PER MR. JUSTICE A.P.SAHI, (PRESIDENT)

1. This Revision Petition has been filed by the owner of a TATA Indica Vista Car bearing Registration No.JH14B1551 who purchased it on 25.03.2010 from the Respondent No.1 Basudev Auto Ltd. GEL Church Complex, Main Road Ranchi (Jharkhand). The Complainant/Petitioner is a businessman who had purchased the vehicle for his personal use.  The Respondent No.2 M/s Tata Motors are the manufacturers of the said vehicle and at the time of purchase the company had extended a two-year warranty or 75,000 KM whichever expires earlier. The Complainant/Petitioner alleged that in spite of having undertaken 11 regular servicings, the vehicle had starting trouble and it had to be tow chained for being taken for repairs. In this regard, the Complainant/Petitioner alleges that he contacted the customer care of M/s Tata Motors and had been advised to take it to the nearby service centre which was the Respondent No.3 M/s HKBK Motors Pvt. Ltd., Renukoot, Dist. Sonbhadra, Uttar Pradesh. He was asked to deposit a token amount of Rs.5,000/- and was under the impression that the dealer had given an extended warranty on behalf of the company for another two years after the expiry of the two-year warranty and therefore the vehicle would be repaired and indemnified under the warranty period. The contention of the complainant was that since the warranty period continued when the vehicle was tow chained on 12.06.2013, and it was duly taken to an approved service centre of M/s Tata Motors, then in that event the Complainant/Petitioner’s claim was covered under the warranty terms as extended for another two years after the expiry of the initial warranty granted by the Respondent No.2 Co. According to the Complainant/Petitioner the warranty was continuing as on the date of the complaint and hence he was entitled to the benefits thereunder.
2. It is further alleged by the Complainant/Petitioner that after the repairs when the Complainant wanted to collect his vehicle, he was called upon by the Respondent No.3 to pay a sum of Rs.2,29,100.82/- which he did not pay expecting it to be met by the coverage under the warranty conditions. On failure to get the delivery of the vehicle without making the payments, the Complainant/Petitioner filed CC/114/2013 before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Sarguja, Ambikapur, Chhattisgarh. The Complainant alleged that the vehicle was under warranty and therefore in the wake of the manufacturing defects that was evident from the expenses incurred and the job performed, the claim was indemnifiable under the warranty clause and therefore the complainant was not liable to make any payments. The complaint therefore prayed for exemption from the payments of the bill and also prayed for a compensation of Rs.50,000/- plus costs of Rs.5,000/- from the Opposite Parties/Respondents No.1 & 2 jointly and severally. It was also prayed that since the Petitioner had been deprived of the usage of vehicle, he should be paid a sum of Rs.700/- per day for loss utilization of the said vehicle as he had to undertake other transport services thereby incurring additional expenditure.
3. The complaint was filed on 03.12.2013 and notices were issued. The Respondent No.1 did not appear or file any written statement. The Respondent No.2 M/s Tata Motors filed their written statement and contested the Complaint. The Respondent No.3 had no occasion to contest the claim in view of the allegations against the Respondent No.1 & 2. The stand taken by M/s Tata Motors was that no such extended warranty was given by them and any representation made by the dealer, the Respondent No.1 was not their liability at all as the warranty extended by the Company at the time of purchase had already expired. It was categorically pleaded in paragraph 6 of the written statement that warranty conditions were specific and subject to the conditions therein and in paragraph 1 of the para-wise reply it was categorically stated that the warranty was for only 24 months from the date of sale or 75,000 KM which occurs earlier. It was pleaded on behalf of the manufacturer that both the conditions had been fulfilled inasmuch as the period of 24 months had already expired after purchase on 25.03.2010 and the complaint about the alleged manufacturing defects had been made after 44 months of the purchase in June 2013. Not only this, the vehicle had already recorded a mileage of 75,645 KM on 08.04.2013. Thus, the warranty conditions had expired and any claim of extended warranty for another succeeding 2 years had never been communicated or extended by the manufacturer to the Complainant.
4. The complaint was dismissed on 25.08.2024 by District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Sarguja, Ambikapur, Chhattisgarh.
5. Aggrieved, the Complainant filed FA/635/2014 where once again the dealer did not appear as recorded in para 7 of the impugned order of the State Commission. The appeal was partly allowed only against the Respondent No.1 to a limited extent that it was the Respondent No.1 who had charged a sum of Rs.4,725/- for the extended warranty at the time of sale of the vehicle without any authority of the Respondent No.2. Therefore, the same amounted to an unfair trade practice on the part of the Respondent No.1 hence the same was liable to be refunded with 9% interest with effect from 25.03.2010 till the date of payment. A sum of Rs.10,000/- was also payable as compensation for mental harassment and Rs.3,000/- as costs.
6. The State Commission therefore in paragraph 10 of the impugned order held that the extended warranty was not provided by the manufacturer, namely the Respondent No.2 but the representation made by the Respondent No.1 dealer of an extended warranty and realisation of a sum of Rs4,725/- amounted to an unfair trade practice.
7. This finding has nowhere been assailed by the Respondent No.1 as no Revision Petition has been filed by the Respondent No.1.
8. The Complainant has come up urging that the District Commission has committed an error by dismissing the complaint in spite of the fact that there was deficiency in service even though there was an extended warranty, and apart from that the appeal was filed taking specific grounds against the Respondent No.1 as well particularly ground no.6 & 10 hence even though the State Commission arrived at the conclusion that the Respondent No.1 was liable for unfair trade practice, yet the entire amount demanded from the Complainant/Petitioner for picking up the vehicle from the Respondent No.3 should be indemnified or the Complainant/Petitioner should be exempted from making such payment with a return of the vehicle to him.
9. The Respondent No.1 has appeared before this Commission and Ms.Srija Choudhary has contested the Revision Petition on its behalf. Learned Counsel for the Respondent No.2 and 3 have also appeared. Learned Counsel for the manufacturer Respondent No.2 has defended the order of the District Commission as well as the State Commission in so far as it relates to the manufacturer and has urged that there is no deficiency in service as there was no manufacturing defect established. It was urged that learned Counsel for M/s Tata Motors that no expert whatsoever was appointed or requested for by the Petitioner in terms of Section 13(1)(c) of the Consumer Protection Act which is mandatory in such cases and even otherwise there was no warranty existing on the date of the complaint as it had already expired hence no liability could be fixed against the manufacturers. It is also urged by him that the findings of fact of non-existence of any manufacturing defect could not be dislodged by the Petitioner by any evidence and consequently the Revision Petition as against the Manufacturer deserves dismissal.
10. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner urged that the extended warranty was binding on the manufacturer as it had been represented by the Respondent No.1 dealer to have been extended on behalf of the manufacturer company. Thus, the warranty stood extended and the Complainant was entitled to the benefit thereof which has been wrongly denied by the District Commission as well as by the State Commission as against the manufacturer. In the alternative it was argued by him that the dealer was responsible for having extended an impression of extended warranty by the Company specifically through the document which bears the dealer’s stamp.
11. Learned Counsel for the Respondent No.1 has urged that this Commission may not interfere with the quantum of the limited relief allowed inasmuch as a revision cannot be entertained for any enhancement of compensation on an issue of fact which stands concluded by the orders of the Fora below.
12. It is also submitted that the complaint was not at all maintainable for any relief against the Respondent No.1 as there was no deficiency in service established against the Respondent No.1, as, in fact no service was either requested by the Petitioner or or extended by the Respondent No.1, the deficiency whereof could be alleged. It is also urged by the learned Counsel for the first Respondent that even assuming for the sake of argument that an extended warranty had been promised by the Respondent No.1, the Petitioner never came to the Respondent No.1 for either any repairs or complaint regarding the vehicle. The Petitioner/Complainant straight away took the vehicle to the service center of the Respondent No.3 and no intimation was given about any expenses having been incurred by him for the repairs of the vehicle. The submission is that the Respondent No.1 was therefore nowhere responsible for any such services availed of by the Petitioner from the Respondent No.3.
13. It is next contended that the entire complaint was essentially about an alleged manufacturing defect and having failed to prove the same before the District Commission, the appeal filed was once again founded on the same set of facts and evidence without there being any evidence against the Respondent No.1 for deficiency in service. Yet the State Commission for reasons best known to it granted a relief which was neither admissible nor had the Complainant even prayed for it. Consequently, the Revision Petition cannot succeed on any ground and as a matter of fact the entire complaint deserves to be dismissed to uphold the order of the District Commission even if the Respondent No.1 has not challenged the impugned order.
14. However, during the course of submissions, learned Counsel for the Respondent No.1 repeatedly urged that the Respondent No.1 was ready to comply with the impugned order of the State Commission dated 01.12.2015, and there is no occasion for any enhancement of the claim to be considered by this Commission on behalf of the Petitioner in the exercise of the Revisional Jurisdiction.
15. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties at length and it would be apt to first clear the deck about the nature of the complaint and the contest by the manufacturer on the issue of manufacturing defect. The terms and conditions of warranty have been extracted in the written statement of the Respondent No.2 M/s Tata Motors which is on record and is not disputed by the Parties. Condition no.1, 5 & 7 are extracted hereinunder:

“1. "This warranty shall be for 24 months from the date of sale of the car or 75000 km whichever occurs earlier. However, for the car with yellow number plates used for commercial application (including those used or reward viz those operating with a yellow number plate), the warranty shall be limited to 24 months or 50000 kms, whichever occurs earlier."

5. "This warranty shall not apply if the vehicle or any part thereof I repaired or altered otherwise than in accordance with our standard repair procedure, or by any person other than our salse or service establishment, our authorized dealers, or service centres or service point in any way as so, in our judgement which shall be final and binding, to affect its reliability, nor shall it reply, in our opinion which shall be final and binding, the vehicle is subjected to misuse, negligence, improper or inadequate maintenance or accident or loading in excess of such carrying as certified by us, or such service as prescribed in our Owner's Manual and Service Book are not carried out by the buyer through our salse or service establishments, our authorized dealers or service centres or service point's."

7."This warranty shall be null and void if the car is subjected to abnormal use such as rallying, racing or participation in any other competitive sport. This warranty shall not apply to any repair or replacements as a result of accident or collision."”

16. A perusal of the aforesaid terms and conditions demonstrates that the Respondent No.2 had promised a warranty that was to last for only 24 months from the date of sale which would be 25.03.2010 till 24.03.2012.  The other condition of the warranty is the running of the vehicle to a maximum of 75,000 KM. The aforesaid condition no.1 of the warranty therefore establishes that the said period of 24 months had already expired when the complaint was made about the alleged manufacturing defect for the first time in June 2013. Thus, the warranty extended by the Respondent No.2 had lapsed when the claim was made. Additionally, it is also undisputed that the vehicle had run 75,645 KM up to 08.04.2013 and consequently the mileage of warranty had also expired which was only 75,000 KM. Thus, the twin conditions were not available for invoking any warranty as against the manufacturer.
17. Coming to the claim of extended warranty as alleged, the same bears only the stamp of the dealer and is not an extended warranty by the Company. The Respondent No.2 M/s Tata Motors in their reply have clearly denied any such representation or benefit of extended warranty to the Petitioner allegedly made on their behalf by the dealer. The denial is clearly contained in several paragraphs of the written statement but in paragraph 1 of the para-wise reply given it has been further stated that the company does not give any extended warranty on the vehicles manufactured by it. The warranty is clearly limited to 24 months, and for commercial vehicles it is only 50,000 KM apart from 24 months. This is clearly reflected from the Condition No.1 of the warranty as quoted above. The Petitioner was unable to refute the aforesaid stand of the manufacturer by any evidence whatsoever.
18. The Petitioner relied on the document that was issued by the Respondent No.1 on a payment of Rs.4,725/- which is extracted hereinunder:

“New Vehicle                                      Proposal Form/Policy Schedule

Owner’s Name Ajay Gupta                  Policy Number 48-158980

Address: Ramanujganj                       Town/City Balrampur

PIN CODE 497…                                 Tel No.9424256021

Make Tata Motors Ltd.                        Model Indica Year 2010

Chassis/Vin No. MAT611462                Engine CC/1404

Vehicle Registration

Vehicle Purchase Price554204             Present Odometer Reading 98…

Date First Registered25.03.2010         Vehicle Purchase Date 25-03-2010

Is the Vehicle under any Manufacturer’s Warranty? Yes {v} NO {}

I have read and understood the terms and conditions of this policy and agree to be bound by them.”

19. The aforesaid terms and conditions have also been extracted in the impugned order of the State Commission and remain undisputed. Learned counsel for the Petitioner urged that the said document categorically states “accordingly this policy is hereby issued on behalf of the company”. The fact remains that this is not a policy issued by the Respondent No.2 M/s Tata Motors. It only bears the dealer’s stamp and there is nothing on record to demonstrate that the policy had been issued by or under authorisation on behalf of the Respondent No.2 company.  Learned Counsel for the Respondent No.1 has been unable to point out from any evidence or pleading to contradict the stand taken by the Respondent No.2 M/s Tata Motors in their written statement or even the findings recorded by the Fora below. As noted above, the Respondent No.1 has not even challenged the said finding which leaves no room for doubt that the said extended warranty does not bind the Respondent No.2 and as pointed out by the State Commission, the recital in the said document that the policy had been issued on behalf of the company was clearly misleading and was an unfair trade practice on the part of the Respondent No.1. There was no authorisation or any document to establish that an extended warranty had been issued for another 2 years through the authority of the Respondent No.2 or on their behalf.
20. To the contrary, the stand of the Respondent No.2 in their written statement that the company does not give any such extended warranty for any vehicles manufactured by it remains unrebutted. Consequently, the contention on behalf of the Petitioner that the extended warranty binds the Respondent No.2 deserves rejection and the argument is accordingly held to be untenable.
21. The third issue is with regard to the allegations regarding manufacturing defect. No evidence was led nor any expert in terms of Section 13(1)(c) was demanded for by the Petitioner or material placed to establish a manufacturing defect. There is complete absence of any such exercise before the District Commission. Section 13(1)(c) is extracted hereinunder:

“13. Procedure on receipt of complaint.-(1) The District Forum shall, on admission of a complaint, if it relates to any goods,-

(c) where the complaint alleges a defect in the goods which cannot be determined without proper analysis or test of the goods, the District Forum shall obtain a sample of the goods from the complainant, seal it and authenticate it in the manner prescribed and refer the sample so sealed to the appropriate laboratory along with a direction that such laboratory make an analysis or test, whichever may be necessary, with a view to finding out whether such goods suffer from any defect alleged in the complaint or from any other defect and to report its findings thereon to the District Forum within a period of forty-five days of the receipt of the reference or within such extended period as may be granted by the District Forum;”

22. Apart from this, no evidence in the shape of bills, job cards or any such record was brought forth by the Petitioner to establish even a semblance of manufacturing defect. The written statement of Respondent No.2 M/s Tata Motors also specifies that the vehicle had been used for almost 44 months and the complaint was made beyond the warranty period after the vehicle had run for more than 75,000 KM. This by itself indicated that there was no manufacturing defect prior to this or within the warranty period or else, the Complainant could have come forward with a complaint accordingly. No intimation, prior to June 2013 which was almost after 3 years of the purchase of the vehicle, was given about any such manufacturing defect. The written statement of the Respondent No.2 relies on several orders and decisions as stated in paragraph 2 of the written statement which indicate that a vehicle having been used for a long span of time and having run a substantial mileage is by itself a fact to raise a presumption that the vehicle does not have a manufacturing defect. It was for the Complainant/Petitioner to have brought forth any such material to prove the same and consequently the complainant had failed to establish by way of evidence or otherwise the existence of a manufacturing defect.
23. Thus, for all the reasons stated hereinabove the manufacturer cannot be held liable and the findings of fact recorded by the Fora below to that extent are hereby confirmed.
24. Coming to the contest between the Respondent No.1 and the Complainant/Petitioner the first fact to be noted is that even assuming that an extended warranty had been represented after realisation of Rs.4,725/- to the Complainant/Petitioner, then in the background of the nature of the said document, the Complainant ought to have approached the Respondent No.1 for any such removal of defect or deficiency in service. The Petitioner did not approach the Respondent No.1 nor did he even intimate the Respondent No.1 about the repairs that were being undertaken before the Respondent No.3 under the impression of an extended warranty issued by the Respondent No.1 on behalf of the Company. To this extent, the Petitioner therefore was under an obligation to have kept the Respondent No.1 in the loop for claiming the extended warranty which was an accident warranty. However, the fact remains that a sum of Rs.4,725/- had been realised and could not be disputed by the Respondent No.1. As noted above, the Respondent No.1 neither contested the matter before the District Commission, nor did they appear in appeal before the State Commission in spite of service of notice and have not even challenged the impugned order dated 01.12.2015 which records findings against them. It may also be noted that no service was undertaken with regard to the repairs of the vehicle by the Petitioner from the Respondent No.1 and as such deficiency to that extent for defects cannot be pleaded nor is there any evidence of such deficiency against the Respondent No.1. Learned Counsel for the Respondent No.1 to an extent is correct in her submissions that the Petitioner had turned his guns towards M/s Tata Motors, the manufactures, and in effect there was hardly any allegation of deficiency either pleaded or proved for any services regarding the repairs or maintenance of the vehicle against the Respondent No.1. Consequently, even if the warranty is held to be binding against the Respondent No.1 the Complainant failed to avail of the benefits if any from the Respondent No.1. As noted above, the said extended warranty given by the Respondent No.1 does not establish any privity of contract between the manufacturer and the Complainant. At the highest the promise is by the Respondent No.1, and therefore to avail of the said benefit the complainant could have approached the Respondent No.1 for any compliance of the said warranty if at all it was permissible. The fact however, remains that the Respondent No.1 did admittedly charge a sum of Rs.4,725/- from the Petitioner for extending the two year promise of accident warranty to the Complainant/Petitioner.
25. In the circumstances, the expenses undertaken for the repair from Respondent No.3 which were never intimated to the Respondent No.1 or communicated otherwise before undertaking the said exercise therefore has an impact on the conduct of the Complainant/Petitioner.
26. The services of repair were therefore taken exclusively from the Respondent No.3 but the Petitioner seems to have been obligated to pay the amount for recovery of the vehicle to the Respondent No.3. The vehicle therefore had been repaired and it is quite possible that the Respondent No.1 would have been obliged to carry out the said repairs, had the complaint sent the vehicle to the Respondent No.1 for the same under the extended accident warranty as represented by the Respondent No.1.
27. In our considered opinion, the State commission was fully justified in recording that the impression of the company having given the extended warranty was a misrepresentation and was a clear unfair trade practice on the part of the Respondent No.1. However, while granting damages and compensating the Petitioner on that count minimised the quantum only to the sum of Rs.4,725/- together with 9% interest thereon which was the premium paid for the said extended warranty. This minimisation is therefore a failure to exercise a judicious discretion while recording a finding on the issue of adequate compensation. The quantum awarded in our opinion does not justify the loss which has been suffered by the Complainant whose vehicle went under repairs and he was charged with a sum of Rs.2,29,100.82/-. This aspect of the sufferance of the loss pertaining to the quantum thereof therefore does not seem to have been appropriately assessed. The loss and the payment due for the repairs was incurred by the Petitioner under an impression of extended warranty that was given by the Opposite Party No.1 and which finding deserves to be confirmed, more so, when the said finding has not been challenged by the Respondent No.1. We therefore hold that the impugned order is not justified as it results in miscarriage of justice and there is therefore a material irregularity in the calculation of the amount to be awarded which is neither proportionate or adequate to the loss suffered by the Petitioner. This incorrect calculation by not awarding the loss suffered for the reasons hereinabove is therefore an illegality that deserves to be cured.
28. We accordingly confirm the findings of both the Fora below that there was no manufacturing defect in the vehicle as has been established by the Respondent No.2. The finding of the State Commission against the Respondent No.2 of unfair trade practice is also confirmed. However, the quantum of compensation in our opinion deserves to be modified as it has not been addressed to in the light of the facts on record as reasoned out above.
29. The argument of the learned Counsel for the Respondent No.1 that this is not a claim of enhancement and no such enhancement can be granted in the exercise of powers of revision as it is an issue of fact has to be rejected as facts have to be decided on the basis of evidence on record and non-consideration of relevant facts amounts to perversity. This is evident as has been recorded by us hereinabove and consequently this is an illegality and also an irregularity that requires curing by this Commission.
30.  Learned Counsel Ms. Srija Choudhary has also tendered written submissions on this aspect pointing out towards Section 21 (b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and relying on 3 judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Rubi (Chandra) Dutta Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2011) 11 SCC 269 where the Apex Court in paragraph 23 as under:

“23. Also, it is to be noted that the revisional powers of the National Commission are derived from Section 21(b) of the Act, under which the said power can be exercised only if there is some prima facie jurisdictional error appearing in the impugned order, and only then, may the same be set aside. In our considered opinion there was no jurisdictional error or miscarriage of justice, which could have warranted the National Commission to have taken a different view than what was taken by the two forums. The decision of the National Commission rests not on the basis of some legal principle that was ignored by the courts below, but on a different (and in our opinion, an erroneous) interpretation of the same set of facts. This is not the manner in which revisional powers should be invoked. In this view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the jurisdiction conferred on the National Commission under Section 21(b) of the Act has been transgressed. It was not a case where such a view could have been taken by setting aside the concurrent findings of two fora.”

31. The said position was reiterated in the case of Sunil Kumar Maity Vs. State Bank of India 2022 SCC OnLine SC 77 (AIR 2022 SC 577) where it was observed in paragraph 9 as follows:

“9. It is needless to say that the revisional jurisdiction of the National Commission under Section 21(b) of the said Act is extremely limited. It should be exercised only in case as contemplated within the parameters specified in the said provision, namely when it appears to the National Commission that the State Commission had exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or had failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested, or had acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. ”

32. The third judgment relied on by the learned Counsel is in the case of Rajiv Shukla Vs. Gold Rush Sales And Services Ltd. & Anr. (2022) 9 SCC 31 where the Apex Court has observed in paragraph 13 & 14 as follows:

“13. As per Section 21(b) the National Commission shall have jurisdiction to call for the records and pass appropriate orders in any consumer dispute which is pending before or has been decided by any State Commission where it appears to the National Commission that such State Commission has exercised its jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. Thus, the powers of the National Commission are very limited. Only in a case where it is found that the State Commission has exercised its jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise the jurisdiction so vested illegally or with material irregularity, the National Commission would be justified in exercising the revisional jurisdiction.

14. In exercising of revisional jurisdiction the National Commission has no jurisdiction to interfere with the concurrent findings recorded by the District Forum and the State Commission which are on appreciation of evidence on record. Therefore, while passing the impugned judgment and order [Goldrush Sales and Services Ltd. v. Rajiv Shukla, 2016 SCC OnLine NCDRC 702] the National Commission has acted beyond the scope and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction conferred under Section 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act.”

33. Applying the principles aforesaid in the present case firstly the concurrent findings of fact in the present case are only in respect of the manufacturer and it has been found that there is no manufacturing defect. We have also confirmed the same. So far as deficiency in service and unfair trade practice is concerned, we have already made our observations hereinabove but there are no concurrent findings in relation to unfair trade practice against the Respondent No.1. The District Commission had dismissed the entire complaint whereas the State Commission in appeal has partly allowed the claim on the ground of an unfair trade practice by the Respondent No.1 as it was the said Respondent who had represented the availability of an extended warranty of two years allegedly on behalf of the company. This finding has not been challenged by the Respondent No.1. Thus, the finding of unfair trade practice for the first time has been recorded by the State Commission and is therefore not a concurrent finding of fact. The said finding in our opinion is correct and we have affirmed the same.
34. However, while recording the said finding, we have found that the computation of damages has been limited to the tune of the premium paid by the Complainant for which we do not find any justification. The expenses incurred as claimed by the Respondent No.3 for delivering the vehicle is an immediate loss of the complainant in spite of the promise extended by the Respondent No.1 for a warranty coverage. It is for this reason we have held that this was a miscarriage of justice which also is a ground for interference as has been observed in the judgment of Rubi (Chandra) Dutta (Supra). The unfair trade practice and the deficiency on the part of the Respondent No.1 by misrepresenting the warranty clause on behalf of the company has resulted in the loss suffered by the Complainant in the shape of the cost of repairs as indicated above. Thus, none of the judgments as cited at the bar denude us from interfering in this Revision Petition.
35. Consequently, we modify the impugned order of the State Commission to the effect that over and above the amount awarded by the State Commission, and after a calculation of the same together with interest, the same shall be adjusted towards the sum of Rs.2,29,100.82/- and the balance of the amount out of the said expenses shall be paid to the complainant within a period of 3 months from today. In the event the payment is not made within the aforesaid period, an interest of 9% would be payable in default. On the said count, the Revision Petition is therefore partly allowed in the terms aforesaid. The order shall be executed by the State Commission in terms thereof and any amount either deposited by the Respondent No.1 towards the decretal amount during the pendency of the litigation or otherwise shall be adjusted accordingly.