Chandigarh

StateCommission

CC/723/2017

Biresh Singhal - Complainant(s)

Versus

Emaar MGF Land Ltd., - Opp.Party(s)

Savinder Singh Gill Adv. & Hoshiar Chand Adv.

03 May 2018

ORDER

STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION,

U.T., CHANDIGARH

 

Complaint case No.	:	723 of 2017
Date of Institution	:	06.10.2017
Date of Decision	:	03.05.2018

 

Biresh Singhal s/o Sh. Yogendra Kishore, r/o H.No.1871, Housefed Complex, Phase – 10, Sector 64, Mohali.

 

……Complainant

V e r s u s

1. Emaar MGF Land Ltd., Mohali Hills, Office No.40, Central Plaza, Sector 105, Mohali, through its Managing Director Sh.Shravan Gupta.

Also at : Emaar MGF Land Ltd., ECE House, 28, Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi 110001 through its CEO Sh.Sanjay Malhotra.

2. Sh. Shravan Gupta, Director of Emaar MGF Land Ltd., ECE House, 28, Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi – 110001.
3. Sh. Sanjay Malhotra, CEO of Emaar MGF Land Ltd., Mohali Hills, Office No.40, Central Plaza, Sector 105, Mohali.

                                              .... Opposite Parties                                          

BEFORE:         JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.), PRESIDENT

                        MR. DEV RAJ, MEMBER.

                        MRS. PADMA PANDEY, MEMBER

Argued by:       

 

Sh. Savinder Singh Gill, Advocate for the complainant.

Sh. Sanjeev Sharma, Advocate for the Opposite Parties.

 

PER PADMA PANDEY, MEMBER

             

              The facts, in brief, are that the complainant was willing to own a residential plot, as such, he applied for a residential plot in the project of the Opposite Parties under the name and style of “Augusta Greens, Mohali Hills” situated at Sector 109, SAS Nagar, Mohali on 22.07.2012 by paying booking amount of Rs.5,00,000/-. The total price of the said plot was Rs.45,34,350/-. The complainant was allotted plot No.226 measuring 300 sq. yards vide provisional allotment letter dated 25.09.2012 (Annexure C-1). Plot Buyer’s Agreement was executed between the parties on 15.10.2012 at Chandigarh (Annexure C-2). As per Clause 8 of the Agreement, the Opposite Parties were to deliver possession of the said plot within a period of 12 months from the date of execution of the Agreement. According to the said clause, the complainant was liable to pay a penalty of Rs.50/- per sq. yards per month for the period of delay beyond 18 months from the date of execution of the Agreement. It was stated that the complainant paid the total amount of Rs.43,13,850/- in respect of the plot, in question, as per account statement (Annexure C-4). The complainant also availed loan of Rs.25,23,708/- from Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited (IHFL) for the said plot, which was duly paid by the complainant and No Objection Certificate dated 28.02.2014 (Annexure C-5) in this regard already received. It was further stated that the Opposite Parties sent a letter of intimation of possession dated 24.12.2014 (Annexure C-6) to the complainant, in which, it has been stated that the possession of the said plot would be handed over within 60 days of the said letter and further raised a demand of Rs.8,03,646/- for taking possession of the said plot and the area of the plot was arbitrarily increased to 312 sq. yds. from the earlier allotted area.  Thereafter, the complainant wrote number of emails to the Opposite Parties raising the issue of non-development of the project site and the issue of compensation not being credited in the account statement of the said plot. However, the Opposite Parties did not give any satisfactory replies to the queries raised by the complainant.  It was further stated that the Opposite Parties did not have completion certificate and the entry points were sealed by the Forest Department and, as such, the possession offered by the Opposite Parties was just a mere paper possession. It was further stated that the aforesaid acts, on the part of the Opposite Parties, amounted to deficiency, in rendering service, and indulgence into unfair trade practice. When the grievance of the complainant, was not redressed, left with no alternative, a complaint under Section 17 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (in short the ‘Act’ only), was filed.

2.           The Opposite Parties, in their written version, have taken objection regarding arbitration clause in the Agreement, and also they separately, moved an application u/s 8 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 taking a specific objection in this regard for referring the matter to the Arbitrator in terms of the agreed terms and conditions of the Agreement. It was further stated that the complainant did not fall within the definition of “Consumer” as per the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, as the complainant is residing in his own house and he purchased the property, in question, solely for speculation purposes only. It was further stated that as per Clause 8 of the Agreement, possession was “proposed” to be delivered within a period of 18 months from the date of execution of the Agreement. It is well settled principle of law that in cases of sale of immovable property and construction, time is never regarded as the essence of the contract. The term “proposes” duly indicates that there was no definitive commitment to hand over possession within 18 months. It was further stated that the complainant had voluntarily agreed the alleged delay, as their interest was safeguarded by the compensation clause in the Agreement. It was further stated that possession of the said plot was offered to the complainant on 24.12.2014 but he neither paid the due amount nor took physical possession of the said plot. It was further stated that the complaint was barred by limitation, as the same was filed  within two years from the date of cause of action. It was further stated that the complainant is bound by the terms and conditions of the Agreement and in cases of seeking refund, forfeiture clause would be applicable. It was further stated that this Commission has no territorial jurisdiction to try and entertain the complaint, as the property, in question, is situated at Mohali, Punjab. It was further stated that this Commission has no pecuniary jurisdiction to try and entertain the complaint, as the complainant is seeking refund of Rs.43,13,850/- alongwith interest @15%, compensation of Rs.2 lacs and litigation expenses of Rs.50,000/-, as such, the reliefs claimed by the complainant is well above Rs.1 crore. It was admitted that the complainant bought the unit No.109-AG-226-300, which was provisionally allotted to the complainant on 25.09.2012. It was further stated that the complainant is entitled for compensation for Rs.1,24,274/- till the date of intimation of possession and the same has been duly credited in the statement of accounts. It was further stated that the Opposite Parties obtained partial completion certificate (Annexure R-7). It was further stated that the Opposite Parties were exempted from PAPRA Act vide notification dated 22.12.2006 and at the time of offer of possession, there was no requirement of any completion certificate. It was further stated that the Chief Administrator, PUDA sent a letter dated 10.06.2013  to the Opposite Parties, which clearly state that the Emaar MGF had been granted exemption under the PAPRA Act. It was further stated that Forest Department had sealed certain entry points but there was still adequate access to the project and to the plot of the complainant i.e. through a motorable road and stand of the complainant that all entry points are sealed is malafide and without basis. It was further stated that no case is pending in Kharar Court because vide order dated 03.11.2016, the Court discharged the company and case stood closed (Exhibit OP/12). It was further stated that neither there was any deficiency, in rendering service, on the part of the Opposite Parties, nor they indulged into unfair trade practice.

3.           The complainant, filed rejoinder to the written statement of the Opposite Parties, wherein he reiterated all the averments, contained in the complaint, and refuted those, contained in the written version of the Opposite Parties. 

4.           The Parties led evidence, in support of their case.

5.           We have heard the Counsel for the parties, and have gone through the evidence and record of the case, carefully. 

6.           The first question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, in the face of existence of arbitration clause in the Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint. This question has already been elaborately dealt with by this Commission in case titled Mrs.Anjani Dass Vs. DLF Universal Limited, Complaint Case No.295 of 2017, decided on 19.07.2017. Para No.12 of the said order, inter-alia, being relevant, is extracted hereunder:-

“12.  At the time of arguments, it was also argued by Counsel for the opposite parties that in view of Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, this Commission has no jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint and let the matter be referred to an arbitrator for adjudication.

                We are not going to agree with the argument raised. This Commission, in a case titled as ‘Sarbjit Singh Vs. Puma Realtors Private Limited’, IV (2016) CPJ 126 has already elaborately dealt with this question, while relying upon ratio of judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, titled as Fair Air Engg. Pvt. Ltd. & another Vs. N. K. Modi (1996) 6  SCC 385, C.C.I Chambers Coop. Housing Society Ltd. Vs Development Credit Bank Ltd. (2003) 7 SCC 233, Rosedale Developers Private Limited Vs. Aghore Bhattacharya and others, (Civil Appeal No.20923 of 2013), Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society v. M. Lalitha (2004) 1 SCC 305 and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. M/s Pushpalaya Printers, I (2004) CPJ 22 (SC),  and LIC of India and another Vs. Hira Lal, IV (2011) CPJ 4 (SC), and held that even in the face of existence of arbitration clause in an Agreement, to settle disputes between the parties through Arbitration, in terms of provisions of Section 8 (amended) of 1996 Act, this Commission has jurisdiction to entertain the consumer complaint. Furthermore, under similar circumstances, the National Commission, in a case titled as Lt. Col. Anil Raj & anr. Vs. M/s. Unitech Limited, and another, Consumer Case No.346 of 2013, decided on 02.05.2016, held as under:-

“In so far as the question of a remedy under the Act being barred because of the existence of Arbitration Agreement between the parties, the issue is no longer res-integra.  In a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it has been held that even if there exists an arbitration clause in the agreement and a Complaint is filed by the consumer, in relation to certain deficiency of service, then the existence of an arbitration clause will not be a bar for the entertainment of the Complaint by a Consumer Fora, constituted under the Act, since the remedy provided under the Act is in addition to the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. The reasoning and ratio of these decisions, particularly in  Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society Vs. M. Lalitha  (Dead) Through LRs. & Others  - (2004) 1 SCC 305; still holds the field, notwithstanding the recent amendments in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986.  [Also see: Skypak Couriers Ltd. Vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd. - (2000) 5 SCC 294 and National Seeds Corporation Limited Vs. M. Madhusudhan Reddy & Anr. - (2012) 2 SCC 506.] It has thus, been authoritatively held that the protection provided to the Consumers under the Act is in addition to the remedies available under any other Statute, including the consentient arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986.”

Furthermore, the National Commission in a case titled Omaxe Limited Vs. Dinesh Lal Tarachandani, First Appeal No.1433 of 2016, decided on 24.11.2016, while dismissing the appeal filed by the builder (Omaxe), held as under:-

“We are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the Learned Counsel.  In our opinion, the decision of the State Commission being based on the authoritative pronouncements by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and also on the decision dated 02.05.2016, rendered by this Bench in the case of Lt. Col. Anil Raj & Ors. Vs. M/s Unitech Limited & Ors. in CC No. 346/2013, in which we have held that notwithstanding the amendments in the Arbitration Act, the reasoning and ratio of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society Vs. M. Lalitha (Dead) Through LRs. & Ors.  (Supra) still holds good, no fault can be found with the view taken by the State Commission. 

Consequently, the Appeal fails and is dismissed accordingly.”

                Recently, the larger Bench of the National Commission in a case titled as Aftab Singh  Vs. Emaar MGF Land Limited & Anr., Consumer Case No. 701 of 2015, vide order dated 13.07.2017, has held that an Arbitration Clause in the Agreements between the complainants and the Builder cannot circumscribe the jurisdiction of a Consumer Fora, notwithstanding the amendments made to Section 8 of the Arbitration Act.

                In view of the above, argument raised by Counsel for the opposite parties, in this regard, being devoid of merit is rejected.”

             

            Against the order passed by the larger Bench of the Hon'ble National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, M/s Emaar MGF Land Limited filed Civil Appeal No.(s) 23512-23513 of 2017 in Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, which was also dismissed.

              In view of the above, the objection raised by Counsel for the Opposite Parties, being devoid of merit, is rejected.

7.           The next question that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, this Commission has territorial jurisdiction to entertain and decide the complaint or not.

              According to Section 17 of the Act, a consumer complaint can be filed, by the complainant, before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, within the territorial Jurisdiction whereof, a part of cause of action arose to him. In the instant case, it is evident from the record, that Plot Buyer’s Agreement was executed between the parties at Chandigarh (Annexure A-C-2). Not only this, letter – Annexure C-1 &  receipts/acknowledgment cum receipts – Annexure C-3 (Colly.). were sent by the Opposite Parties from their Chandigarh Office, as the same bore the address of the Company as “SCO 120-122, First Floor, Sector 17-C, Chandigarh 160017”. Since, as per the documents, referred to above, a part of cause of action arose to the complainant, at Chandigarh, this Commission has got territorial Jurisdiction to entertain and decide the complaint.  The objection taken by the Opposite Parties, in their written version, in this regard, therefore, being devoid of merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected. 

8.           Another objection taken by the Opposite Parties, with regard to pecuniary jurisdiction, also deserves rejection.  This issue has already been decided by this Commission in the case of Surjit Singh Vs. M/s Emaar MGF Land Pvt. Ltd. and another, Consumer Case no. 484 of 2016 decided on 15.12.2016, which reads thus:-

“13.        Now we will deal with another contention of the opposite parties that for want of pecuniary jurisdiction, it is not open to this Commission to entertain and adjudicate this complaint.  As per admitted facts, the complainant has sought refund of amount paid i.e. Rs.48,95,264/- alongwith interest @12% p.a. from the respective date of deposits; compensation to the tune of Rs.5 lacs, for mental agony and physical harassment and cost of litigation to the tune of Rs.55,000/-. It is argued by Counsel for the opposite parties that if his entire claimed amount is added, alongwith interest claimed, it will cross Rs.1 crore and  in that event it will not be open to this Commission to entertain and adjudicate this complaint, for want of pecuniary jurisdiction. To say so, reliance has been placed upon ratio of judgment of a Larger Bench of the National Commission, in the case of Ambrish Kumar Shukla (supra). In the said case, it was specifically observed that when determining pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras, it is the value of the goods and services, which has to be noted and not the value of deficiencies claimed. Further, that interest component also has to be taken into account, for the purpose of determining pecuniary jurisdiction.

14.        In the first blush, if we look into the ratio of the judgment, referred to above, it appears that this Commission will not have pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain this complaint.  However, on deep analysis, we are going to differ with the argument raised by Counsel for the opposite parties.  Judgment in the case of Ambrish Kumar Shukla (supra) was rendered by Three Judges Bench of the National Commission, without noting its earlier view of the subject. This issue, whether, when determining pecuniary jurisdiction of the State Commission/ Consumer Foras, interest is to be added with other relief claimed or not, came up for consideration, before the Three Judges Bench of the National Commission in Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. And Ors., II 2003 CPJ 81 (NC). In the said case, noting similar arguments, it was observed as under:-

“3. Complaint (at pp 17-36) was filed with the following prayer :

“It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that the complaint be allowed and the opposite parties be directed to pay the claim to the tune of Rs. 18,33,000/- plus interest @ 18% from the date of claim till its realization. Also the suitable damages caused to the complainant be ordered to be paid to the complainant.”

4. Bare reading of the prayer made would show that the interest claimed by appellant pertains to the period upto the date of filing complaint, pendente lite and future. Rate and the period for which interest has to be allowed, is within the discretion of State Commission and the stage for exercise of such a discretion would be the time when the complaint is finally disposed of. Thus, the State Commission had acted erroneously in adding to the amount of Rs. 18,33,000/- the interest at the rate of 18% per annum thereon till date of filing of complaint for the purpose of determination of pecuniary jurisdiction before reaching the said stage. Order under appeal, therefore, deserves to be set aside. However, in view of change in pecuniary jurisdiction w.e.f. 15.3.2003, the complaint is now to be dealt with by the District Forum instead of State Commission.”

15.       It was specifically stated that interest claimed by appellant/complainant pertained to the period upto the date of filing complaint, pendente lite and future, need not be added in the relief claimed, to determine pecuniary jurisdiction of the State Commission/Consumer Foras. It was rightly said that the rate and period for which the interest has to be allowed, is within the discretion of the particular Consumer Fora, and the stage for exercise of such discretion would be the time, when final order is passed. We are of the considered opinion that the view taken is perfectly justified. There may be cases, where the complainant may not be entitled to claim any interest upon the amount paid, like the one, where he is rescinding his contract and  further at what rate interest is to be granted will be determined by the competent Consumer Fora, by looking into the facts of each case. All cases cannot be put into a straitjacket formula, to add interest claimed, to determine pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras. The interest, which is a discretionary relief, cannot be added to the value of the goods or services, as the case may be, for the purpose of determining the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras. As per provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (Act) value of the goods purchased or services plus (+) compensation claimed needs to be added only, for determining pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras.

                As per ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd., Civil Appeal No.10941-10942 of 2013, decided on 04.12.2015, we would like to follow the view expressed by Three Judges Bench (former Bench) of the National Commission in Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. case (supra), in preference to the ratio of judgment passed by a Bench of co-equal strength (subsequent Bench) of the National Commission in the case of Ambrish Kumar Shukla case (supra).

                In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. case (supra), it was specifically observed by the Supreme Court that when a former Bench of co-equal strength has given a finding qua one legal issue, it is not open to the subsequent Bench of co-equal strength to opine qua that very legal issue and give a contrary finding. At the maximum, the subsequent Bench of co-equal strength can refer the matter to the President/Chief Justice of India to constitute a bigger Bench, to look into the matter and reconsider the legal proposition. It was further specifically held that, in case, there are two contrary views by the former and later co-equal strength Benches, the former will prevail. It was so said by looking into the ratio of judgment rendered by the Five Judges Bench of the Supreme Court of India, in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2005) 2 SCC 673, wherein, when dealing with similar proposition,  it was observed as under:-

 “12. Having carefully considered the submissions made by the learned senior counsel for the parties and having examined the law laid down by the Constitution Benches in the abovesaid decisions, we would like to sum up the legal position in the following terms :-

 (1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or co-equal strength.

 (2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent from the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has come up for consideration. It will be open only for a Bench of coequal strength to express an opinion  doubting the correctness of the view taken by the earlier Bench of coequal strength, whereupon the matter may be placed for hearing before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than the one which pronounced the decision laying down the law the correctness of which is doubted.

 (3) The above rules are subject to two exceptions : (i) The abovesaid rules do not bind the discretion of the Chief Justice in whom vests the power of framing the roster and who can direct any particular matter to be placed for hearing before any particular Bench of any strength; and

 (ii) In spite of the rules laid down hereinabove, if the matter has already come up for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum and that Bench itself feels that the view of the law taken by a Bench of lesser quorum, which view is in doubt, needs correction or reconsideration then by way of exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons given by it, it may proceed to hear the case and examine the correctness of the previous decision in question dispensing with the need of a specific reference or the order of Chief Justice constituting the Bench and such listing. Such was the situation in Raghubir Singh and Hansoli Devi.”

16.         In Ambrish Kumar Shukla case (supra), ratio of judgment-Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. (supra) was not even discussed and considered. In view of above proposition of law laid down by the Five Judges Bench in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community & Anr.`s and also Three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court, in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. case (supra), it is not open to the Bench of co-equal strength to give contrary findings, to the view already expressed by a Former Bench of same strength. In Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. case (supra), decided on 02.04.2003, it was specifically observed by Three Judges Bench of the National Commission that when determining pecuniary jurisdiction of the Consumer Foras, interest component claimed by the complainant/party, is not to be added. We are of the considered view that in view of proposition of law, as explained above, the view taken in Shahbad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. case (supra), to determine pecuniary jurisdiction without taking interest claimed, will prevail. As such, in the present case, we are not looking into the interest claimed by the complainant, when determining pecuniary jurisdiction of this Commission.  If the interest part is excluded, the amount claimed in the relief clause fell below Rs.1 crore and above Rs.20 lacs. Hence, this Commission has pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain and decide the present complaint. In view of above, the objection raised by the opposite parties, in this regard, being devoid of merit, must fail and the same stands rejected.”

              However, in the present case, keeping in mind, the prevalent rate of interest, even if the interest component is added to the amount claimed, the case is well within the pecuniary jurisdiction. In view of above, this objection taken by the Opposite Parties that this Commission lacks pecuniary jurisdiction, being devoid of merit, fails and the same stands rejected.

9.           The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, the complainant falls within the definition of a consumer, as defined by Section 2 (1) (d) (ii) of the Act, or not. The plea taken by the Opposite Parties in their written statement that the complainant is residing in his own house, as such, he purchased the property solely for speculation purposes only. After going through the record, we are of the view that the objection taken by the Opposite Parties does not carry any weight and is liable to be rejected. It has been mentioned by the complainant, in para no.1 of his complaint that he was willing to own a residential plot as the complainant is living in a two-bedroom flat with his family and due to the paucity of space and for his extended family needs and for personal use applied for a residential plot in the project being developed by the Opposite Parties. Even otherwise, the mere fact that it was a residential unit, which was allotted, in favour of the complainant, was sufficient to prove that it was to be used for the purpose of residence, by the complainant. There is nothing, on the record, that the complainant is property dealer. Thus, in the absence of any cogent evidence, in support of the objection raised by the  Opposite Parties, mere bald assertion i.e. simply saying that the  complainant purchased the property for speculation purposes, as such, he did not fall within the definition of a consumer, cannot be taken into consideration. Further, in a case titled as Kavita Ahuja Vs. Shipra Estate Ltd. and Jai Krishna Estate Developer Pvt. Ltd. 2016 (1) CPJ 31, decided by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, it was held that the buyer(s) of the residential unit(s), would be termed as consumer(s), unless it is proved that he or she had booked the same for commercial purpose. Similar view was reiterated by the National Commission, in DLF Universal Limited Vs Nirmala Devi Gupta,  2016 (2) CPJ 316. Not only this, recently in a case titled as  Aashish Oberai Vs. Emaar MGF Land Limited, Consumer Case No. 70 of 2015, decided on 14 Sep 2016, under similar circumstances, the National Commission negated the plea taken by the builder, while holding as under:-

“In the case of the purchase of the houses which a builder undertakes to construct for the buyer, the purchase can be said to be for a commercial purpose where it is shown, by producing evidence, that the buyer is engaged in the business of a buying and selling of houses and or plots as a trading activity, with a view to make profits by sale of such houses or plots.  A person cannot be said to have purchased a house for a commercial purpose only by proving that he owns or had purchased more than one houses or plots.  In a given case, separate houses may be purchased by a person for the individual use of his family members.  A person owning a house in a city A may also purchase a house in city B for the purpose of staying in that house during short visits to that city.  A person may buy two or three houses if the requirement of his family cannot be met in one house.  Therefore, it would not be correct to say that in every case where a person owns more than one house, the acquisition of the house is for a commercial purpose.”

 

 

               

                The principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid cases, is fully applicable to the present case. The  complainant, thus, falls within the definition of a ‘consumer’, as defined under Section 2(1)(d) of the Act. Such an objection, taken by  the Opposite Parties, in their written reply, therefore, being devoid of merit, is rejected.  

10.          Another objection raised by Counsel for the Opposite Parties that since it was mentioned in the Agreement that the Company shall “proposes” to deliver possession of the unit within maximum period of 18 months from the date of execution of the Agreement, as such, time was not the essence of contract, is also devoid of merit. It may be stated here that it was clearly mentioned in Clause 8 of the Agreement that possession of the unit will be delivered by the Opposite Parties, within a maximum period of 18 months from the date of execution of the Agreement, subject to force majeure circumstances or reason beyond the control of the Opposite Parties. In the instant case, the Opposite Parties did not raise any force majeure circumstances, if any, encountered by them. In the absence of any force majeure circumstances having been faced by the Opposite Parties or any other valid and legal reason beyond their control, the stand taken by them, in this regard, for condonation of delay in delivery of possession of the unit, to the complainant, cannot be taken into consideration. Thus, under these circumstances, since as per Clause 8 of the Agreement, the Opposite Parties were bound to deliver possession of the unit, within a maximum period of 18 months from the date of execution of the Agreement, as such, time was,  unequivocally made the essence of contract.

              Even otherwise, the Opposite Parties cannot evade their liability, merely by saying that since the word endeavour/tentative/ proposed was mentioned in the Agreement, for delivery of possession of the unit, as such, time is not to be considered as essence of the contract. Non-mentioning of exact date of delivery of possession of the unit(s) in the Buyer’s Agreement, is an unfair trade practice, on the part of the Builder. The builder is bound to mention the exact/specific date of delivery of possession of the unit(s) to the allottees/purchasers thereof.  It was so said by the Hon`ble National Commission, in Rajeev Nohwar & Anr. V/S Sahajanand Hi Tech Construction Pvt Ltd, 2016 (2) CPR 769. Relevant portion of the said case reads thus:-

“Merely making possession by a particular date will also not meet the requirement of law and the promotor is under a legal mandate to stipulate a specific date for delivery of possession of the flat in the agreement which he executes with the flat buyer”.

In view of above, the plea of the Opposite Parties in this regard also stands rejected.

11.          The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to within which period, the delivery of possession of the plot, was to be given to the  complainant. According to Clause 8 of the Plot Buyer’s Agreement dated 15.10.2012 (Annexure C-2), subject to force majeure conditions and reasons, beyond the control of the Opposite Parties, they were to deliver possession of the plot, in question, within a period of 12 months, from the date of execution of the Agreement, but not later than 18 months. It is, thus, evident, from Clause 8 of the Agreement, that the Opposite Parties were required to deliver possession of the plot, in question, in favour of  the complainant,  within the maximum period of 18 months, from the date of execution of the  Agreement dated 15.10.2012, i.e. latest by 14.04.2014 and not more than that.

12.          The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether the Opposite Parties offered possession of the unit/plot, in question, to the complainant, complete in all respects or not. As per Clause 8 of the Agreement, possession of the unit was to be delivered to the complainant within a period of 12 months from the date of execution of the Agreement but not later than 18 months. So, the period of 18 months from the date of execution of the Agreement dated 15.10.2012 has expired on 14.04.2014. However, the Opposite Parties sent letter of intimation to the complainant vide letter dated 24.12.2014 (Annexure    C-6) i.e. after a delay of about 8 months. According to the Counsel for the Opposite Parties, possession of the said plot was offered to the complainant vide intimation of possession letter dated 24.12.2014 (Annexure C-6) after completion of amenities, but he did not come forward to take possession of the said plot, in question. On the other hand, as per the complainant, the Opposite Parties offered possession vide the aforesaid letter, without completion of amenities, at the site because number of emails/letters were exchanged between the parties in this regard and the entry points being sealed by the Forest Department, as such, possession offered by the Opposite Parties was just a mere paper possession.   After going through the record, we are not agreeable with the contention of the Counsel for the Opposite Parties because after receipt of the possession letter, the complainant sent an email dated 27.04.2016 (at page No.49 of the file) to the Opposite Parties, the relevant portion of which reads thus :-

“After receiving your mail I have visited the site along with Ms.Praneeta (from Emmar) & Ms. Rishi Chauhan (Director, M/s Colors Properties, Mohali), where I have observe that the plot is still not ready for possession. I have noticed that on particularly to the area of my plot, lots of work is still incomplete and this plot is still not ready for possession. Following points have been noticed by me :-

1. No street light poles has not been installed yet on any side of the front or side road (safety is the most serious concern).
2. Demarcation has not been done yet.
3. The main road has not be completed.
4. No pavement work has been done while rest of the sector 109 has complete pavements.
5. No electrification has been made.
6. Land is still not labeled, lots of big Khaddas are there inside the plot.”

From the afore-extracted email, it is clearly proved that the Opposite Parties failed to offer possession of the unit to the complainant, complete in all respects. It is well settled law that the onus to prove that the project had been completed and the area/site, in question, is fully developed is on the builder. It was so said by the National Commission, in Emaar MGF Land Limited and another Vs. Krishan Chander Chandna, First Appeal No.873 of 2013 decided on 29.09.2014. It is very strange that not even an iota of evidence has been placed, on record, by the Opposite Parties, to prove that development work was complete and that all the basic amenities were in existence. On the other hand, in case, all the development activities, had been undertaken, and completed at the site, by the said dates, then it was for Opposite Parties, which could be said to be in possession of the best evidence, to produce cogent and convincing documentary evidence, in the shape of the reports and affidavits of the Engineers/Architects, as they could be said to be the best persons, to testify, as to whether, all these development activities, had been undertaken and completed at the site or not, but they failed to do so. It is relevant to mention here that the Opposite Parties in their intimation of possession letter in respect of plot No.109-AG-226-300 dated 24.12.2014 (Annexure C-6) informed the complainant that “process of handing over of the plots in Sector 109, Mohali Hills shall commence within 60 days of this letter, as your plot is ready to be handed over for possession.” A bare perusal of the aforesaid letter clearly reveals that the Opposite Parties only intimated the complainant that the process of handing over of possession shall start within 60 days of this letter.  In the present case, according to the Agreement, the possession was to be delivered to the complainant within a maximum period of 18 months from the date of execution of the Agreement i.e. latest by 14.04.2014 but the Opposite Parties failed to deliver possession of the unit, complete in all respects, to the complainant, within the stipulated period, as mentioned in the Agreement and only offered possession vide letter dated 24.12.2014 i.e. after a delay of about 8 months that too was only a paper possession and not more than.  It is, no doubt, true that the Opposite Parties obtained Partial Completion Certificate only on 16.10.2015. It is also relevant to mention here that intimation of possession letter sent to the complainant vide letter dated 24.12.2014 (Annexure C-6) and Partial Completion Certificate obtained by the Opposite Parties vide memo dated 16.10.2015 i.e. after about 10 months of offer of possession. So, it is clearly proved that when the possession letter was sent to the complainant, the project was not complete. A bare perusal of possession letter (Annexure C-6) clearly shows that the gullible consumer was lured by the Opposite Parties stating that development work of the project is complete. Not only this, it is also relevant to note that a number of cases of Sector 109 of Emaar MGF Land Limited have already been decided by this Commission regarding the issue of sealing of project by Forest Department and other issues in Sector 109, one of which is titled as “Prabhujeev Singh Bajaj Vs. Emaar MGF Land Limited & Anr., Complaint Case No.43 of 2016, decided by this Commission vide order dated 29.06.2016”, the relevant portion of the said judgment reads thus :-.

“31. However, the main grouse of the complainant is that, despite relocation to the said units, even then, actual physical possession thereof, was not offered to him, whereas, on the other hand, paper offer was made to him, vide letters dated 25.08.2014 and 07.11.2014, because when he visited the site after receiving the said letters, to see development and basic amenities, the same were found missing and besides  that, all entry points of the project, had been sealed by the Forest Department, as opposite parties no.1 and 2, failed to take requisite permissions/sanction from it. Thus, in these circumstances, the principal question, which goes to the root of the case, and falls for consideration, is, as to whether, offer of possession made by opposite parties no.1 and 2, to the complainant, vide letters dated 25.08.2014 and 07.11.2014, in respect of the relocated units, could be said to be genuine offer or not. It is well settled law that the onus to prove that the project had been completed and the area/site, in question, is fully developed is on the builder/opposite parties no.1 and 2. It was so said by the National Commission, in Emaar MGF Land Limited and another Vs. Krishan Chander Chandna, First Appeal No.873 of 2013 decided on 29.09.2014. It is very strange that not even an iota of evidence has been placed, on record, by opposite parties no.1 and 2, to prove that when offer was made to the complainant, in respect of the units, in question, development work was complete and that all the basic amenities were in existence. On the other hand, in case, all the development activities, had been undertaken, and completed at the site, by the said dates, then it was for opposite parties no.1 and 2, which could be said to be in possession of the best evidence, to produce cogent and convincing documentary evidence, in the shape of the reports and affidavits of the Engineers/Architects, as they could be said to be the best persons, to testify, as to whether, all these development activities, had been undertaken and completed at the site or not, but they failed to do so. Opposite parties no.1 and 2 were also required to produce on record, a copy of the Completion Certificate (if obtained), having been issued by the Competent Authority, which could be said to be best evidence, to prove their case, but they miserably failed to do so. It is well settled law that before offering/delivery of possession of unit, in a project, it is mandatory to obtain completion certificate, from the Competent Authority(s), failing which the purchaser is at liberty to say no, to such an offer.

                Secondly, the complainant has placed on record, copies of the RTI Information, relating to the said project, in question. Vide RTI Information dated 29.04.2014 Annexure C-31, it was clearly intimated by Greater Mohali Area Development Authority (GMADA), that opposite parties no.1 and 2, had not even applied to them for commission of sewerage treatment plant, water supply, electricity etc. Not only this, it is further evident from  RTI Information dated 26.02.2015 Annexure C-30, issued by the Punjab State Power Corporation Limited (PSPCL), that no regular electricity connection has been released in the sector, in question, wherein the plots are situated. The said RTI Information goes unrebutted by opposite parties no.1 and 2. Not even a single document has been brought on record to prove that the information relating to non-existence of basic amenities, mentioned in the said RTI Information is false, or that the said information was fabricated by the complainant. Had the said information been false or fabricated, opposite parties no.1 and 2, could have obtained certificate from the said Authorities, to say that the same had not been supplied from their Department, but they (opposite parties no.1 and 2) failed to do so. Thus, it could safely be said that the complainant has proved his case, that opposite parties no.1 and 2 did not even obtain permission to provide basic amenities such as water, electricity etc., till  29.04.2014 or 26.02.2015, the dates when RTI information aforesaid, was issued by the Authorities concerned.

                Not only this, it is also an admitted case, that entry points of the project had been sealed by the Forest Department, as opposite parties no.1 and 2, failed to take requisite permissions/ sanction from it, which fact has also been admitted by them (Opposite Parties no.1 and 2), in paragraph No.26 of their written version. Not only this, the said fact is further corroborated from the letter dated 15.04.2015 Annexure-4 (at page 190 of the file), sent by opposite parties no.1 and 2, to the Chief Administrator, GMADA, requesting it to take up the matter with the Forest Department, regarding sealing of entry points of the project, in question, as the same had been stated to be “illegal access”. It has been clearly mentioned by opposite parties no.1 and 2, in the said letter that “…….we are bound by the agreement to give delivery within time bound manner to our various restive customers, we had applied for grant of access with your good self”. This admission of the opposite parties no.1 and 2, in the letter dated 15.04.2015 written to the Chief Administrator, GAMDA, itself clearly goes to prove that even till that date (15.04.2015), they  were not in a position, to deliver possession of the plot(s) to their customers, including the complainant, in the said project, on account of reason that the entries thereof  had been sealed by the Forest Department, stating it to be an “illegal access through the Forest Strip”,permissions/sanction, whereof has not been obtained by them. Not even a single piece of evidence has been brought on record, to prove that the said entry points have been got reopened by opposite parties no.1 and 2, after having obtained permission from the Authorities concerned. If it is so, then it remained unclarified by opposite parties no.1 and 2, as to when entry points of the project were sealed, how could they offer possession of the units, to the allottees, including the complainant, in the year 2014.

                A plea was also taken by opposite parties no.1 and 2 that only recently the Forest Department has served notice on them, alleging illegal access created by them, through the Forest land. To the contrary, perusal of RTI Information dated 05.05.2015 Annexure C-28 (colly.) (at pages 120 to 127 of the file) issued by the Government of Punjab, reveals that a court case with regard to dispute between the Forest Department and opposite parties no.1 and 2, is pending litigation before the Civil Court Kharar, since 03.07.2012, as opposite parties no.1 and 2 have violated Sections 29,33 and 63 of the Indian Forest Act 1927 and have also violated the directions passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, vide order dated 12.12.1996. The said RTI Information also goes unrebutted by opposite parties no.1 and 2. Thus, the matter with regard to entry points aforesaid, in respect of the said sector, in dispute, was an old dispute, between the Forest Department and opposite parties no.1 and 2, as they had not taken permission from the Competent Authorities, which fact was not disclosed by them, in their written version, filed before this Commission. 

                In view of above, it is held that the act of opposite parties no.1 and 2, in offering paper possession of the units, in question, vide letters 25.08.2014 and 07.11.2014, in the absence of development work; basic amenities at the site; non-obtaining of completion certificate, and also entry points of the project being sealed/closed by the Forest Department, amounted to deficiency in providing service and also adoption of unfair trade practice. It is therefore held that the offer of possession made by opposite parties no.1 and 2, vide letters dated 25.08.2014 and 07.11.2014 is nothing, but a paper possession, which is not sustainable, in the eyes of law.”

              Aggrieved against the afore-extracted order passed by this Commission, the Opposite Parties filed First Appeal No.997 of 2016 in the Hon'ble National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, wherein, the matter was settled between the parties on 08.11.2016, as per the Settlement Agreement.

              It is pertinent to note that the Opposite Parties  (Emaar MGF) filed appeal in another case i.e. First Appeal bearing No. 709 of 2016 titled as ‘Emaar MGF Land Limited Vs. Mandeep Saini’ before the Hon'ble National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, against the order of this Commission and the Hon'ble National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi passed the order dated 14.09.2016, which reads thus :-

“x x x x xx

It is vehemently argued by Mr.Aditya Narain, learned counsel appearing for the Appellant that since the delay in delivery of possession of the flats in Sectors 104, 106, 108 and 109 is directly attributed to the sealing of the main access road to these Sectors by the Forest Department, one of the factors which weighed with the State Commission, falls within the ambit of force majeure clause in the agreement, there is no deficiency in service on the part of the Appellant in its alleged failure to deliver the possession of the subject flats in question by the committed time.  He thus prays that ex parte ad interim stay may to be continued. 

Prima facie, we are not convinced with the submission.  Hence, without expressing final opinion on the issue but having regard to the fact that the sealing orders have not yet been revoked and the Appellant is still not in a position to deliver possession of the fully developed flats with proper access, to the Complainants, we direct that the Appellant shall deposit in this Commission the principal amount(s) deposited by the Complainants with them, within 6 weeks from today.  On deposit of the said amount(s), it will be open to the Complainants to withdraw the said amount, on filing affidavits, undertaking to this Commission that they will refund the amount(s) withdrawn, if so directed at the time of final disposal of the Appeals.  Subject to the said deposits, the operation of the remaining directions, regarding interest, compensation, etc., in the impugned order shall remain stayed.

X x x x x xx x”

From the afore-extracted order, it is clearly proved that Counsel for the Opposite Parties admitted before the Hon'ble National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi that the delay in delivery of possession to these Sectors i.e. Sectors 104, 106, 108 & 109 was due to the sealing of main access road by the Forest Department. It is clearly proved that the Hon'ble National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi without expressing final opinion on the issue but having regard to the fact that the sealing orders have not yet been revoked and the Appellant i.e. Emaar MGF Land Limited is still not in a position to deliver possession of the fully developed flats with proper access, to the complainants i.e. till the passing of the afore-extracted order dated 14.09.2016. So, we are of the view that in the present case, the possession offered by the Opposite Parties is only a paper possession and not more than that.

13.          The next question that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, the complainant was bound to accept offer of possession, in respect of the unit/plot, in question, when the same was offered to him vide letter dated 24.12.2014 (Annexure C-6) and that too, after a delay of about eight months, in the absence of any force majeure circumstances. It is pertinent to note that possession of the unit was to be delivered to the complainant within a maximum period of 18 months from the date of execution of the Agreement i.e. latest by 14.04.2014. However, the Opposite Parties sent letter of offer of possession of different unit only vide letter dated 24.12.2014 to the complainant, after a delay of about eight months and that was only a paper possession, without completion of formalities, as per terms and conditions of the Agreement. It may be stated here that non-delivery of possession of the unit, in question, complete in all respects, by the stipulated date, is a material violation of the terms and conditions of the Agreement. It is not the case of the Opposite Parties that the said delay occurred, on account of force majeure circumstances, met by them, on account of some stay or any other valid reason. It is settled law that when there is a material violation on the part of the builder, in not handing over possession by the stipulated date, the purchaser is not bound to accept the offer, even if the same is made at a belated stage and on the other hand, can seek refund of amount paid. It was so said by the National Commission, in a case titled as Aashish Oberai Vs. Emaar MGF Land Limited, Consumer Case No. 70 of 2015, decided on 14 Sep 2016, wherein, under similar circumstances, while negating the plea taken by the builder, it was held  as under:-

“I am in agreement with the learned senior counsel for the complainants that considering the default on the part of opposite parties no.1 and 2 in performing its contractual obligation, the complainants cannot be compelled to accept the offer of possession at this belated stage and therefore, is entitled to refund the entire amount paid by him along with reasonable compensation, in the form of interest.”

 

Not only as above, in a case titled as Brig Ajay Raina (Retd.) and another Vs. M/s Unitech Limited, Consumer Complaint No.59 of 2016, decided on 24.05.2016, wherein possession was offered after a long delay, this Commission, while relying upon the judgments rendered by the Hon`ble National Commission, ordered refund to the complainants, while holding as under:-

“Further, even if, it is assumed for the sake of arguments, that offer of possession, was made to the complainants, in July 2015 i.e. after a delay of about three years, from the stipulated date, even then, it is not obligatory upon the complainants to accept the same.

 

Further, in another case titled as M/s. Emaar MGF Land Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Dr.Manuj Chhabra, First Appeal No.1028 of 2015, decided on 19.04.2016, the National Commission, under similar circumstances, held as under:-

“I am of the prima facie view that even if the said offer was genuine, yet, the complainants was not obliged to accept such an offer, made after a lapse of more than two years of committed date of delivery”.

 

                In view of the above, it is held that since there was a material violation on the part of the Opposite Parties, in not handing over physical possession of the unit, complete in all respects, within the stipulated date, as mentioned in the Agreement, the complainant was at liberty, not to accept the offer made after a long delay, and on the other hand, was right by seeking refund of the amount deposited, alongwith interest and compensation, by way of filing the instant complaint.

14.          The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, the complaint filed by the complainant, was within limitation or not.  It is clearly proved from the aforesaid paras that the Opposite Parties failed to offer/deliver possession of the unit, complete in all respects, to the complainant within the stipulated period, as per terms and conditions of the Agreement and the possession offered by the complainant vide intimation of possession letter dated 24.12.2014 (Annexure C-6) i.e. only a paper possession and on the other hand, amount deposited was also not refunded to the complainant alongwith interest, as such, there is continuing cause of action, in his favour, in view of principle of law laid down, in  Lata Construction & Ors. Vs. Dr. Rameshchandra Ramniklal  Shah and Anr., II 2000 (1) CPC 269=AIR 1999 SC 380 and Meerut Development Authority Vs. Mukesh Kumar Gupta, IV (2012) CPJ 12 (SC). Under these circumstances, it is held that the complaint is not at all barred by time. The submission of Counsel for  the Opposite Parties, in this regard, being devoid of merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.

15.          The next question, that falls for consideration, is, as to whether, the complainant is entitled to refund of the amount of Rs.43,13,850/-, as claimed by him. The Opposite Parties admitted that the complainant paid the total amount of Rs.43,13,850/- and an amount of Rs.1,24,274/- was credited as compensation to the complainant i.e. total Rs.44,38,124/-, as is evident from statement of accounts (Annexure C-4). However, the complainant denied the receipt of Rs.1,24,274/- as compensation from the Opposite Parties. In the present case, the Opposite Parties only offered paper possession and failed to give physical possession of the unit, in question, complete in all respects, within the stipulated period, as mentioned in the Agreement or even by the time when the complaint was filed. The complainant cannot be made to wait for an indefinite period, for delivery of actual physical possession of the plot purchased by him. The  Opposite Parties, therefore, had no right, to retain the hard-earned money of the complainant, deposited towards price of the unit, in question. The complainant is thus, entitled to get refund of amount deposited by him. In view of above facts of the case, the  Opposite Parties are also under an obligation to compensate the complainant, for inflicting mental agony and causing physical harassment to him.

16.          It is to be further seen, as to whether, interest, on the amount refunded, can be granted, in favour of the  complainant. It is no doubt true that an amount of Rs.43,13,850/-, was paid by the complainant, without getting anything, in lieu thereof. The said amount has been used by the  Opposite Parties, for their own benefit. There is no dispute that for making delayed payments, the  Opposite Parties were charging heavy rate of interest (compounded quarterly @24% p.a.) as per Clause 3 of the Agreement, for the period of delay in making payment of installments.  It is well settled law that whenever money has been received by a party and when its refund is ordered, the right to get interest follows, as a matter of course. The obligation to refund money received and retained without right implies and carries with it, the said right. It was also so said by the Hon`ble Supreme Court of India, in UOI vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd (Supreme Court), (2014) 6 SCC 335 decided on March 20th, 2014 (2014) 6 SCC 335). In view of above, the  complainant is certainly entitled to get refund of the amount deposited by him, to the tune of Rs.43,13,850/-alongwith interest @10% p.a., from the respective dates of deposits till realization. 

17.          As far as the plea taken by the Opposite Parties, regarding forfeiture of earnest money is concerned, it may be stated here that the same stands rejected, because it is not their (Opposite Parties) case, that they were ready with possession of the plot, to be delivered to the complainant, by the stipulated date but it was he (complainant) who wanted to rescind the contract, on account of some unavoidable circumstances/ financial constraints due to deficiency in service rendered by the Opposite Parties or for  any  personal  reason,  and  is  seeking  refund  of the amount deposited. Had this been the case of the Opposite Parties, only in those circumstances, it would have been held that since the complainant himself is rescinding the contract, as such, he is entitled to the amount deposited, after deduction of the earnest money, as per the terms and conditions of the Agreement. In this view of the matter, the plea taken by the Opposite Parties, in this regard, has no legs to stand and is accordingly rejected.

18.          No other point, was urged, by Counsel for the parties.

19.          For the reasons recorded above, the complaint is partly accepted, with costs. The  Opposite Parties are jointly and severally directed as under:-

1. To refund the amount of Rs.43,13,850/-, to  the  complainant, alongwith interest @10% p.a.,  from the respective dates of deposits onwards.
2. To pay compensation, in the sum of     Rs.1,50,000/-, for causing mental agony and physical harassment, to the complainant.
3. To pay cost of litigation, to the tune of Rs.33,000/- to the  complainant.
4. The payment of awarded amounts mentioned at sr.nos.(i) to (iii), shall be made, within a period of 02 (two) months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, failing which, the amount mentioned at sr.no.(i) shall carry penal interest @12% p.a., instead of @10% p.a., from the date of default, and interest @10% p.a., on the amounts mentioned at sr.nos.(ii) and (iii), from the date of filing of this complaint, till realization.

20.          However, it is made clear that, if the complainant in the aforesaid case, has availed loan facility from any banking or financial institution, for making payment of installments towards the said unit(s), it will have the first charge of the amount payable, to the extent, the same is due to be paid by the complainant.

21.          Certified Copies of this order be sent to the parties, free of charge.

22.          The file be consigned to Record Room, after completion.

Pronounced.

May 3^rd, 2018                                   Sd/-

[JUSTICE JASBIR SINGH (RETD.)]

[PRESIDENT]

 

Sd/-

 [DEV RAJ]

MEMBER

 

Sd/-

 (PADMA PANDEY)

        MEMBER

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