PER JUSTICE J.M. MALIK 1. Counsel for the parties present. We have heard the counsel for the parties. This order shall decide two revision petitions by a common judgment as both of them entail the same facts and question of law. There is delay of 190 days each in filing the revision petitions before this Commission. In both the cases same pleas have been taken. In the application for condonation of delay, the delay has been explained in para No. 5, which is reproduced as under:- “5. That the petitioner is an agriculturist and was not having sufficient money and had arranged money and thereafter looking for appropriate Counsel to represent his case in New Delhi as he had no contacts in Delhi and it took time to explain facts of the case and draft the RP, file and the case before this Hon’ble Commission. That the delay in filing the above R.P. was neither willful nor wanton by due to aforesaid reasons. The Petitioner has a very good case on merits to succeed before this Hon’ble Commission” 2. The case of the petitioners are supported by their own affidavits. Counsel for the petitioners reiterates these please. We are not satisfied with the pleas raised by the petitioners. It is strange that sometime they were too poor and suddenly they have become rich and filed these revision petitions. The petitioners have failed to prove day-to-day delay. The expression “sufficient cause” cannot be erased from Section 5 of the Limitation Act by adopting excessive liberal approach, which would defeat the very purpose of Section 5 of Limitation Act and Consumer Protection Act. There must be some cause that must be termed as sufficient one for the purpose of delay condonation. We do not find that the petitioners have established sufficient cause for condonation of their delay. Mere poverty is not the ground for condonation of delay. Such pleas can be created at any time by the litigants. These views stand fortified by the various authorities which are detailed below. 3. In Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), it has been held that “It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras”. 4. Similar view was taken in R.B. Ramlingam v. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, I (2009) CLT 188 (SC), Ram Lal and Others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, & Bikram Dass Vs. Financial Commissioner and others, AIR, 1977 SC 1221. Both the revision petitions are hopelessly barred by time, therefore, the same are dismissed. | 
