Chandigarh

StateCommission

CC/513/2016

Mrs. Sunita Kaul & anr. - Complainant(s)

Versus

Emaar MGF Land Private Limited & anr. - Opp.Party(s)

Sukaam Gupta, Adv.

07 Feb 2017

ORDER

STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,

U.T., CHANDIGARH

Complaint case No.	:	513 of 2016
Date of Institution	:	29.08.2016
Date of Decision	:	07.02.2017

Mrs. Sunita Koul w/o Sh. Ramesh Kumar Koul, r/o #202, N.F.L. Enclave, Sector 48-A, Chandigarh.
Gautam Arora s/o Sh. P.D.Arora r/o #202, N.F.L. Enclave, Sector 48-A, Chandigarh.

……Complainants

V e r s u s

Emaar MGF Land Private Limited, SCO 120-122, 1^st Floor, Sector 17-C, Chandigarh, through its Authorized Signatory.
Emaar MGF Land Pvt. Limited, registered office MGF House, 17-B Asif Ali Road, New Delhi, through its Managing Director.

.... Opposite Parties

BEFORE: JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.), PRESIDENT

MR. DEV RAJ, MEMBER.

MRS. PADMA PANDEY, MEMBER

Argued by:

Sh. Sukaam Gupta, Advocate for the complainants.

Sh. Sanjeev Sharma, Advocate for the Opposite Parties.

PER PADMA PANDEY, MEMBER

The facts, in brief, are that the Opposite Parties came up with a project in the name and style of “Pinewood Park” situated at Sector 108, Mohali. The complainants applied for a plot measuring 300 sq. yards in the project of the Opposite Parties and paid the booking amount of Rs.10,35,000/- on 30.09.2006. The total price of the said plot was Rs.35,97,249/-. Accordingly, plot No.143 was allotted to the complainants and subsequently, Plot Buyer’s Agreement was executed between the parties on 04.07.2007 (Annexure C-1). As per Clause 8 of the Agreement, possession of the unit was to be delivered within a period of 2 years from the date of the said Agreement but not later than 3 years i.e. latest by 03.07.2010. It was further stated that the complainants made the total payment of Rs.35,97,274/- and Rs.75,000/- was also paid as nomination charges to the Opposite Parties. Thereafter, the complainants waited patiently for possession of their plot and even visited time and again to the office of the Opposite Parties but every time they made false assurances to the complainants. It was further stated that the complainants made number of correspondences with the Opposite Parties about the date of delivery of possession but none of the letters were ever replied by them (Annexure C-6 colly.). It was further stated that the Opposite Parties sent letter of intimation of possession dated 27.05.2016 (Annexure C-10), in which, it has been stated that possession of the said plot would be handed over within 60 days of the said letter and further raised a demand of Rs.94,851/-. It was further stated that despite lack of basic amenities such as roads/connecting roads, electricity, water, sewerage, storm water, drainage etc., the Opposite Parties offered paper possession vide letter dated 27.05.2016. It was further stated that the aforesaid acts, on the part of the Opposite Parties, amounted to deficiency, in rendering service, and indulgence into unfair trade practice. When the grievance of the complainants, was not redressed, left with no alternative, a complaint under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (in short the ‘Act’ only), was filed.

2. The Opposite Parties, in their joint written version, have taken objection regarding arbitration clause in the Agreement, and also they separately, moved an application u/s 8 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 taking a specific objection in this regard for referring the matter to the Arbitrator in terms of the agreed terms and conditions of the Agreement. It was stated that this Commission has no pecuniary jurisdiction as well as territorial jurisdiction to try and entertain the complaint. Further, the possession has already been offered to the complainants in May, 2016 and after offer of possession, seeking of refund amount tantamount to recession of contract and the amount is liable to be forfeited and money to be returned without interest after forfeiture only. It was further stated that the unit was initially allotted in the name of Sh. Paramjit Singh and provisional allotment letter was issued in the name of Sh. Paramjit Singh. Thereafter, the said plot was transferred in favour of the complainants on 21.06.2007 (Annexure R-1 colly.). It was further stated that on the request of the complainants, the plot has been relocated to unit No.108-PP-143-300 for total consideration of Rs.35,97,249/- (i.e. from PLC to non PLC unit). It was further stated that the complainants purchased the property in resale and paid the amount of Rs.75,000/- as service charges on 12.10.2007. It was further stated that no reasoning has been given by the complainants regarding purchase of the plot in Mohali, as they have already a house at Chandigarh, as such, the complainants are speculators. It was further stated that the Opposite Parties received the amount of Rs.35,97,274/- towards unit No.108-PP-143-300 and Rs.75,000/- as service charges for getting the plot transferred/nominated in the name of the complainants. It was further stated that the complainants are defaulters and consequently numerous reminders were sent to them for making payments and as on date, a sum of Rs.29,549/- is outstanding towards delayed interest and Rs.6,87,832/- is outstanding towards the complainants. Copies of the reminders and statement of accounts are Annexures R-3 colly. & R-4. It was further stated that as per Clause 8 of the Agreement, possession was “endeavored” to be handed over within three years of execution of the Agreement and, as such, there was no definitive agreement stating that possession would definitely be delivered within three years. It was further stated that it is well settled principle of law that in cases of sale of immovable property and construction, time is never regarded as the essence of the contract more so when there is penalty clause under the Agreement for any alleged delay. It was further stated that possession of the plot has been offered to the complainants vide letter dated 27.05.2016 (Annexure R-5), after completion of amenities at the site but the complainants themselves are avoiding to accept the possession. Copy of the Partial Completion Certificate is Annexure R-7. It was denied regarding closure of entry points of Sector 108. It was further stated that neither there was any deficiency, in rendering service, on the part of the Opposite Parties, nor they indulged into unfair trade practice.

3. The complainants filed rejoinder to the written statement of the Opposite Parties, wherein they reiterated all the averments, contained in the complaint, and refuted those, contained in the written version of the Opposite Parties.

4. The Parties led evidence, in support of their case.

5. We have heard the Counsel for the parties, and have gone through the evidence and record of the case, carefully.

6. The first question that falls for consideration is, as to whether, in the face of existence of arbitration clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of Arbitration Act 1996, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the present complaint. It may be stated here that the objection raised by the Opposite Parties, in this regard, deserves rejection, in view of the judgment passed by this Commission in Abha Arora Vs. Puma Realtors Pvt. Ltd. and another, consumer complaint No.170 of 2015, decided on 01.04.2016, wherein this issue was dealt, in detail, while referring various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India; the National Commission, New Delhi, and also Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Ultimately it was held by this Commission that even i n the face of existence of arbitration clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, this Commission has jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint. It was also so said by the National Commission, recently, in a case titled as Lt. Col. Anil Raj & anr. Vs. M/s. Unitech Limited, and another, Consumer Case No. 346 of 2013, decided on 02.05.2016. Relevant portion of the said case, reads thus:-

“In so far as the question of a remedy under the Act being barred because of the existence of Arbitration Agreement between the parties, the issue is no longer res-integra. In a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it has been held that even if there exists an arbitration clause in the agreement and a Complaint is filed by the consumer, in relation to certain deficiency of service, then the existence of an arbitration clause will not be a bar for the entertainment of the Complaint by a Consumer Fora, constituted under the Act, since the remedy provided under the Act is in addition to the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. The reasoning and ratio of these decisions, particularly in Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society Vs. M. Lalitha (Dead) Through LRs. & Others - (2004) 1 SCC 305; still holds the field, notwithstanding the recent amendments in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986. [Also see: Skypak Couriers Ltd. Vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd. - (2000) 5 SCC 294 and National Seeds Corporation Limited Vs. M. Madhusudhan Reddy & Anr. - (2012) 2 SCC 506.] It has thus, been authoritatively held that the protection provided to the Consumers under the Act is in addition to the remedies available under any other Statute, including the consentient arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986.”

In view of the above, and also in the face of ratio of judgments, referred to above, passed by the National Commission and this Commission, the arguments raised by Counsel for the Opposite Parties, stands rejected.

7. Another frivolous objection was taken by the Opposite Parties, by stating that registered office of the Opposite Parties is situated at Delhi and the plot is situated at Mohali, as such, this Commission has no territorial Jurisdiction to entertain and decide the complaint. In the instant case, Plot Buyer’s Agreement was executed between the parties, at Chandigarh, on 04.07.2007 (Annexure C-1). Not only this, letter (Annexure C-3) and letter of intimation of possession dated 27.05.2016 (Annexure C-10), were sent by Chandigarh office of the Opposite Parties, as the same had the address “Emaar MGF Land Limited, SCO 120-122, First Floor, Sector 17-C, Chandigarh-160017”. It means that a part of cause of action arose to the complainants, within the territorial Jurisdiction of this Commission. This Commission has, therefore, got territorial Jurisdiction to entertain and decide the complaint. The objection taken by the Opposite Parties, also stands rejected.

8. Another objection taken by the Opposite Party, with regard to pecuniary jurisdiction, also deserves rejection. It may be stated here, that the complainants have sought refund of the entire amount of Rs.35,97,274/- as well as Rs.75,000/- charged by the Opposite Parties as nomination fee alongwith interest @18% p.a. from the date of respective payments; to pay Rs.5,00,000/- as compensation for mental agony, harassment and deficiency in service and cost of litigation, to the tune of Rs.1,00,000/-, aggregate value whereof [excluding the interest claimed] fell above Rs.20 lacs and below Rs.1 crore because the Opposite Parties admitted in their written statement that the complainants deposited an amount of Rs.35,97,274/-, as is evident from statement of account (at page No.49 of the Opposite Parties documents). Thus, this Commission has got pecuniary Jurisdiction, to entertain and decide the complaint.

As far as the interest claimed by the complainants, on the deposited amount is concerned, it is not required to be added, at this stage, to the value of the reliefs claimed, for determining the pecuniary Jurisdiction of this Commission, in view of law laid down by three Member Bench of the National Commission, in a case titled as Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. II (2003) CPJ 81 (NC), wherein it was clearly held that since rate and the period for which interest has to be allowed, is within the discretion of Consumer Foras, and that too at the stage, when the complaint is finally disposed of, as such, the same being imaginary would not be taken into consideration, at the time of filing of the same (complaint), for the purpose of determination of pecuniary jurisdiction. Not only as above, in the case of Denis Exports Pvt. Ltd Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd, Consumer Case No. 196 of 2016, decided on 08 March 2016, it was clearly held by the National Commission that interest component being imaginary, will not be added in the reliefs sought by the consumers, for determining pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras. This issue has already been elaborately dealt with by this Commission in Surjit Singh Thadwal Vs. M/s Emaar MGF Land Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., Consumer Complaint No.484 of 2016, decided on 15.12.2016. Relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment reads thus :-

“13. Now we will deal with another contention of the opposite parties that for want of pecuniary jurisdiction, it is not open to this Commission to entertain and adjudicate this complaint. As per admitted facts, the complainant has sought refund of amount paid i.e. Rs.48,95,264/- alongwith interest @12% p.a. from the respective date of deposits; compensation to the tune of Rs.5 lacs, for mental agony and physical harassment and cost of litigation to the tune of Rs.55,000/-. It is argued by Counsel for the opposite parties that if his entire claimed amount is added, alongwith interest claimed, it will cross Rs.1 crore and in that event it will not be open to this Commission to entertain and adjudicate this complaint, for want of pecuniary jurisdiction. To say so, reliance has been placed upon ratio of judgment of a Larger Bench of the National Commission, in the case of Ambrish Kumar Shukla (supra). In the said case, it was specifically observed that when determining pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras, it is the value of the goods and services, which has to be noted and not the value of deficiencies claimed. Further, that interest component also has to be taken into account, for the purpose of determining pecuniary jurisdiction.

In the first blush, if we look into the ratio of the judgment, referred to above, it appears that this Commission will not have pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain this complaint. However, on deep analysis, we are going to differ with the argument raised by Counsel for the opposite parties. Judgment in the case of Ambrish Kumar Shukla (supra) was rendered by Three Judges Bench of the National Commission, without noting its earlier view of the subject. This issue, whether, when determining pecuniary jurisdiction of the State Commission/ Consumer Foras, interest is to be added with other relief claimed or not, came up for consideration, before the Three Judges Bench of the National Commission in Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. And Ors., II 2003 CPJ 81 (NC). In the said case, noting similar arguments, it was observed as under:-

“3. Complaint (at pp 17-36) was filed with the following prayer :

“It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that the complaint be allowed and the opposite parties be directed to pay the claim to the tune of Rs. 18,33,000/- plus interest @ 18% from the date of claim till its realization. Also the suitable damages caused to the complainant be ordered to be paid to the complainant.”

4. Bare reading of the prayer made would show that the interest claimed by appellant pertains to the period upto the date of filing complaint, pendente lite and future. Rate and the period for which interest has to be allowed, is within the discretion of State Commission and the stage for exercise of such a discretion would be the time when the complaint is finally disposed of. Thus, the State Commission had acted erroneously in adding to the amount of Rs. 18,33,000/- the interest at the rate of 18% per annum thereon till date of filing of complaint for the purpose of determination of pecuniary jurisdiction before reaching the said stage. Order under appeal, therefore, deserves to be set aside. However, in view of change in pecuniary jurisdiction w.e.f. 15.3.2003, the complaint is now to be dealt with by the District Forum instead of State Commission.”

It was specifically stated that interest claimed by appellant/complainant pertained to the period upto the date of filing complaint, pendente lite and future, need not be added in the relief claimed, to determine pecuniary jurisdiction of the State Commission/Consumer Foras. It was rightly said that the rate and period for which the interest has to be allowed, is within the discretion of the particular Consumer Fora, and the stage for exercise of such discretion would be the time, when final order is passed. We are of the considered opinion that the view taken is perfectly justified. There may be cases, where the complainant may not be entitled to claim any interest upon the amount paid, like the one, where he is rescinding his contract and further at what rate interest is to be granted will be determined by the competent Consumer Fora, by looking into the facts of each case. All cases cannot be put into a straitjacket formula, to add interest claimed, to determine pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras. The interest, which is a discretionary relief, cannot be added to the value of the goods or services, as the case may be, for the purpose of determining the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras. As per provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (Act) value of the goods purchased or services plus (+) compensation claimed needs to be added only, for determining pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras.

As per ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd., Civil Appeal No.10941-10942 of 2013, decided on 04.12.2015, we would like to follow the view expressed by Three Judges Bench (former Bench) of the National Commission in Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. case (supra), in preference to the ratio of judgment passed by a Bench of co-equal strength (subsequent Bench) of the National Commission in the case of Ambrish Kumar Shukla case (supra).

In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. case (supra), it was specifically observed by the Supreme Court that when a former Bench of co-equal strength has given a finding qua one legal issue, it is not open to the subsequent Bench of co-equal strength to opine qua that very legal issue and give a contrary finding. At the maximum, the subsequent Bench of co-equal strength can refer the matter to the President/Chief Justice of India to constitute a bigger Bench, to look into the matter and reconsider the legal proposition. It was further specifically held that, in case, there are two contrary views by the former and later co-equal strength Benches, the former will prevail. It was so said by looking into the ratio of judgment rendered by the Five Judges Bench of the Supreme Court of India, in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2005) 2 SCC 673, wherein, when dealing with similar proposition, it was observed as under:-

“12. Having carefully considered the submissions made by the learned senior counsel for the parties and having examined the law laid down by the Constitution Benches in the abovesaid decisions, we would like to sum up the legal position in the following terms :-

(1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or co-equal strength.

(2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent from the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has come up for consideration. It will be open only for a Bench of coequal strength to express an opinion doubting the correctness of the view taken by the earlier Bench of coequal strength, whereupon the matter may be placed for hearing before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than the one which pronounced the decision laying down the law the correctness of which is doubted.

(3) The above rules are subject to two exceptions : (i) The abovesaid rules do not bind the discretion of the Chief Justice in whom vests the power of framing the roster and who can direct any particular matter to be placed for hearing before any particular Bench of any strength; and

(ii) In spite of the rules laid down hereinabove, if the matter has already come up for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum and that Bench itself feels that the view of the law taken by a Bench of lesser quorum, which view is in doubt, needs correction or reconsideration then by way of exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons given by it, it may proceed to hear the case and examine the correctness of the previous decision in question dispensing with the need of a specific reference or the order of Chief Justice constituting the Bench and such listing. Such was the situation in Raghubir Singh and Hansoli Devi.”

In Ambrish Kumar Shukla case (supra), ratio of judgment-Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. (supra) was not even discussed and considered. In view of above proposition of law laid down by the Five Judges Bench in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community & Anr.`s and also Three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court, in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. case (supra), it is not open to the Bench of co-equal strength to give contrary findings, to the view already expressed by a Former Bench of same strength. In Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. case (supra), decided on 02.04.2003, it was specifically observed by Three Judges Bench of the National Commission that when determining pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras, interest component claimed by the complainant/party, is not to be added. We are of the considered view that in view of proposition of law, as explained above, the view taken in Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. case (supra), to determine pecuniary jurisdiction without taking interest claimed, will prevail. As such, in the present case, we are not looking into the interest claimed by the complainant, when determining pecuniary jurisdiction of this Commission. If the interest part is excluded, the amount claimed in the relief clause fell below Rs.1 crore and above Rs.20 lacs. Hence, this Commission has pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and decide the present complaint. In view of above, the objection raised by the opposite parties, in this regard, being devoid of merit, must fail and the same stands rejected.”

The principles of law, laid down, in the cases referred to above, are fully applicable, to the facts of the instant case. In view of the above, the objection taken by the Opposite Parties, that this Commission lacks pecuniary Jurisdiction, being devoid of merit, must fail and the same stands rejected.

9. The objection taken by the Opposite Parties, to the effect that the complainants being speculators/investors, as they already have a house at Chandigarh and purchased the unit in the project of the Opposite Parties for speculation purposes, therefore, did not fall within the definition of a consumer, as defined by Section 2 (1) (d) (ii) of the Act, also deserves rejection. It may be stated here that there is nothing, on the record, that the complainants are the property dealers, and deal in the sale and purchase of property, on regular basis, and as such, the unit, in question, was purchased by them, by way of investment, with a view to resell the same, as and when, there was escalation in the prices thereof. Thus, in the absence of any cogent evidence, in support of the objection raised by the Opposite Parties, mere bald assertion i.e. simply saying that the complainants being speculators, did not fall within the definition of a consumer, cannot be taken into consideration. In a case titled as Kavita Ahuja Vs. Shipra Estate Ltd. and Jai Krishna Estate Developer Pvt. Ltd. 2016 (1) CPJ 31, by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, it was held that the buyer(s) of the residential unit(s), would be termed as consumer(s), unless it is proved that he or she had booked the same for commercial purpose. Similar view was reiterated by the National Commission, in DLF Universal Limited Vs Nirmala Devi Gupta, 2016 (2) CPJ 316. The principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid cases, is fully applicable to the present case. The complainants, thus, fall within the definition of a ‘consumer’, as defined under Section 2(1)(d) of the Act. Such an objection, taken by the Opposite Parties, in their written reply, therefore, being devoid of merit, is rejected.

10. Another objection raised by the Opposite Parties that since it was mentioned in the Agreement that the Company shall endeavour to deliver possession of the unit within maximum period of three years, as such, time was not the essence of contract, is also devoid of merit. It may be stated here that it was clearly mentioned in Clause 8 of the Agreement that possession of the unit will be delivered by the Opposite Parties, within a period of two years from the execution of the Agreement but not later than three years, subject to force majeure circumstances or reason beyond the control of the Opposite Parties. In the instant case, the Opposite Parties did not raise any force majeure circumstances, if any, encountered by them. In the absence of any force majeure circumstances having been faced by the Opposite Parties or any other valid and legal reason beyond their control, the stand taken by them, in this regard, for condonation of delay in delivery of possession of the unit, to the complainants, cannot be taken into consideration. Thus, under these circumstances, since as per Clause 8 of the Agreement, the Opposite Parties was bound to deliver possession of the unit, within a maximum period of three years from the date of execution of the Agreement i.e. latest by 03.07.2010 and not more than that, as such, time was, unequivocally made the essence of contract.

Even otherwise, the Opposite Parties cannot evade their liability, merely by saying that since the word tentative/ proposed was mentioned in the Agreement, for delivery of possession of the unit and, as such, time is not to be considered as essence of the contract. Non-mentioning of exact date of delivery of possession of the unit(s) in the Buyer’s Agreement, is an unfair trade practice, on the part of the Builder. The builder is bound to mention the exact/specific date of delivery of possession of the unit(s) to the allottees/purchasers thereof. It was so said by the Hon`ble National Commission, in Rajeev Nohwar & Anr. V/S Sahajanand Hi Tech Construction Pvt Ltd, 2016 (2) CPR 769. Relevant portion of the said case reads thus:-

“Merely making possession by a particular date will also not meet the requirement of law and the promotor is under a legal mandate to stipulate a specific date for delivery of possession of the flat in the agreement which he executes with the flat buyer”.

In view of above, the plea of the Opposite Parties in this regard also stands rejected.

11. The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to within which period, the delivery of the unit, was to be given to the complainants. It is clearly proved from Clause 8 of the Agreement that possession of the unit was to be delivered to the complainants within a maximum period of three years from the date of execution of the Agreement i.e. latest by 03.07.2010. However, the Opposite Parties sent letter of intimation of possession dated 27.05.2016 (Annexure C-10) i.e. after a delay of more than five years.

It is pertinent to note that the Opposite Parties (Emaar MGF) filed appeal in another case i.e. First Appeal bearing No. 709 of 2016 titled as ‘Emaar MGF Land Limited Vs. Mandeep Saini’ before the Hon'ble National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, against the order of this Commission and the Hon'ble National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi passed the order dated 14.09.2016, which reads thus :-

“x x x x xx

It is vehemently argued by Mr.Aditya Narain, learned counsel appearing for the Appellant that since the delay in delivery of possession of the flats in Sectors 104, 106, 108 and 109 is directly attributed to the sealing of the main access road to these Sectors by the Forest Department, one of the factors which weighed with the State Commission, falls within the ambit of force majeure clause in the agreement, there is no deficiency in service on the part of the Appellant in its alleged failure to deliver the possession of the subject flats in question by the committed time. He thus prays that ex parte ad interim stay may to be continued.

Prima facie, we are not convinced with the submission. Hence, without expressing final opinion on the issue but having regard to the fact that the sealing orders have not yet been revoked and the Appellant is still not in a position to deliver possession of the fully developed flats with proper access, to the Complainants, we direct that the Appellant shall deposit in this Commission the principal amount(s) deposited by the Complainants with them, within 6 weeks from today. On deposit of the said amount(s), it will be open to the Complainants to withdraw the said amount, on filing affidavits, undertaking to this Commission that they will refund the amount(s) withdrawn, if so directed at the time of final disposal of the Appeals. Subject to the said deposits, the operation of the remaining directions, regarding interest, compensation, etc., in the impugned order shall remain stayed.

X x x x x xx x”

From the afore-extracted order, it is clearly proved that Counsel for the Opposite Parties admitted before the Hon'ble National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi that the delay in delivery of possession to these Sectors i.e. Sectors 104, 106, 108 & 109 was due to the sealing of main access road by the Forest Department. It is clearly proved that the Hon'ble National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi without expressing final opinion on the issue but having regard to the fact that the sealing orders have not yet been revoked and the Appellant i.e. Emaar MGF Land Limited is still not in a position to deliver possession of the fully developed units with proper access, to the complainants i.e. till the passing of the afore-extracted order dated 14.09.2016. So, we are of the view that in the present case, the possession offered by the Opposite Parties vide letter dated 27.05.2016 is only a paper possession and not more than that.

If for the sake of arguments, we believe that the possession offered by the Opposite Parties was complete in all respects, even the complainants are not bound to accept such an offer, made by the Opposite Parties. Under similar circumstances, this Commission, in the case of Brig Ajay Raina (Retd.) and another Vs. M/s Unitech Limited, Consumer Complaint No.59 of 2016, decided on 24.05.2016, while relying upon the judgments rendered by the Hon`ble National Commission, held as under:-

“Further, even if, it is assumed for the sake of arguments, that offer of possession, was made to the complainants, in July 2015 i.e. after a delay of about three years, from the stipulated date, even then, it is not obligatory upon the complainants to accept the same. It was so held by the National Commission in Emaar MGF Land Limited and another Vs. Dilshad Gill, III (2015) CPJ 329 (NC). Recently also, under similar circumstances, in the case of M/s. Emaar MGF Land Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Dr.Manuj Chhabra, First Appeal No.1028 of 2015, decided on 19.04.2016, the National Commission, held as under:-

“I am of the prima facie view that even if the said offer was genuine, yet, the Complainant was not obliged to accept such an offer, made after a lapse of more than two years of committed date of delivery”.