1.      This first appeal has been filed by the appellant, Shobhit Gupta, against the order dated 29.05.2017 of the Delhi State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, (in short ‘the State Commission’) passed in Complaint No.66/2016.

2.      Brief facts of the case are that the appellant/complainant had applied against the advertisement issued by the DDA for allotment of flats.  Draw of lots had taken place on 18.04.2011whereby the complainant was allotted flat No.202, 2^nd floor, flat category two pocket D-6, Block S-5, Locality Vasant Kunj, New Delhi.  DDA vide its letter dated 29.03.2012 sent letter with demand cum allotment letter requiring the complainant to deposit the cost of the flat and to furnish required number of copies of the conveyance deed. The needful was done by the complainant on 26.06.2012.  The respondent/opposite party No.3 issued the offer letter or possession, however, the complainant alleged that the same was not received by him.  Then the opposite party issued letter demanding watch and ward charges.  As the possession was not taken on 05.11.2014 by the complainant, the complainant approached the opposite party and the opposite party waived of watch and ward charges and complainant was asked to take possession by letter dated 01.05.2013.  According to the complainant, furnishing was not as per the agreed terms and therefore, the complainant accepted the possession with protest.  The complainant also alleged in the complaint that the complainant deposited due amount on 01.10.2014 with the DDA.  The conveyance deed was also executed by DDA on 20.06.2015.  Not satisfied with the fittings and furnishing and the bad quality of constructions as well as for delayed possession the complainant filed a consumer complaint before the State Commission on 18.01.2016.

3.      The opposite party/respondent resisted the complaint by filing the written statement by raising preliminary objection and objection on merits.  The State Commission vide its order dated 29.05.2017 partly allowed the complaint as under:-

“We have given a careful consideration on the question about the quantum of compensation.  Keeping in view the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and have regard to the judicial pronouncements of the Hon’ble Apex Court and Hon’ble National Consumer Commission we are of the considered view that compensation to the extent of Rs.3,50,000/- would be just and proper.  An amount of Rs.50,000/- be also paid to the complainant as litigation cost.”

4.      The complainant has preferred this appeal against the above order of the State Commission.

5.      Heard the learned counsel for the appellant at the admission stage.  Learned counsel stated that though the paper possession has been taken by the complainant, but actually the house is not in a condition fit for living.  The quality of the construction is very bad and even the sanitary fittings have not been completed.  The learned counsel mentioned that all the toilets fittings were given to the complainant on the date of possession and DDA expected the complainant to install them on his own.  Thus, the house was not ready and was offered for possession just to save on delay.  Even the furnishing like sofa, table chairs etc. were not of good quality and complainant is not in a position to use them.  The complainant had mentioned all these points in his complaint, but the State Commission has not given its finding on all the grievances that were mentioned in the complaint. The learned counsel pointed out that there is not a single whisper in the impugned order on any of the claim made by the appellant and the State Commission has awarded the compensation in lumpsum without disclosing any calculation or the basis of the same.  Learned counsel also mentioned that the State Commission has not given its finding on the request for conversion charges charged by the DDA.  Learned counsel also alleged that the State Commission has failed to consider the refund of the price of the broken/unusable furniture subsequently given to the appellant at the spot under threat at the time of handing over the possession of the flat.  Learned counsel submitted that the revision petition may be admitted and the impugned order of the State Commission may be set aside.

6.      I have carefully considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and have examined the material on record.  From the facts of the case it is clear that the possession of the flat has been taken on 05.11.2014 and the delay in taking over the possession has been due to the fact that the complainant did not receive first letter of offer of possession, which was issued in the first in the year 2012 itself then in the year 2013 and that is why on the request of the complainant the opposite party DDA had already waived the watch and ward charges.  The complainant finally paid all the due amounts on 01.10.2014 and he took the possession on 05.11.2014. Thus, clearly the DDA is not responsible for delay in handing over the possession. 

7.      The State Commission has allowed the complaint of the complainant in spite of the fact the complainant had taken the possession and also conveyance deed was registered on 23.06.2015.  In fact when the possession was taken and conveyance deed was also executed no cause of action survives.  However, no order is being passed on this count and it is only an observation. This observation may not be read to the detriment of the complainant.  The order of the State Commission has already become final qua DDA as DDA has not preferred any appeal against the impugned order of the State Commission. 

8.      The State Commission has considered the grievances of the complainant and has allowed a compensation of Rs.3,50,000/- along with Rs.50,000/- as cost to be paid by the opposite party, DDA to the complainant for all the short comings.  It is difficult to ascertain the facts whether damaged furniture was supplied or not as this would require elaborate documentary evidence and oral evidence, which is not possible in the proceedings under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, which are, by nature only summary proceedings.  Hence, the State Commission has taken a consolidated view and has awarded reasonable compensation and cost in the facts and circumstances of the case.

10.    So far as the conversion charges are concerned they seem to be in the nature of charges fixed by the DDA and consumer fora have no role to play in adjudicating upon such charges as laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in HUDA Vs. Sunita (2005) 2 SCC 479, which reads as follows:-

“Consumer Protection Act, 1986- Ss. 2(1)(g) & (o)—“Deficiency in service”- Development Authority- Statutory obligations of, under relevant statute and regulations- Held, are not acts or omissions constituting “deficiency of service” within meaning of the 1986 Act- National Commission having held that it has no jurisdiction to go into correctness of demands made by the Development Authority (HUDA), it had no jurisdiction to go into correctness of demand of “composition fee” and “extension fee” made by HUDA from respondent complainant- Hence it should have set aside orders of District Forum and State Commission setting aside demands of “composition fee” and “extension fee” made by HUDA from respondent complainant- Appeal allowed and said orders of District Forum and State Commission set aside.”

11.    In the present case, the complainant has already paid all the charges and all the dues and has taken possession and has got its conveyance deed registered before filing the complaint.  In such situation I am afraid, that the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Punjab and Ors. Vs. Dhanjit Singh Sandhu, Civil Appeal Nos.5698-5699 of 2009 decided on March 14, 2014, become applicable in the present case and the complainant cannot claim refund for conversion charges.  The said observations are as follows:-

“21.   ……………..The said demand was rejected by the Estate Officer by  passing the reasoned order in compliance of the directions of the  High  Court.   In the facts of the instant case, we have no doubt in our mind in holding  that the ratio decided in Tehal Singh's case will not apply in the instant  case. In our considered opinion defaulting allottes of valuable plots cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate by first agreeing to abide by terms and conditions of allotment and later seeking to deny their liability as per the agreed terms.

25. It is evident that  the doctrine of election is based  on  the  rule  of estoppel the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate  is inherent in it. The doctrine of estoppel by election is one among the species of estoppel in pais (or equitable estoppel), which is a rule of equity.  By this law, a person may be precluded, by way of his actions, or conduct, or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he would have otherwise had.”

12.    Based on the above discussion, I find no force in the appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed at the admission stage.  Consequently, First Appeal No.1529 of 2017 Shobit Gupta  vs. Delhi Development Authority is dismissed at the admission stage.