JUSTICE V. K. JAIN, PRESIDING MEMBER (ORAL) The complainant/respondent had stood as guarantor for one Mr. Chellan, who had taken some loan from the petitioner Tamilnadu Circle Postal Co-operative Bank Limited. The principal borrower had authorized the petitioner bank to recover the amount of loan from his death cum retirement gratuity. (2) Since the principal borrower Mr. Chellan committed default in repayment of the loan, which he had taken from the petitioner bank, a communication dated 08.01.1992 was sent by the bank to the Senior Superintendent of Post, Coimbatore with a copy to Senior Post Master, Coimbatore, requesting him to deduct a sum of Rs. 3,485/- from his death cum retirement gratuity. The case of respondent nos. 2 and 3 is that the aforesaid letter dated 08.01.1992 was not received by them, though admittedly Senior Post Master Puliya Kula, Coimbatore was the Pay and Disbursing Officer of Mr. Chellan. However, the District Forum returned a finding that the bank had actually written to the Post Office to recover the dues of Mr. Chellan from his account. In this regard, the District Forum noted that the bank had produced office copy of the letter dated 08.01.1992, which the Post Office had acknowledged vide Ex. B6. It was for this reason that the District Forum awarded compensation amounting to Rs. 250/- and cost of litigation amounting to Rs. 1000/- to the complainant against the Post Office officers as well. (3) Since, the petitioner bank could not recover its dues from Mr. Chellan, it recovered the same from the amount, which was lying in the loan account, which the complainant had with it. (4) Being aggrieved from the bank adjusting the aforesaid amount from the saving bank account and keeping it in suspense account, the complainant filed a petition before the District Forum. Vide order dated 22.06.2000, the District Forum directed the bank to refund the said amount to the complainant alongwith interest at the rate of 18% per annum. All the opposite parties i.e. the bank as well as the Post Office were directed to pay Rs. 250/- as compensation and Rs. 1000/- as cost of litigation to the complainant. Being aggrieved from the aforesaid order, the bank is before us, by way of this petition. (5) The learned counsel for the complainant/respondent no. 1 submits that amount in question had already become time barred when it was recovered from the bank from the loan account of the complainant. He further submits that the bank ought to have recovered from the said account from the principal borrower before he superannuated on 30.06.1992 and that having not been done, the bank was clearly guilty of deficiency in providing services. However, we do not find any merit in the contention. The bank on its part took appropriate steps to recover the said amount from the principal borrower by sending the letter dated 08.01.1992 to the Pay and Disbursing Officer of the principal borrower. It was only on the account of the default on the part of the officers of the Post Office that the aforesaid amount could not be deducted from the death cum retirement gratuity of Mr. Chellan before he superannuated on 30.06.1992. (6) Even if it is presumed that the amount which the bank recovered from the loan account of the complainant had become time barred by the time it was recovered, that would not make out a case of deficiency in service on the part of the bank. Though limitation prescribed in the Limitation Act bars the legal remedy of filing the civil suit to enforce a legal right, it does not extinguish the legal right of a person to recover the money otherwise due to him, in some other legal manner. Since, the funds of the complainant were available with the petitioner bank in his loan account, the petitioner bank was fully justified in recovering due amount of loan taken by Mr. Chellan from those funds. We are of the clear view that the order of the District Forum, to the extent the bank was directed to refund the amount realised from the loan account of the complainant with interest can not be sustained and is liable to be set aside. (7) For the reasons stated hereinabove, the revision petition is allowed and the impugned order, to the extent of direction to refund of the amount to the complainant, is set aside. The learned counsel for respondent no. 2 and 3 states that the amount of compensation with cost of litigation had already been paid by them to the complainant. Hence, there is no question of the petitioner paying the said amount to the complainant.