1. The present Revision Petition (RP) has been filed by the Petitioner against Respondent(s) as detailed above, under section 58(1)(b) of Consumer Protection Act 2019, against the order dated 16.11.2022 of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Panaji, Goa (hereinafter referred to as the ‘State Commission’), in MA/07 of 2022 for condonation of delay in Appeal No. 32 of 2022 vide which condonation of delay in filing the appeal was allowed subject to cost of Rs. 1000/- inter alia praying to set aside the order dated 16.11.2022 passed by State Commission and to dismiss the application for condonation of delay MA(CD)/07/2022 along with Appeal No. A/32/2022 pending before the State Commission.

2. Notice was issued to the Respondent(s) on 10.02.2023.  Parties filed Written Arguments/Synopsis on 01.05.2023 (Petitioner/Complainant) and 07.08.2023 (Respondents/OPs) respectively.

3. Petitioner has challenged the said Order dated 16.11.2022 of the State Commission mainly on following grounds:

1. That the impugned order dated 16.11.2022 in MA (CD)/07/2022, issued by the State Commission has been passed in a mechanical manner, without application of judicial mind. The State Commission exercised its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularities.

2. The OPs failed to submit a certified copy of the order dated 04.04.2022, issued by the District Commission in CC/58/2020, while submitting the appeal and the application for condonation of delay. That the OPs did not furnish the application for condonation of delay with an accompanying affidavit, as stipulated by The Consumer Protection (Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission) Rules, 2020. This affidavit should have presented the factual basis upon which the respondents relied to demonstrate to the State Commission that they had valid reasons for not filing the appeal within the established limitation period.

3. The OPs inaccurately calculated the number of days of delay in their application for condonation of delay. The appeal before the State Commission was required to be initiated within 45 days from the date of the order and the time frame for filing the appeal against the order dated 04.04.2022 expired on 19.05.2022. OPs submitted the appeal along with an application for condonation of delay on 28.07.2022.

4. In the petition seeking condonation of delay, the OPs sought to excuse a 67 day delay, even though the actual delay in filing the appeal was 70 days. Granting the request to condone a 67 day delay would not have been appropriate to address the factual 70 day delay in filing the appeal against the order dated 04.04.2022. The OPs' application for condonation of delay indicated that the delay arose from the process of obtaining legal opinion from an advocate. However, specific dates regarding the initiation and receipt of the legal opinion were omitted. Moreover, even after securing legal advice, the OPs cited a delay in obtaining approval for the file. Yet, the specific submission and approval dates remained undisclosed. Furthermore, the OPs neglected to mention when they engaged the advocate to file the appeal. It is imperative that explicit and comprehensive justifications accompany each request for the condonation of delay. Delays attributed to bureaucratic processes are typically not considered valid grounds for condonation.

5. The OPs did not present any supporting documents to substantiate their claims. The application for condonation of delay, along with the affidavit, was sworn before a notary in Panaji on 23.07.2022, which is beyond the limitation period.

4. Heard Petitioner, who appeared in person and counsel of Respondent.  Contentions/pleas of the parties, on various issues raised in the RP, Written Arguments, and Oral Arguments advanced during the hearing, are summed up below.

1. The counsel for Respondents/OPs argues that the OPs have presented sufficient cause to explain their delay in filing the appeal within the stipulated time. The OPs, being a government department, deemed it necessary to seek legal opinion before proceeding. They promptly sought such legal advice, but the process took longer than anticipated, causing a delay. Following receipt of the legal opinion, the matter was forwarded for approval prior to filing the appeal. Given the hierarchical approval process within government offices, including the head office, regional, and circle offices, the process took longer than expected. Furthermore, obtaining the necessary sanction for the appeal and seeking a stay contributed to the delay. Once the approvals were secured, the necessary funds were sanctioned, and the OPs immediately engaged the advocate to file the present appeal.

2. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that the denial of relief should not be based solely on technicalities. Condoning a delay of 67 days would not adversely affect the complainant in this case. Moreover, the Consumer Protection Act does not contain provisions that restrict the rights of the State Commission to condone delays. The term "sufficient cause" should be interpreted with a justice-oriented approach, considering the distinctive functioning characteristics of governmental bodies. A pragmatic perspective should be adopted in justice-centered processes, rather than a strict technical assessment of sufficient cause for each day of delay. There should be no separate standards for assessing cause between government entities and private litigants. The Supreme Court's judgment in Sridevi Datla v. Union of India [(2021) 5 SCC 321] underlines the need to avoid rigid standards and consider the factual context in deciding matters of sufficient cause.

3. Respondent further contended that in an earlier judgment, Esha Bhattcharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [(2013) 12 SCC 649], the Hon’ble Supreme Court highlighted that adhering to a strict standard of proof may not always serve public justice and can lead to undesirable outcomes. It was noted that determining whether sufficient cause has been shown is fact-specific and lacks a universal formula. The interest of justice is best served by deciding matters on their merits. As stated in State of Haryana Vs. Chandra Mani & Ors. (AIR 1996 Supreme Court 1623) and in Dr. Hemant Kulkarni Vs. Trifino Pacheco [2000(1) CPR 497], "substantial justice deserves preference" over technicalities, and relief should not be declined based on such grounds by consumer forums.

4. The Petitioner, who appeared in person, asserts that State Commission has acted unlawfully or with significant irregularities in exercising its jurisdiction. He argued that the respondents' application for the condonation of delay lacks a satisfactory explanation, which justifies its dismissal. The OPs' attempt to establish sufficient cause in their application has fallen short. The respondents attached an incomplete copy of the Judgment and Order dated 04.04.2022, which lacks vital details such as a certified stamp, correct name, and accurate date of receipt. They refer to The Consumer Protection (Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission) Rules, 2020, which mandates that a certified copy of the appealed District Commission's order must accompany the memorandum of appeal. Moreover, the respondents failed to seek the necessary leave from the State Commission to rely on the incomplete copy of the Judgment and Order. The OPs' application for condonation of delay lacks an affidavit, as required by The Consumer Protection (Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission) Rules, 2020.

5. The Petitioner argues that the OPs' application for condonation of delay contains inaccuracies in calculating the number of days delayed. They criticize the OPs for offering vague explanations for the delay in obtaining legal opinion and approvals. The Petitioner contends that bureaucratic or in-house delays are not valid grounds for condonation. The OPs failed to provide specific dates and documents to support their claims, both regarding the delay's causes and subsequent actions. They assert that the OPs' approach lacks sincerity and adequate explanation. The affidavit and application for condonation of delay were sworn and notarized after the limitation period, and the OPs did not satisfactorily explain this delay.

6. The Petitioner challenges the OPs' claim of negligence on the part of their counsel, emphasizing that negligence can only be considered a valid ground for condonation if it is demonstrated by an experienced legal professional. The complainant argues that the OPs' negligence, inadequate explanation, and failure to provide proper documentation disqualify them from seeking condonation of delay. They emphasize that condonation of delay is not an inherent right and must be substantiated by valid reasons. The complainant contends that the OPs' inability to establish sufficient cause for their delay in filing the appeal justifies its dismissal. Additionally, they express concerns about the authenticity of the appeal's pleadings, noting the absence of proper signatures by authorized signatories of the appellants.

7. Petitioner has relied upon various judgements of Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Commission in support of his case/contention, some of which are listed below:-

1. Classic MOT vs. A. P. Khurana (CPJ 1994 -3-104)

2. Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committtee of Raghunathpur nafar Academy and Ors. (2013) 12 SCC 649

3. Secretary, State Council of Technical Education and Vocational Training vs. Naresh Kumar Mohakud RP/3593/2014 NCDRC

4. Executive Director, Sales & Marketing Renault India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Paramjeet Singh Brar & Anr. CPR 2018-2-194

5. Rishi Khedia vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Anr. CPR-2018-2-194

6. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. Aarogyasri Health Care Trust LAWS (NCD)- 2018-11-27

7. Office of the Chief Post Master General & Ors. vs. Living Media India Ltd. Anr. (2012) 3 SCC 563

8. Ramlal Pandey vs. Shyam Narayan Dwivedi 2014 (4) CPR 510

1. Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Nina Sunil Rane 2014 (4) CPR 737

10. Sri Bijit Bose vs. Sri Soumen Saha RP/4367/2014 NCDRC

5. We have carefully gone through the facts & circumstances of the case, order of the State Commission and rival contentions of the parties. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Esha Bhattcharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [(2013) 12 SCC 649], while dealing with the issue of condonation of delay, after taking note of various authorities/earlier judgements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, culled out broad principles for considering the condonation of delay applications and also added few more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. These are reproduced below:-

“15. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:

i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation.

iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle

cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.

xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.

xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.

16. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: -

a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.

b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.

c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.

d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.”

6. In Office of the Chief Post Master General & Ors. vs. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr.  [(2012) 3 SCC 563], Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the issue of condoning the delay on the part of office of the Chief Post master General, observed

"12) It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

                   Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.

13) In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay.”

7. In Sridevi Datla vs. Union of India & Ors. [(2021) 5 SCC 321], Hon’ble Supreme Court observed,

"25. Much later, in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy this court referred to a large number of previous judgments, and observed that adoption of a strict standard of proof sometimes fails to protect public justice and it may result in public mischief. Other decisions have highlighted that there cannot be a universal formula to judge whether sufficient cause has, or has not been shown and the exercise is necessarily fact specific; in Improvement Trust v. Ujagar Singh, the court held:

“16. While considering [an] application for condonation of delay no straitjacket formula is prescribed to come to the conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not.”

26. The court also emphasized that each case has to be balanced on the basis of its facts and the surrounding circumstances in which the parties act and behave.”

8. As regards contention of the petitioner that the Respondent did not submit a certified copy of the order of the District Commission while submitting the application for condonation of delay and that delay is 70 days and not 67 days as claimed by the Respondent herein, we note that State Commission, has taken due note of all these contentions raised by the Petitioner before the State Commission before allowing the Condonation of delay application as well as various case laws cited by the Petitioner herein and has come to a finding that interest of justice would ideally be served if the same is heard and decided on merits. Not only that, State Commission has imposed cost on the Respondents herein while allowing the delay application.

9. As was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rubi Chandra Dutta Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2011) 11 SCC 269] that the scope in a Revision Petition is limited. Such powers can be exercised only if there is some prima facie jurisdictional error appearing in the impugned order. In Sunil Kumar Maity Vs. State Bank of India & Ors. [AIR (2022) SC 577] held that “the revisional jurisdiction of the National Commission under Section 21(b) of the said Act is extremely limited. It should be exercised only in case as contemplated within the parameters specified in the said provision, namely when it appears to the National Commission that the State Commission had exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or had failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested, or had acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.”   

10.  Hence, keeping in view the broad principle/guidelines laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Esha Bhattcharjee (Supra), other case laws cited and other facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any illegality or material irregularity or jurisdictional error in the order dated 16.11.2022 of the State Commission in allowing condonation of delay in filing the appeal before the State Commission, hence the same is upheld.

11.  For the reasons stated hereinabove, and after giving a thoughtful consideration to the entire facts and circumstances of the case, various pleas raised by the learned Counsel for the Parties, the RP is dismissed.

12.  Parties to bear their respective costs.

13. The pending IAs in the case, if any, also stand disposed off.