HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJIT MANDAL, PRESIDENT

1. This appeal has been filed against the order dated 18.08.2022 passed by the Learned District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum (Kolkata – Unit IV) ( in short, ‘the District Commission’) in connection with Consumer Case No. CC/73/2021.

2. Along with the appeal an application for condonation of delay has also been filed by the appellant.

3. We have heard the Learned Advocates appearing for both the parties on the application for condonation of delay and also carefully perused the record.

4. Learned Advocate appearing for the appellant has urged that there is a delay of 149 days excluding the statutory period to file the appeal. The erstwhile Advocate for the appellant without any prior intimation to the Appellant Company had stopped appearing in all matters and had never informed the Company of his retirement from the briefs.

5. He has further urged that the matter went unattended and the impugned order was passed.

6. He has further urged that the erstwhile Advocate never given any ‘No Objection’ to the Appellant. Hence, there was much difficulty to get the relevant papers and order copy too.

7. He has further urged that the Appellant has somehow able to obtain the certified copy of the order and has filed the instant appeal. So, the appeal should be admitted after condoning the delay in filing the present appeal.

8. On the other hand, Learned Advocate appearing for the Respondents has urged that the appeal has been filed with a delay of 162 days. The delay in filing is intentional. The Appellant has filed the instant appeal only to harass the Respondents in this case. The Respondents have prayed for dismissal of the condonation application.

9. Having heard the Learned Advocates appearing for both the parties and on perusal of the record it appears to us that the office has submitted a report that this appeal has been filed with a delay of 162 days. It also appears to us that the judgment of this case was passed on 18.08.2022 and the present appeal has been filed on 13.03.2023.

10. Now, we shall have to consider as to whether the application for condonation of delay should be allowed. To adjudicate this issue we deem it appropriate to refer section 41 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 which runs as follows :-

“41. Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Commission may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission on the grounds of facts or law within a period of forty-five days from the date of the order, in such form and manner, as may be prescribed:

Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of forty-five days, if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period:

Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the District Commission, shall be entertained by the State Commission unless the appellant has deposited fifty per cent. of that amount in the manner as may be prescribed:

Provided also that no appeal shall lie from any order passed under sub-section (1) of section 81 by the District Commission pursuant to a settlement by mediation under section 80.”

11. On perusal of the aforesaid statutory provision it is clear to us that the appeal against the order should be preferred within a period of 45 days from the date of the order. On perusal of the record produced before us it is clear that the impugned order was passed on 18.08.2022 and the present appeal was filed on 13.03.2023 i.e. after a delay of 162 days. The office has also submitted a report before this Commission that this appeal has been filed with a delay of 162 days. 

12. In order to condone the delay of the said 162 days, the appellant has to satisfy this Commission that there was sufficient cause for preferring the appeal after the statutory period. The term “sufficient cause” has been explained by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Basawaraj and Ors. V. The Special Land Acquisition Officer reported in AIR 2014 SC 746. The relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under :-

“9.Sufficient cause is the cause for which Defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The appellant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose”.

13. We also deem it appropriate to refer to Anil Kumar Sharma vs. United Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. reported in IV (2015) CPJ 453 (NC), wherein the Hon’ble NCDRC held as under :-

“12. ………….. we are not satisfied with the cause shown to justify the delay of 590/601 days. Day to day delay has not been explained. Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment of Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has held that while deciding the application filed for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes, will get defeated if the appeals and revisions, which are highly belated are entertained.

From the aforesaid dicta of the Hon’ble Apex Court and the Hon’ble National Commission, it is clear that ‘sufficient cause’ means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part and applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any ‘sufficient cause’ from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay.”

14. Reverting to the materials available before us para 3,4,5 & 6 of the application for condonation of delay is the explanation given by the Appellant for the delay caused in filing the appeal.  To explain the said delay, the Appellant has stated that the erstwhile Advocate of the Appellant without any prior intimation to the Appellant had stopped appearing in all matters and had never informed the Company of his retirement from the briefs. The matter was unattended and the said impugned order was passed. The erstwhile Advocate never given any objection to the Appellant. Hence, there was too much difficulty faced by the Appellant to get the relevant papers and order copy too. The Appellant was somehow able to obtain the certified copy of the order and has been able to file the appeal with a delay of 162 days. We think that such plea has been taken by the Appellant only to get rid from the complaint case and to condone the delay though he had full knowledge about this case. The plea taken by the Appellant / Opposite Party is not convincing and believable at all and the said plea, prima facie, appeared to have been made with an intention to mislead the Commission to get the condonation petition allowed at the admission stage itself. In the result, the submission of the Appellant to that effect that the erstwhile Advocate without any prior intimation to the Appellant Company had stopped appearing in all matters and never informed the Appellant Company of his retirement from the briefs and the matter was unattended and the impugned order was passed are nothing but an attempt to mislead the Commission.

15. In view of the above, we find no sufficient ground to condone the inordinate delay of about 162 days. The present appeal is nothing but an attempt to abuse the process of law.

16. The application for condonation of delay is accordingly dismissed.

17. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed being barred by limitation.

18. The appeal is thus disposed of accordingly.