i.e. after about six years of offer of possession. So, it is clearly proved that when the possession letter was sent to the complainant, the project was not complete. Even the Opposite Party failed to place on record any document, which could prove that all the basic amenities were complete at the site. Not only this, it is also relevant to note that a number of cases of Sector 109 of Emaar MGF Land Limited have already been decided by this Commission regarding the issue of sealing of project by Forest Department and other issues in Sector 109, one of which is titled as “Prabhujeev Singh Bajaj Vs. Emaar MGF Land Limited & Anr., Complaint Case No.43 of 2016, decided by this Commission vide order dated 29.06.2016”, the relevant portion of the said judgment reads thus :-.

“31. However, the main grouse of the complainant is that, despite relocation to the said units, even then, actual physical possession thereof, was not offered to him, whereas, on the other hand, paper offer was made to him, vide letters dated 25.08.2014 and 07.11.2014, because when he visited the site after receiving the said letters, to see development and basic amenities, the same were found missing and besides  that, all entry points of the project, had been sealed by the Forest Department, as opposite parties no.1 and 2, failed to take requisite permissions/sanction from it. Thus, in these circumstances, the principal question, which goes to the root of the case, and falls for consideration, is, as to whether, offer of possession made by opposite parties no.1 and 2, to the complainant, vide letters dated 25.08.2014 and 07.11.2014, in respect of the relocated units, could be said to be genuine offer or not. It is well settled law that the onus to prove that the project had been completed and the area/site, in question, is fully developed is on the builder/opposite parties no.1 and 2. It was so said by the National Commission, in Emaar MGF Land Limited and another Vs. Krishan Chander Chandna, First Appeal No.873 of 2013 decided on 29.09.2014. It is very strange that not even an iota of evidence has been placed, on record, by opposite parties no.1 and 2, to prove that when offer was made to the complainant, in respect of the units, in question, development work was complete and that all the basic amenities were in existence. On the other hand, in case, all the development activities, had been undertaken, and completed at the site, by the said dates, then it was for opposite parties no.1 and 2, which could be said to be in possession of the best evidence, to produce cogent and convincing documentary evidence, in the shape of the reports and affidavits of the Engineers/Architects, as they could be said to be the best persons, to testify, as to whether, all these development activities, had been undertaken and completed at the site or not, but they failed to do so. Opposite parties no.1 and 2 were also required to produce on record, a copy of the Completion Certificate (if obtained), having been issued by the Competent Authority, which could be said to be best evidence, to prove their case, but they miserably failed to do so. It is well settled law that before offering/delivery of possession of unit, in a project, it is mandatory to obtain completion certificate, from the Competent Authority(s), failing which the purchaser is at liberty to say no, to such an offer.

                Secondly, the complainant has placed on record, copies of the RTI Information, relating to the said project, in question. Vide RTI Information dated 29.04.2014 Annexure C-31, it was clearly intimated by Greater Mohali Area Development Authority (GMADA), that opposite parties no.1 and 2, had not even applied to them for commission of sewerage treatment plant, water supply, electricity etc. Not only this, it is further evident from  RTI Information dated 26.02.2015 Annexure C-30, issued by the Punjab State Power Corporation Limited (PSPCL), that no regular electricity connection has been released in the sector, in question, wherein the plots are situated. The said RTI Information goes unrebutted by opposite parties no.1 and 2. Not even a single document has been brought on record to prove that the information relating to non-existence of basic amenities, mentioned in the said RTI Information is false, or that the said information was fabricated by the complainant. Had the said information been false or fabricated, opposite parties no.1 and 2, could have obtained certificate from the said Authorities, to say that the same had not been supplied from their Department, but they (opposite parties no.1 and 2) failed to do so. Thus, it could safely be said that the complainant has proved his case, that opposite parties no.1 and 2 did not even obtain permission to provide basic amenities such as water, electricity etc., till  29.04.2014 or 26.02.2015, the dates when RTI information aforesaid, was issued by the Authorities concerned.

                Not only this, it is also an admitted case, that entry points of the project had been sealed by the Forest Department, as opposite parties no.1 and 2, failed to take requisite permissions/ sanction from it, which fact has also been admitted by them (Opposite Parties no.1 and 2), in paragraph No.26 of their written version. Not only this, the said fact is further corroborated from the letter dated 15.04.2015 Annexure-4 (at page 190 of the file), sent by opposite parties no.1 and 2, to the Chief Administrator, GMADA, requesting it to take up the matter with the Forest Department, regarding sealing of entry points of the project, in question, as the same had been stated to be “illegal access”. It has been clearly mentioned by opposite parties no.1 and 2, in the said letter that “…….we are bound by the agreement to give delivery within time bound manner to our various restive customers, we had applied for grant of access with your good self”. This admission of the opposite parties no.1 and 2, in the letter dated 15.04.2015 written to the Chief Administrator, GAMDA, itself clearly goes to prove that even till that date (15.04.2015), they  were not in a position, to deliver possession of the plot(s) to their customers, including the complainant, in the said project, on account of reason that the entries thereof  had been sealed by the Forest Department, stating it to be an “illegal access through the Forest Strip”,permissions/sanction, whereof has not been obtained by them. Not even a single piece of evidence has been brought on record, to prove that the said entry points have been got reopened by opposite parties no.1 and 2, after having obtained permission from the Authorities concerned. If it is so, then it remained unclarified by opposite parties no.1 and 2, as to when entry points of the project were sealed, how could they offer possession of the units, to the allottees, including the complainant, in the year 2014.

                A plea was also taken by opposite parties no.1 and 2 that only recently the Forest Department has served notice on them, alleging illegal access created by them, through the Forest land. To the contrary, perusal of RTI Information dated 05.05.2015 Annexure C-28 (colly.) (at pages 120 to 127 of the file) issued by the Government of Punjab, reveals that a court case with regard to dispute between the Forest Department and opposite parties no.1 and 2, is pending litigation before the Civil Court Kharar, since 03.07.2012, as opposite parties no.1 and 2 have violated Sections 29,33 and 63 of the Indian Forest Act 1927 and have also violated the directions passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, vide order dated 12.12.1996. The said RTI Information also goes unrebutted by opposite parties no.1 and 2. Thus, the matter with regard to entry points aforesaid, in respect of the said sector, in dispute, was an old dispute, between the Forest Department and opposite parties no.1 and 2, as they had not taken permission from the Competent Authorities, which fact was not disclosed by them, in their written version, filed before this Commission. 

                In view of above, it is held that the act of opposite parties no.1 and 2, in offering paper possession of the units, in question, vide letters 25.08.2014 and 07.11.2014, in the absence of development work; basic amenities at the site; non-obtaining of completion certificate, and also entry points of the project being sealed/closed by the Forest Department, amounted to deficiency in providing service and also adoption of unfair trade practice. It is therefore held that the offer of possession made by opposite parties no.1 and 2, vide letters dated 25.08.2014 and 07.11.2014 is nothing, but a paper possession, which is not sustainable, in the eyes of law.”

              Aggrieved against the afore-extracted order passed by this Commission, the Opposite Party filed First Appeal No.997 of 2016 in the Hon'ble National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, wherein, the matter was settled between the parties on 08.11.2016, as per the Settlement Agreement.

              It is pertinent to note that the Opposite Parties  (Emaar MGF) filed appeal in another case i.e. First Appeal bearing No. 709 of 2016 titled as ‘Emaar MGF Land Limited Vs. Mandeep Saini’ before the Hon'ble National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, against the order of this Commission and the Hon'ble National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi passed the order dated 14.09.2016, which reads thus :-

“x x x x xx

It is vehemently argued by Mr.Aditya Narain, learned counsel appearing for the Appellant that since the delay in delivery of possession of the flats in Sectors 104, 106, 108 and 109 is directly attributed to the sealing of the main access road to these Sectors by the Forest Department, one of the factors which weighed with the State Commission, falls within the ambit of force majeure clause in the agreement, there is no deficiency in service on the part of the Appellant in its alleged failure to deliver the possession of the subject flats in question by the committed time.  He thus prays that ex parte ad interim stay may to be continued. 

Prima facie, we are not convinced with the submission.  Hence, without expressing final opinion on the issue but having regard to the fact that the sealing orders have not yet been revoked and the Appellant is still not in a position to deliver possession of the fully developed flats with proper access, to the Complainants, we direct that the Appellant shall deposit in this Commission the principal amount(s) deposited by the Complainants with them, within 6 weeks from today.  On deposit of the said amount(s), it will be open to the Complainants to withdraw the said amount, on filing affidavits, undertaking to this Commission that they will refund the amount(s) withdrawn, if so directed at the time of final disposal of the Appeals.  Subject to the said deposits, the operation of the remaining directions, regarding interest, compensation, etc., in the impugned order shall remain stayed.

X x x x x xx x”

From the afore-extracted order, it is clearly proved that Counsel for the Opposite Party admitted before the Hon'ble National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi that the delay in delivery of possession to these Sectors i.e. Sectors 104, 106, 108 & 109 was due to the sealing of main access road by the Forest Department. It is clearly proved that the Hon'ble National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi without expressing final opinion on the issue but having regard to the fact that the sealing orders have not yet been revoked and the Appellant i.e. Emaar MGF Land Limited is still not in a position to deliver possession of the fully developed flats with proper access, to the complainants i.e. till the passing of the afore-extracted order dated 14.09.2016. So, we are of the view that in the present case, the possession offered by the Opposite Party is only a paper possession and not more than that.

13.          The next question that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, the complainant was bound to accept offer of possession, in respect of the unit, in question, when the same was offered to him vide letter of intimation of possession dated 28.12.2009 (Exhibit OP-4). It is pertinent to note that possession of the unit was to be delivered to the complainant within a maximum period of 3 years from the date of execution of the Agreement i.e. latest by 29.06.2010. However, the Opposite Party sent only updation regarding construction to the complainant only on 28.12.2009. Even the Opposite Party failed to send any letter, after of aforesaid letter dated 28.12.2009 stating that the unit was complete in all respects and the Opposite Party ready for delivery of possession complete in all respects. It may be stated here that non-delivery of possession of the unit, in question, complete in all respects by the stipulated date, is a material violation of the terms and conditions of the Agreement. It is not the case of the Opposite Party that the said delay occurred, on account of force majeure circumstances, met by it, on account of some stay or any other valid reason. Under similar circumstances, this Commission, in the case of Brig Ajay Raina (Retd.) and another Vs. M/s Unitech Limited, Consumer Complaint No.59 of 2016, decided on 24.05.2016, while relying upon the judgments rendered by the Hon`ble National Commission, held as under:-

“Further, even if, it is assumed for the sake of arguments, that offer of possession, was made to the complainants, in July 2015 i.e. after a delay of about three years, from the stipulated date, even then, it is not obligatory upon the complainants to accept the same. It was so held by the National Commission in Emaar   MGF   Land   Limited   and   another   Vs. Dilshad Gill, III (2015) CPJ 329 (NC). Recently also, under similar circumstances, in the case of M/s. Emaar MGF Land Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Dr.Manuj Chhabra, First Appeal No.1028 of 2015, decided on 19.04.2016, the National Commission, held as under:-

“I am of the prima facie view that even if the said offer was genuine, yet, the Complainant was not obliged to accept such an offer, made after a lapse of more than two years of committed date of delivery”.

The principle of law laid down in the aforesaid cases is fully applicable to the present case. It is therefore held that the complainants could not be held guilty, of filing the present complaint, seeking refund of the deposited amount, alongwith interest and compensation, as possession of the unit was not offered to them by the stipulated date.

 

Moreover, the judgment passed by the Hon’ble National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi titled as ‘Emaar MGF Land Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Dyal Singh, First Appeal No.462 of 2014, decided on 03.07.2015.’ The relevant portion of the judgment reads thus :-

“16.    Admittedly, appellants did not offer possession of the apartment within  the prescribed period, in terms of Clause 21 of the “Apartment Buyer’s Agreement”,  Moreover, no explanation has been given by the appellants as to why they did not offer the possession of the apartment by the stipulated period, though respondents had paid substantial amount. As per copy of the Statement of Account filed by the appellants, as on 04-Sep-2012 (Page No.133 of Paper Book of F.A. No.462 of 2014), the respondent has paid a sum of Rs.41,45,068/- out of the total sale price of the apartment, which was Rs.48,65,580.50. Thus, deficiency on the part of the appellants started right from that very moment. It is an admitted fact, that as per the agreement possession of the apartment was to be handed over latest by 23.8.2011. But the appellants admittedly offered the possession of the apartment for the first time only  in the year 2013. When the appellants did not offer the possession of the apartment in question within the specified period, under these circumstances, the respondents were fully justified to refuse the offer of possession, as late as in the year 2013. Thus, appellants themselves have violated the relevant terms and conditions with regard to handing over of the possession. Now it does not lie in their mouth to blame  the respondents for their own negligence (i.e. of the appellants). Therefore, appellants by not delivering the legal physical possession of the apartment within the prescribed period, are not only deficient in rendering  service but are also guilty of indulging into unfair trade practice. The appellants in  the present  case are enjoying the hard earned money  of the respondents since 2008. Now on one pretext or the other, appellants do not want to refund the same, though negligence on the part of the appellants, is writ large in this case.”

The aforesaid appeal was dismissed by the Hon'ble National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi with punitive damages. Aggrieved against the aforesaid order, Emaar MGF Land Limited filed Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 32492/2015 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and the same was also dismissed.

                   In view of the above, it is held that since there was a material violation on the part of the Opposite Party, in not handing over physical possession of the unit, complete in all respects, within the stipulated date, as mentioned in the Agreement, the complainant was at liberty, not to accept the offer made after a long delay, and on the other hand, was right by seeking refund of the amount deposited, alongwith interest and compensation, by way of filing the instant complaint.

14.          The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to what amount was deposited by the complainant in respect of the unit, in question. The complainant has claimed an amount of Rs.39,52,855/-. On the other hand, the Opposite Party claimed that an amount of Rs.38,77,855/- was deposited by the complainant, as is evident from statement of account (Exhibit OP-5). It is pertinent to note that the complainant is adding Rs.75,000/- as transfer fee in respect of purchase of the unit in the claimed amount. So, we are of the view that the complainant is not entitled to the aforesaid amount of Rs.75,000/- as transfer fee and it is clearly proved that she deposited an amount of Rs.38,77,855/- in respect of the unit, in question.

15.          The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, the complainant is entitled to refund of the amount of Rs.38,77,855/-, deposited by him. It is an admitted fact that the  Opposite Party is unable to deliver  possession of the unit, in question, complete in all respects, within the stipulated period, as mentioned in the Agreement, and firm date of delivery of possession of the unit, could not be given to him (complainant). The complainant cannot be made to wait for an indefinite period, for delivery of actual physical possession of the unit purchased by him. The  Opposite Party, therefore, had no right, to retain the hard-earned money of the complainant, deposited towards price of the unit, in question. The complainant is thus, entitled to get refund of amount deposited by him. In view of above facts of the case, the  Opposite Party is also under an obligation to compensate the complainant, for inflicting mental agony and causing physical harassment to him.

16.          It is to be further seen, as to whether, interest, on the amount refunded, can be granted, in favour of the  complainant. It is no doubt true that an amount of Rs.38,77,855/-, was paid by the complainant, without getting anything, in lieu thereof. The said amount has been used by the  Opposite Party, for its own benefit. There is no dispute that for making delayed payments, the  Opposite Party was charging heavy rate of interest (compounded @15% p.a.) as per Clause 3 of the Agreement, for the period of delay in making payment of installments.  It is well settled law that whenever money has been received by a party and when its refund is ordered, the right to get interest follows, as a matter of course. The obligation to refund money received and retained without right implies and carries with it, the said right. It was also so said by the Hon`ble Supreme Court of India, in UOI vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd (Supreme Court), (2014) 6 SCC 335 decided on March 20th, 2014 (2014) 6 SCC 335). It is relevant to note that when Opposite Party sent updation letter dated 28.12.2009 to the complainant, he kept silent for about six years and only sent legal notice dated 23.07.2016 to the Opposite Party. So, it is clearly proved that the complainant is also at fault and not exchanged any correspondence with the Opposite Party for not offering possession of the unit, complete in all respects. In view of above, the  complainant is certainly entitled to get refund of the amount deposited by him alongwith interest @10% p.a., from the respective dates of deposits till realization. 

17.          As far as the plea taken by the Opposite Party, regarding forfeiture of earnest money is concerned, it may be stated here that the same stands rejected, because it is not its (Opposite Party) case, that it was ready with possession of the unit, to be delivered to the complainant, by the stipulated date but it was he (complainant) who wanted to rescind the contract, on account of some unavoidable circumstances/ financial constraints due to deficiency in service rendered by the Opposite Party or for  any  personal  reason,  and  is  seeking  refund  of the amount deposited. Had this been the case of the Opposite Party, only in those circumstances, it would have been held that since the complainant himself is rescinding the contract, as such, he is entitled to the amount deposited, after deduction of the earnest money, as per the terms and conditions of the Agreement. In this view of the matter, the plea taken by the Opposite Party, in this regard, has no legs to stand and is accordingly rejected.

18.          No other point, was urged, by Counsel for the parties.

19.          For the reasons recorded above, the complaint is partly accepted, with costs. The  Opposite Party is directed as under:-

1. To refund the amount Rs.38,77,855/-, to  the  complainant, alongwith interest @10% p.a.,  from the respective date of endorsement of the unit onwards (endorsement date not mentioned by both the parties).
2. To pay compensation, in the sum of Rs.1.50 lacs, for causing mental agony and physical harassment, to the complainant.
3. To pay cost of litigation, to the tune of Rs.33,000/- to the  complainant.
4. The payment of awarded amounts mentioned at sr.nos.(i) to (iii), shall be made, within a period of 02 (two) months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, failing which, the amount mentioned at sr.no.(i) shall carry penal interest @12% p.a., instead of @10% p.a., from the respective date of endorsement of the unit onwards, and interest @10% p.a., on the amounts mentioned at sr.nos.(ii) and (iii), from the date of filing of this complaint, till realization.

 

19.          However, it is made clear that, if the complainant has availed loan facility from any banking or financial institution, for making payment of installments towards the said unit, it will have the first charge of the amount payable, to the extent, the same is due to be paid by the complainant.

20.          Certified Copies of this order be sent to the parties, free of charge.

21.          The file be consigned to Record Room, after completion.

Pronounced.

August 28^th,  2017.                                        Sd/-

[JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.)]

[PRESIDENT]

 

Sd/-

 [DEV RAJ]

MEMBER

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 (PADMA PANDEY)

        MEMBER

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