This appeal has been filed by the appellant Emaar MGF Land Ltd. against the order dated 09.10.2017 of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Punjab, (in short ‘the State Commission’) passed in CC No.293 of 2015.

2.      Brief facts of the case are that the respondent booked a residential unit bearing No.L-1-F08-804 in “The Views”, Sector- 105, Mohali, Punjab with opposite party /appellant.  The total consideration of the flat was Rs.58,60,158/- and the complainant has paid a total amount of Rs.51,21,417/-.  Even after the expiry of due date of possession as per the agreement, the possession was not handed over to the complainant.  Therefore, the complainant filed a consumer complaint No.293 of 2015 before the State Commission, wherein it was prayed that the amount paid by the complainant be refunded along with 9.3% p.a. compound interest on the deposited amount.

3.      The complaint was resisted by the opposite party by filing the written statement.  However, the State Commission allowed the complaint and passed the following order on 09.10.2017:-

“24.   In view of our above discussion, the complaint is allowed and following directions are issued to the opposite party.

i)   to refund Rs.51,05,009/- to the complainant, along with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the respective dates of deposit till realization, as per Rule 17 of PAPRA;

ii)   to pay Rs.55,000/-, as compensation on account of mental tension and harassment suffered by the complainant as well as litigation expenses.

25.    The opposite party are directed to comply with this order within 30 days of the receipt of certified copy of the order.

26.    The complaint could not be decided within the stipulated timeframe, due to heavy pendency of Court cases.”

4.      Hence the present appeal by the opposite party.

5.      Heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as respondent /complainant in person.  Learned counsel for the appellant stated that the complainant has sought refund of the amount paid to the appellant, which is Rs.51,05,009/- along with 9.3% p.a. compound interest.  This amount is more than Rs.1 crore and therefore, the State Commission was not having the pecuniary jurisdiction to decide this complaint.  It was argued by the learned counsel that the State Commission has not considered the interest as part of compensation for deciding the pecuniary jurisdiction.  It is an established principle now that the interest has to be treated as compensation and has to be added for deciding the pecuniary jurisdiction. 

6.      Learned counsel for the appellant further argued that the State Commission has awarded interest as per PAPRA Act, whereas the PAPRA Act, is not applicable on the appellant as per the Notification No.4966-CTP (Pb)/SP-458 dated 02.09.2014 issued by the Government of Punjab for exemption under different provisions of PAPRA Act.  It was contended that when the appellant was exempted from PAPRA Act, how the State Commission could order interest as per the PAPRA Act?

7.      It was further pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant that there is a delay of 275 days in filing the present appeal.  It was stated that the delay has been caused due to the reason that the court file of the State Commission was misplaced and the same was reconstructed and this has taken time. There is no intentional delay in the present matter.  It was requested to condone the delay on the grounds mentioned in the application for condonation of delay.

8.      Learned counsel for the appellant stated that once the appellant is ready to give the possession, there should be no question of refund.

9.      On the other hand, respondent/complainant in person stated that the order of the State Commission was passed on 09.10.2017, whereas the appeal has been filed on 21.12.2018.  The fact is that the complainant has already moved the execution of the order of the State Commission dated 09.10.2017.  The execution has already been decided.  In order to nullify the order of execution, the present appeal has been filed. There is a huge delay in filing the present appeal and in the condonation application, no proper explanation for delay has been given. No dates are given in the condonation application.  Reasons given are totally vague, whereas in the application for condonation of delay, the appellant should have given the date wise details of the delay occurred.  It was requested to dismiss the appeal on the ground of delay.  

10.    On merits, the respondent/complainant stated that the possession was due in 2010.  However, the possession was inordinately delayed, therefore, the consumer complaint was filed on 09.11.2015 for refund of the paid amount.  The provision in the PAPRA Act is that if the amount is refunded by the builder, the same will be refunded with simple interest @ 12% p.a.  Therefore, even if the State Commission has ordered the opposite party to pay interest allowed under the PAPRA Act and the opposite party is exempted from PAPRA Act, it can only be read as 12% p.a. It was further stated that in respect of the pecuniary jurisdiction, the State Commission has clearly decided this question and has given a finding that the State Commission had jurisdiction to decide this complaint.

11.    I have carefully considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the respondent in person.  It is seen that there is a delay of 275 days in filing the present appeal and the application for condonation of delay has been filed.  The reasons given in the application for condonation of delay are as under:-

“The delay occurred due to the reason that the court file of the Hon’ble State Commission was misplaced by the concerned officer Shri Subrat Kumar Pradhan and was being reconstructed by the court file from the concerned lawyers office and thus some time was taken to collate the documents, ensure that the same was in order and sent to the counsel’s office on 16.4.2018, for preparation of the appeal, the appeal is being filed as soon as was possible.  The delay of 275 days in filing the same was for bonafide reasons and neither deliberate nor intentional.”

12.    The applicant has not given any specific dates as to when court file was misplaced or when duplicate copy was prepared and how much time has been taken by the counsel to get the papers and to prepare the appeal.  When there is a huge delay of about 275 days, the applicant should have given some broad time lines where the delay has happened.  The reason given in the application for condonation of delay is vague and it does not reflect the reasonable diligence on the part of appellant in prosecution of the case in filing the appeal.  Hon’ble Supreme Court in R.B. Ramlingam Vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, 2009 (2) Scale 108, has observed:-

“We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition”.

  13.  Special periods of limitation have been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, its Rules 1987 and its Regulations 2005 for speedy disposal of consumer disputes.  Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has laid down that;

“It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer Foras.”

14.   Decision of Anshul Aggarwal (Supra) has been reiterated in CicilyKallarackal  Vs. Vehicle Factory, IV (2012) CPJ 1(SC) 1, wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court observed:-

         “4. This Court in Anshul Aggarwal v. NOIDA, (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has explained the scope of condonation of delay in a matter where the special Courts/ Tribunals have been constituted in order to provide expeditious remedies to the person aggrieved and Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is one of them. Therefore, this Court held that while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in such cases the Court must keep in mind the special period of limitation prescribed under the statute (s).

  5.    In the instant case, condoning such an inordinate delay without any sufficient cause would amount to substituting the period of limitation by this Court in place of the period prescribed by the Legislature for filing the special leave petition. Therefore, we do not see any cogent reason to condone the delay.      

6.      Hence, in the facts and circumstance of the case as explained hereinabove, we are not inclined to entertain these petitions. The same are dismissed on the ground of delay”.

15.    Hon’ble Supreme Court in  Basawaraj and Anr. Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81. It has been held that:-

“9.     Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended.  Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man.  In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”.  However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously.  The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay.  The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. 

12.    It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes.  The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil.  A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.”  The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.  The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation.  It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.”

16.    Based on the above judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which are fully applicable in the present case, negligence, deliberate inaction and lack of bona fides are imputable to the appellant in filing the present appeal.  The reasons given in the application for condonation of delay do not justify the delay of 275 days as no dates are mentioned in the application for condonation of delay.  Accordingly, application for condonation of delay is dismissed.  Consequently, the First Appeal No. 2256 of 2018 is also dismissed with no order as to costs.