JUSTICE J. M. MALIK, PRESIDING MEMBER (ORAL)

1.       There is a delay of 193 days in filing this revision petition.  The petitioner has filed an application for condonation of delay.  The delay is explained in para 2, which runs as under:

“2. That the petitioner is a poor villager and living at Village Kalmanda, Tehsil & District Baran and after passing of the order dated 17.08.2012, he was not informed by his counsel nor he received certified copy of the order from the Hon’ble Commission.  When the non-petitioner started recovery proceedings then he came to Jaipur to enquire about the matter and on 01.03.2013 filed application to receive copy of the order, which was issued to him on 06.03.2013, thereafter he approached Mr. Jitendra Mitrucka Advocate at Jaipur to understand the nature of the order and thereafter he decided to file revision before this Hon’ble National Commission.  After that the paper book was prepared and the same was filed before the Hon’ble Commission and in that process delay occasioned.”

2.       It appears that the petitioner is not telling the truth.  We have seen the certified copy issued by the State Commission which clearly, specifically and unequivocally mentions that the first copy was issued on 3.9.2012.  Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that copy of the order was not received by the petitioner in village and he came to know when the execution petition is filed against him.  Whole of the time they are sleeping.  It is well settled that law does not come to the rescue of a sleeping man.  It is strange that most of the litigants come to know orders against them at the time of execution proceedings only.

3.       In Jaswant Singh Vs. Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies  2000 (3) Punj. L.R. 83, it was observed that cause of delay was that the counsel of the appellant in the lower Court had told them that there was no need of their coming to Court and they would be informed of the result, as and when the decision comes, was held to be a story which cannot be believed.

4.       In Banshi Vs. Lakshmi Narain – 1993 (1) R.L.R. 68, it was held that reason for delay was sought to be explained on the ground that the counsel  did not inform the appellant in time, was not accepted since it was primarily the duty of the party himself to have gone to lawyer’s office and enquired about the case, especially when the case was regarding deposit of arrears of rent.

5.       It is well settled that ‘sufficient cause’ cannot be erased from Section 5 of the Limitation Act by adopting excessive liberal approach which would defeat the very purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.  There must be sufficient cause which may be termed as sufficient one for the purpose of condonation of delay.  The Act itself prescribes its own limitation in deciding the appeal and revision petition.  If such a huge delay is condoned, it would defeat the very purpose and object of Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

6.       This view is further supported by a decision of the Apex Court reported   in      Anshul    Aggarwal    v.    New   Okhla    Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), it has been held that “It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras”. 

7.       In R.B. Ramlingam v. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, I (2009) CLT 188 (SC)= I (2009) SLT 701=2009 (2) Scale 108, it has been observed that “We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the Special Appeal Leave Petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition”.

8.       In Ram Lal and Others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, it has been observed that “It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right.  The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5.  If ‘sufficient cause’ is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone.  If ‘sufficient cause’ is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bonafides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the inquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant.”

9.       Similar view was taken in Bikram Dass Vs. Financial Commissioner and others AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1221.

10.     This case is hopelessly barred by time and involves a meager amount.  We therefore dismiss the revision petition.