1.         The present Revision Petition (RP) has been filed by the Petitioner against Respondents as detailed above, against the order dated 05.04.2021 of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Punjab (hereinafter referred to as the ‘State Commission’), in First Appeal (FA) No. 93 of 2021 in which order dated 02.03.2021 of District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Mohali (hereinafter referred to as District Forum) in Consumer Complaint (CC) No. 1457 of 2020 was challenged, inter alia praying for setting aside the order dated 05.04.2021 and 02.03.2021 of the State Commission and District Forum respectively.

2.         While the Revision Petitioner (hereinafter also referred to as Complainant) was Appellant before the State Commission and Complainant before the District Forum and the Respondent(s) (hereinafter also referred to as Opposite Party No. 1, 2 and 3) were Respondent No. 1, 2 and 3 respectively before the State Commission and Opposite Party No. 1, 2 and 3 before the District Forum.

3.         Notice was issued to the Respondent(s) on 02.08.2021.  Parties filed Written Arguments on 23.01.2023 and 22.09.2023 (Petitioner) and 23.12.2022 (Respondent-1) respectively. 

4.         Brief facts of the case, as presented by the Complainant and as emerged from the RP, Order of the State Commission, Order of the District Commission and other case records are that: -

(i)        Petitioner applied for an Apartment in Group Housing Project namely “Wave Gardens”, Mohali of the Respondents at the cost of Rs.1,32,63,750/-. Provisionally, Petitioner was allotted Hibiscus, Apartment No. 001, Ground Floor, Type Duplex measuring 3275 sq. ft.

(ii)       As per Sub-clause 5.1 of Clause 5 of Apartment Allotte(s) Agreement dated 07.11.2012, Respondent were to develop the said project within 30 months along with six months’ grace period from the date of the said agreement and the possession of the Apartment was to be delivered on or before 06.11.2015.  

(iii)     Payments made by the Petitioner to the Respondent on the following dates:

(iv)      In December, 2015, Petitioner visited the site and found no development which was contrary to Sub-clause 5.1 of clause 5 of the Apartment Allotte(s) Agreement and Respondents failed to obtain the Completion Certificate/Occupation Certificate.

(v)       On 15.01.2016, Petitioner received a letter from the Respondents which was issued in routine manner asking to deposit a further amount of ₹42,28,062.94/-, for which Respondent told Petitioner to avoid it.   

(vi)      Petitioner kept on waiting for about two years for the completion of her apartment but was shocked to receive another letter dated 07.07.2018 stating Respondents were giving one-time interest waiver scheme to the Petitioner on the outstanding payable amount to which Respondent informed the Petitioner that she need not to pay any amount till the completion and handing over the actual physical possession of the apartment.

(vii)    In January, 2020, Petitioner asked the Respondents for the refund of amount along with up to date interest which was assured by the Respondents also to return the amount within a period of four months but due to lock down staring from the month of March, 2020, all communications between the Petitioner and the Respondents stopped.  

(viii)   On 06.07.2020, Petitioner received a letter from Respondents for handing over possession of the apartment, for which the Respondents had already agreed to refund amount in the month of January, 2020.

(ix)      On 07.08.2020, Petitioner filed a complaint due to ‘unfair trade practices’ and ‘deficiency in service’ on the part of the Respondent in not handing over possession of the apartment in time.

5.         Vide Order dated 02.03.2021, in the CC no. 1457 of 2020 the District Commission has rejected the complaint and passed the following order:

“Heard. We feel, that consumer dispute is not made out between the complainant and the Ops, since the complaint is highly time barred. First payment was made by the complainant on 04.08.2012 and the last payment was made on 09.09.2014 for an apartment. We feel that the complainant did not bother to invoke the jurisdiction of this Commission within the limitation period of two years., Moreover the complainant is seeking only refund of his amount. No application for condonation of delay has been filed by the complainant. The complaint is highly time barred and the same is not admitted and is rejected. File be consigned to record.”

6.         Aggrieved by the said Order dated 02.03.2021 of District Commission, Petitioner appealed in State Commission and the State Commission vide order dated 05.04.2021 in FA No. 93 of 2021 has dismissed the appeal in limine.

7.         Petitioner(s) have challenged the said Order dated 05.04.2021 of the State Commission mainly on following grounds:

1. Because the accrual of the Cause of Action is required to be computed from the ‘date of delivery of possession’ and not from the ‘date of last payment’.

2. Because the Petitioner had booked the Apartment in question in the year, 2012, however, the possession of the said Apartment was offered by the Respondents in the year, 2020.

3. Because the Petitioner cannot be compelled to wait indefinitely for the builder to deliver possession of the apartment booked by her.

4. Because as per Sub-Clause 5.1 of the Agreement dated 07.11.2012, the Respondents were to develop and complete the project within 30 months along with an extended period of six month from the date of execution of Agreement dated 07.11.2012 i.e. the possession of the Apartment was to be delivered by 06.11.2015.

8.         Heard counsels of both sides.  Contentions/pleas of the parties, on various issues raised in the RP, Written Arguments, and Oral Arguments advanced during the hearing, are summed up below.

8.1       In addition to the averments made under the grounds (para 7), the petitioner contended that the Consumer Complaint filed was not time-barred, as the Respondents offered possession on 06.07.2020 and complaint was filed before the District Forum on 07.08.2020. Thus, the complaint was within the time period as prescribed under Section 69 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.

8.2       Further, Petitioner contended that consumer cannot be made to wait indefinitely for Possession as Respondent offered possession of the apartment on 06.07.2020 which is more than 4.5 years from the promised date of possession.

8.3       In support of her contentions, Petitioner relied upon the following judgements:

(i)        M/s Usha India Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Kajal Bhattacharya [RP No. 4671 of 2008 decided on 08.01.2015] 2015 SCC OnLine NCDRC 1693

(ii)       Satish Kumar Pandey & Anr. Vs. M/s. Unitech Ltd. [Consumer Complaint No. 427 of 2017 decided on 08.06.2015] 2015 SCC OnLine NCDRC 14

(iii)     Sipra Thomas Vs. Bengal Unitech Universal Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. [CC No. 398 of 2015 decided on 19.05.2016] 2016 SCC OnLine NCDRC 1495

(iv)      Mehnga Singh Khera and Another Vs. Unitech Ltd. [CC No. 1395 of 2017 decided on 18.12.2019] 2019 SCC OnLine NCDRC 726]           

                            (v)       Fortune Infrastructure Vs. Trevor D’Lima (2018) 5 SCC 442

(vi)      Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. Vs. Govindan Raghavan (2019) 5 SCC 725

(vii)    Kolkata West International City Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Debasis Rudra (2020) 18 SCC 613

(viii)   CCI Chambers Coop. Hsg. Society Ltd. Vs. Development Credit Bank Ltd. (2003) 7 SCC 233

(ix)      Punj Lloyd Ltd. Vs. Corporate Risks India (P) Ltd. (2009) 2 SCC 301.

8.4       On the other hand Respondent-1 contended that the Revision Petition is not maintainable. The complaint was barred by limitation since the same was filed after expiry of the period of two years. As Petitioner made last payment on 09.09.2014, whereas the complaint was only filed on 07.08.2020, about six years later.  

8.5       Further, Respondent submitted that the unit bearing no. 001, Tower Hibiscus, Ground Floor allotted to the Petitioner is fully constructed and habitable. Petitioner was offered the possession vide Intimation for Possession letter dated 06.07.2020. Respondent contended that the Petitioner is obligated to take possession once the Occupancy Certificate has been obtained.

8.6       Respondent relied upon the following judgements:

(i)        Ruby (Chandra) Dutta Vs. United India Insurance Company (2011) 11 SCC 269

(ii)       Haryana Urban Development Authority & Ors. Vs. Tej Refrigeration Industries Limited (2013) 14 SCC 758

(iii)     Ireo Grace Realtech Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Abhishek Khanna & Ors. (2021) 3 SCC 241

9.         Heard counsels for both sides. Challenge is to order dated 05.04.2021 of the State Commission vide which appeal filed by the petitioner herein was dismissed and order of the District Forum rejecting the complaint of the petitioner herein on account of limitation was upheld. The District Forum in its order recorded that consumer dispute is not made out between the complainant and the OPs since the complaint is highly time barred. First payment was made by the complainant on 04.08.2012 and last payment was made on 09.09.2014. The District Forum observed that the complainant is seeking only refund of his amount and no application for condonation of delay has been filed, hence the complaint was not admitted and rejected being highly time barred. (The complaint was filed on 07.08.2020).

10.       Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the agreement in the present case was signed on 07.11.2012, committed period for possession was 30 months plus 6 months grace period, which comes to 06.11.2015. In this case, the offer of possession with Occupancy Certificate (OC) was made on 06.07.2020 (although the respondent states that the OC was obtained on 16.10.2019). The petitioner contends that he orally made request for refund in January, 2020 and thereafter was following up his refund request with the OPs. As it did not materialize, he filed the consumer complaint before the District Forum on 07.08.2020. It is contended by the petitioner that his cause of action does not stop at the time of his last payment i.e. 09.09.2014 as has been recorded by the District Forum, but it is a continuous cause of action till the possession is given to him. He further contends that in case the possession is delayed beyond the committed date, he has a right to seek refund. Hence, according to him his complaint before the District Forum was not time barred and both District Forum and State Commission went wrong in rejecting his complaint and appeal respectively. In support of his contention, he has relied on certain judgements of this Commission as well as Hon’ble Supreme Court which have been filed by him along with his brief of written arguments.

11.       The respondent on the other hand contends that as this is a case of refund, it does not give him continuous cause of action. The respondent from their side has relied upon various judgements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, including the one in “Ireo Grace Realtech Private Limited Vs. Abhishek Khanna and Others (2021) 3 SCC 241”. It is the case of the respondent that in view of the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abhishek Khanna’s case (Supra) as the offer of possession has been made with the OC, the petitioner herein is obligated to take possession and is not entitled to refund. In case he wishes to seek refund, his cause of action to seek refund starts on the committed date of possession which in the present case is 06.11.2015.

12.       Learned counsel for the respondent argued that in none of the judgements relied upon by the petitioner, possession was offered while in the present case the possession has been offered prior to filing of the complaint. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner stated that in some of the judgements like “Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. V. Govindan Raghavan (2019) 5 SCC 725” judgement, the possession was offered.

13.       The committed date of possession as per the agreement, with grace period, was 06.11.2015. Till the possession is delivered, there is a continuous cause of action. In this case, possession with OC was offered on 06.07.2020. Hence, till this date there is a continuous cause of action. Now the question is whether in case of inordinate delay in offer of possession from the committed date, allottee is obligated to take possession. In our considered view, no. Hence, the allottee has a right to seek refund in such cases. In this regard, we refer to following judgements of Hon’ble Supreme Court:

1. It was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Samruddhi Coop. Housing Society Ltd. vs. Mumbai Mahalaxmi Construction (p) Ltd. (2022) 4 SCC 103, that continuous failure to obtain an occupancy certificate is a breach of obligations and amounts to a continuous wrong…… the complaint cannot be rejected on the ground that it is a recovery proceeding and not consumer dispute ……. Failure of builder to obtain OC is a deficiency in service for which respondent builder is liable. In this case Hon’ble Supreme Court observed

Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides for the computation of limitation in the case of a continuing breach of contract or tort. It provides that in case of a continuing breach of contract, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of time during which the breach continues. A continuing wrong occurs when a party continuously breaches an obligation imposed by law or agreement.

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11. The crux of the appeal revolves around the maintainability of the complaint and whether it is barred by limitation. Ncdrc held [Samruddhi Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Mumbai Mahalaxmi Construction (P) Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine NCDRC 1711] that the cause of action arose when the municipal authorities asked the appellant to pay higher charges in the first instance and thus, a complaint should have been filed within two years of the accrual of the cause of action. The appellant however, has argued that the cause of action is of a continuing nature, since members of the appellant have continued paying higher charges as the respondent failed to provide the occupancy certificate.

12. Section 24-A of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 provides for the period of limitation period for lodging a complaint. A complaint to a consumer forum has to be filed within two years of the date on which the cause of action has arisen. In the instant case, the appellant has submitted that since the cause of action is founded on a continuing wrong, the complaint is within limitation.

13. Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963 [ “22. Continuing breaches and torts.—In the case of a continuing breach of contract or in the case of a continuing tort, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during which the breach or the tort, as the case may be, continues.”] provides for the computation of limitation in the case of a continuing breach of contract or tort. It provides that in case of a continuing breach of contract, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of time during which the breach continues. This Court in Balakrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan [Balakrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan, 1959 Supp (2) SCR 476 : AIR 1959 SC 798] elaborated on when a continuous cause of action arises.

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16. The Court further provided illustrations of continuous wrongs: (Suresh Seth case [CWT v. Suresh Seth, (1981) 2 SCC 790 : 1981 SCC (Tax) 168], SCC p. 800, para 17)

“17. The true principle appears to be that where the wrong complained of is the omission to perform a positive duty requiring a person to do a certain act the test to determine whether such a wrong is a continuing one is whether the duty in question is one which requires him to continue to do that act. Breach of a covenant to keep the premises in good repair, breach of a continuing guarantee, obstruction to a right of way, obstruction to the right of a person to the unobstructed flow of water, refusal by a man to maintain his wife and children whom he is bound to maintain under law and the carrying on of mining operations or the running of a factory without complying with the measures intended for the safety and well-being of workmen may be illustrations of continuing breaches or wrongs giving rise to civil or criminal liability, as the case may be, de die in diem.”

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18. A continuing wrong occurs when a party continuously breaches an obligation imposed by law or agreement. Section 3 of the MOFA imposes certain general obligations on a promoter. These obligations inter alia include making disclosures on the nature of title to the land, encumbrances on the land, fixtures, fittings and amenities to be provided, and to not grant possession of a flat until a completion certificate is given by the local authority. The responsibility to obtain the occupancy certificate from the local authority has also been imposed under the agreement to sell between the members of the appellant and the respondent on the latter.

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21. Based on these provisions, it is evident that there was an obligation on the respondent to provide the occupancy certificate and pay for the relevant charges till the certificate has been provided. The respondent has time and again failed to provide the occupancy certificate to the appellant Society. For this reason, a complaint was instituted in 1998 by the appellant against the respondent. Ncdrc on 20-8-2014 directed the respondent to obtain the certificate within a period of four months. Further, Ncdrc also imposed a penalty for any delay in obtaining the occupancy certificate beyond these 4 months. Since 2014 till date, the respondent has failed to provide the occupancy certificate. Owing to the failure of the respondent to obtain the certificate, there has been a direct impact on the members of the appellant in terms of the payment of higher taxes and water charges to the municipal authority. This continuous failure to obtain an occupancy certificate is a breach of the obligations imposed on the respondent under the MOFA and amounts to a continuing wrong. The appellants, therefore, are entitled to damages arising out of this continuing wrong and their complaint is not barred by limitation.

22.Ncdrc in its impugned order has held [Samruddhi Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Mumbai Mahalaxmi Construction (P) Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine NCDRC 1711] that the cause of action arose when the municipal authorities ordered the payment of higher taxes in the first instance. Further, the impugned order [Samruddhi Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Mumbai Mahalaxmi Construction (P) Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine NCDRC 1711] also states that the present complaint is barred by limitation as there is no prayer for supply of occupancy certificate. We are unable to subscribe to the view of Ncdrc on both counts. Undoubtedly, the continuing wrong in the present case is the failure to obtain the occupancy certificate. Against this act of the respondent, the appellant Society has taken appropriate action by filing a complaint before the consumer forum. The appellant is currently pursuing the execution of the order of Scdrc arising from that complaint. However, that itself does not preclude it from claiming compensation for the consequences which have arisen out of this continuing wrong. The failure to obtain the occupancy certificate has resulted in the levy of higher taxes on the members of the appellant Society repeatedly by the municipal authorities. Despite the order of 20-8-2014, the respondent has failed to obtain the occupancy certificate. This has resulted in a situation where the appellant, despite having followed the correct course of litigation in demanding the furnishing of an occupancy certificate, will continue to suffer the injury inflicted by the respondent merely due to the delay in the execution of the order against the respondent. Rejecting the complaint as being barred by limitation, when the demand for higher taxes is made repeatedly due to the lack of an occupancy certificate, is a narrow view which is not in consonance with the welfare objective of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

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24. Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act defines a “consumer” as a person that avails of any service for a consideration. A “deficiency” is defined under Section 2(1)(g) as the shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality of service that is required to be maintained by law. In its decisions in Arifur Rahman Khan v. DLF Southern Homes (P) Ltd. [Arifur Rahman Khan v. DLF Southern Homes (P) Ltd., (2020) 16 SCC 512] and Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. v. Govindan Raghavan [Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. v. Govindan Raghavan, (2019) 5 SCC 725 : (2019) 3 SCC (Civ) 37] , this Court has held that the failure to obtain an occupancy certificate or abide by contractual obligations amounts to a deficiency in service. In Treaty Construction v. Ruby Tower Coop. Housing Society Ltd. [Treaty Construction v. Ruby Tower Coop. Housing Society Ltd., (2019) 8 SCC 157 : (2019) 4 SCC (Civ) 141] , the Court also considered the question of awarding compensation for not obtaining the certificate. In that case, the Court declined to award damages as there was no cogent basis for holding the appellant liable for compensation, and assessing the quantum of compensation or assessing the loss to the members of the respondent society.

2. It was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Wg. Cdr. Arifur Rahman Khan and Aleya Sultana and Ors. vs DLF Southern Homes Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (2020) 16 SCC 512, “failure of the developer to comply with the contractual obligation to provide the flat to a flat purchaser within the contractually stipulated period, amount to deficiency”. 

3. In Ireo Grace Realtech Pvt.Ltd. Vs. Abhishek Khanna & Anr. (2021) 3 SCC 241, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “allottees who have not been given possession, cannot be made to wait indefinitely for possession, nor they can be bound to take possession in other phase of the project. Such allottees are entitled to refund of entire amount deposited by them”. 

4. In Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. Vs. Govindan Raghvan  (2019) 5 SCC 725, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that “flat purchaser could not be compelled to take possession of the flat, when it was offered almost 2 years after the grace period under the agreement expired”.

5. In Kolkata West International City Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Devasis Rudra- (2020) 18 SCC 613, Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that “A buyer can be expected to wait for possession for a reasonable period.”

6. It was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Banglore Development authority Vs Syndicate Bank (2007) 6 SCC 442 and Fortune Infrastructure Vs Trevor D' Lima (2018) 5 SCC 422 "Home buyers cannot be made to wait for position of the flat for indefinite period".

14.       It is the case of Petitioner-Complainant that he, on account of inordinate delay in offer of possession, he orally sought refund in January, 2020, i.e. before the offer of possession with OC, and was following up his refund request with the OPs. As it did not materialize, he filed Consumer Complaint before District Commission on 07.08.2020. Once it is decided that there is a continuous cause of action in favour of Petitioner-Complainant till the offer of possession with OC, i.e. till 06.07.2020, filing of Consumer Complaint on 07.08.2020 is well within the limitation period of two years. Once it is decided that complaint is maintainable and not barred by limitation, on merits, in case of inordinate delays, in view of judgements of Hon’ble Supreme Court cited, the Petitioner-Complainant cannot be compelled to take possession and has a right to seek refund. Hence, we are of the considered view that District Commission went wrong in concluding that cause of action started with last payment dated 09.09.2014 and that complaint filed on 07.08.2020 was highly time barred. State Commission also went wrong in upholding the order of District Commission on the same reasoning and dismissing the appeal filed by the Petitioner-Complainant. In this regard, extract of relevant paras of orders of State Commission is reproduced below:

“4.       We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant/complainant at preliminary stage and also perused the record of the case. Perusal of complaint attached with the appeal, reveals that the project, wherein the apartment of the complainant is situated was to complete by OPs No. 1-3 within 36 months (including extended period) from the date of execution of agreement i.e. 07.11.2012 and the said date was expired on 06.11.2015. Moreover, the complainant claimed the refund of the deposited amount, whereas she made the last payment to OPs No. 1-3 on 09.09.2014 and the date of completion of the project was 06.11.2015, as per agreement dated 07.11.2012 and on failure of OPs No. 1-3 in completing the project in time as per agreement dated 07.11.2012, the complainant had right to approach the District Commission within two years i.e. upto the year 2017, in the case of refund. Perusal of copy of complaint attached with the appeal, reveals that the complaint was prepared on 07.08.2020 and probably filed by her in August, 2020 after the expiry of limitation period, as prescribed in Section 69 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, which is reproduced as under:-

“(1) The District Commission, the State Commission or the National Commission shall not admit a complaint unless it is filed within two years from the date on which the cause of action has arisen.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), a complaint may be entertained after the period specified in sub-section (1), if the complainant satisfies the District Commission, the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, that he had sufficient cause for not filing the complaint within such period: Provided that no such complaint shall be entertained unless the District Commission or the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be records its reasons for condoning such delay.”

In view of the above Section, the delay in filing the complaint is condonable, if the consumer satisfies the District Commission, State Commission or the National Commission that due to unavoidable reasons, he/she could not file the complaint within limitation period. Perusal of record also reveals that complainant has not filed any application with the complaint for condonation of delay in filing the complaint mentioning the reasons for delay, because she filed the complaint specifically for refund of her deposited amount. Even the limitation of filing the civil suit is of three years. As such, the appellant/complainant filed the complaint before the District Commission for refund of her deposited beyond the period of limitation and the District Commission has rightly rejected the complaint of the complainant.”

15.       As regards observations of State Commission that no application was filed seeking the condonation of delay (assuming there was a delay, which is condonable by the Commission (on showing sufficient cause), as was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Sesh Nath Singh v. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Coop. Bank Ltd.”, (2021) 7 SCC 313, delay can be condoned without formal application, filing of application is not mandatory for seeking condonation of delay. Extract of relevant paras of the said judgement is reproduced below:

              In Sesh Nath Singh (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that:-

61. …Although, it is the general practice to make a formal application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in order to enable the court or tribunal to weigh the sufficiency of the cause for the inability of the appellant applicant to approach the court/tribunal within the time prescribed by limitation, there is no bar to exercise by the court/tribunal of its discretion to condone delay, in the absence of a formal application.

62. A plain reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act makes it amply clear that, it is not mandatory to file an application in writing before relief can be granted under the said section. Had such an application been mandatory, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would have expressly provided so. Section 5 would then have read that the court might condone delay beyond the time prescribed by limitation for filing an application or appeal, if on consideration of the application of the appellant or the applicant, as the case may be, for condonation of delay, the court is satisfied that the appellant applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Alternatively, a proviso or an Explanation would have been added to Section 5, requiring the appellant or the applicant, as the case may be, to make an application for condonation of delay

16.       In view of foregoing, we hold that both the fora below went wrong, District Commission in dismissing the complaint and State Commission in dismissing the appeal, on the grounds of complaint being time barred. Hence the orders of State Commission and District Commission cannot be sustained, the same are hereby set aside. Complaint is allowed. OP-Respondent herein is directed to refund the entire amount paid by the Complainant-Petitioner herein with interest @9% p.a. with effect from date of each deposit till the date of refund, within 45 days of this order failing which the amount payable at the end of 45 days will carry interest @12% p.a. from the expiry of 45 days till the date of actual payment.  

17.       The pending IAs in the case, if any, also stand disposed off.