1.     This appeal has been filed under section 19 of The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 in challenge to the Orders dated 17.12.2015 and dated 01.02.2016 of the State Commission in complaint no. 503 of 2014.

2.     We have heard the learned counsel for the developer (the appellant herein) and for the complainant (the respondent herein). We have also perused the material on record, including inter alia the State Commission’s impugned Orders dated 17.12.2015 and dated 01.02.2016, the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal and the memorandum of appeal.

3.     The prescribed period to file appeal as laid down in section 19 of the Act 1986 is 30 days. The present appeal has been filed with self-admitted delay of 1371 days in respect of the Order dated 17.12.2015 and 1325 days in respect of the Order dated 01.02.2016.

4.     The application for condonation of delay is first being taken up.

We see that the application mostly speaks of the procedural aspects and also touches on the merits of the case before the State Commission but it scarcely contains any such narration of the facts which may go to show sufficient cause to condone the delay.

In this regard learned counsel for the developer submits that the facts which in his opinion constitute good grounds to condone the delay are given in para 10 of the application. The same is being reproduced below for reference:

10. In the meanwhile, during a periodic review of all matters pending before various judicial forums, it was discovered that orders dated 17.12.2015 and 01.02.2016 had come to be passed by the Hon’ble State Commission in the absence of counsel, and that not only had the complaint been admitted, but the opportunity to file written version had also been closed, and that no further steps had been taken to defend the matter. The Applicant was not aware of the passing of orders dated 17.12.2015 and 01.02.2016 and only came to know regarding the said orders somewhere in/around January 2017. The Appellant company immediately took steps to engage a new counsel to appear and advice in the matter.

Learned counsel submits that it was during a periodic review of pending cases sometime in January 2017 that it was discovered that the impugned Orders dated 17.12.2015 and dated 01.02.2016 had come to be passed by the State Commission.

We find this argument to be not quite acceptable since the impugned Orders, which are interlocutory orders and not an order of final disposal of the complaint, were passed after notice to the developer i.e. after the developer had been duly made aware of the case.

Learned counsel then submits that the advocate it had engaged had not informed the developer of these Orders.

We find this argument also to be not very plausible since by its own admission the impugned Orders came to its notice in a periodic review which pre-supposes that the same were available in its concerned cell / office for perusal / review.

Learned counsel further submits that the developer then took steps to immediately engage a new advocate and went by his advice.

Though we have already observed that it is difficult to accept that the developer was not aware of the Orders but even then by its own admission the developer was necessarily aware of the Orders in January 2017. Yet still from January 2017 to 23.10.2019 i.e. when the appeal was filed, for about 2 ¾ years, it did not file appeal when the statutory period prescribed under section 19 of the Act 1986 is only 30 days. This period of delay too is in itself palpably abnormal and necessarily requires justified sufficient cause for condonation.

In this regard learned counsel submits that the new advocate who was freshly engaged first agitated in the State Commission on the issue of pecuniary jurisdiction and on his not being successful to get the complaint dismissed on this ground it was decided to file the present appeal. In this process much time got exhausted.

To us this is by no means a justified reason for condonation of delay. Pleas regarding wrong perception of a counsel, his flawed concept of the law of limitation or procedure, his electing a wrong standpoint or line of defence or his unsound professional advice resulting the lapse of the period of limitation are often raised in such matters where perhaps nothing better is available to proffer. That another issue unrelated to the issues in the present Orders was first agitated before the State Commission and after it not being accepted by the State Commission the present Orders were challenged before this Commission is on its own a self-defeating argument.

As such the various contentions raised on behalf of the developer do not appear to be convincing at all.

5.     All this points towards an unmerited attempt to anyhow explain the unusual abnormal delay coupled with a perfunctory and casual attitude if not total disregard towards the law of limitation.

6.  Ordinarily one leans in favour of the defaulting appellant for the purpose of condoning the delay and prefers to decide the lis on merits rather than rejecting the same at the threshold stage but even a liberal exercise of such kind will require at least some semblance of a plausible explanation being proffered to bridge up the significant gap after which the appeal has been filed.

Here, but, the ground being offered appears to be wholly inadequate if not mendacious.

It alongside bears emphasis that the interlocutory orders of the State Commission cannot be made a victim of inordinate efflux of time without just cause, moreso when as provided in section 13(3A) of the Act 1986 the ideal normative period to decide a complaint is 03 months from the date of receipt of notice by the opposite party if it does not require analysis or testing of commodities.

The powers which have been conferred to condone the delay have got to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily and certainly not at will either whimsically or capriciously. The discretion to be exercised in such matters is not an exercise of some kind of privilege or prerogative, it is essentially a legal exercise and has to be lawfully harnessed with judicious discipline. The object and purpose behind the law of limitation cannot be either swung into oblivion or be ignored with apathy. A complete disregard of the law of limitation will eventually frustrate and defeat the salutary purpose which inspires the enactment in this regard wherever provided.

7.      In the present case however one does not see even a semblance of an explanation which may constitute a good ground to condone the delay. The onus of the developer to show the factual basis from which may emanate such ground remains undischarged. The application for condonation of delay is palpably without worth or substance, sufficient cause to condone the delay is not at all forthcoming.

As such we have no hesitation in dismissing the application.

8.   Resultantly the appeal stands dismissed on limitation.

Though we have not entered into the merits of the matter, but having regard to the overall facts & circumstances and specificities of the case and to the fact that the impugned Orders are interlocutory orders not in the nature of final disposal of the complaint we are satisfied that in the totality of the things no miscarriage of justice is being occasioned.

9.   The Registry is requested to send a copy each of this Order to the parties in the appeal and to their learned counsel as well as to the State Commission immediately. The stenographer is also requested to upload this Order on the website of this Commission immediately.